School of Economics and Finance

No. 726: On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games

Nizar Allouch , Queen Mary University of London
Myrna Wooders , Vanderbilt University

September 26, 2014

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We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment ε-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.

J.E.L classification codes: C71, C78, D71

Keywords:NTU games, Core, Approximate cores, Small group effectiveness, Coalition formation, Payoff dependent balancedness