Following the publication of Labour's Commission on the UK's Future in December 2022, David Richards and Patrick Diamond reflect on the Report's recommendations, the need to tackle the UK's weak productivity and anaemic growth, and how Labour can maintain the momentum for constitutional reform.
The recent publication of the Labour Party's 'Commission on the UK's Future' - chaired by the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown - has launched a renewed debate about the UK constitution and the state of contemporary British politics in the wake of Brexit.
The report makes familiar criticisms of the British political system, which is identified as being among the most centralised in Europe, rooted in the top-down approach to politics enshrined in the dominant Westminster model. The report argues that citizens feel disenfranchised and poorly represented by the existing constitutional settlement, a situation that the Brexit referendum has so far done little to resolve. Indeed, Brexit has arguably compounded the problem of disconnection, raising expectations that citizens can ‘take back control’, while in practice centralising decision-making in Whitehall and Westminster.
Previously we charted the response by Westminster's political class to the issue of growing disengagement from traditional forms of arena politics over the last thirty years, often associated with the rise of 'anti-politics'. What then followed were vocal demands for a 'new politics', often articulated by parties in opposition, requiring greater 'participatory, pluralistic, devolved and deliberative approaches' to governance and the constitution. Our study of party manifestos and subsequent reform programmes revealed 'a failure by governments to deliver on their earlier rhetoric' of political renewal.
What makes the report of Labour’s Commission distinctive as a contribution to the on-going debate is that the case for political reform is focused as much on economic as constitutional grounds. Political reform and economic reform are viewed as symbiotic and deeply interwoven. The report’s introduction observes: 'When we should be unleashing the potential for growth and opportunity in every part of the country, the continuing over-concentration of power in Westminster and Whitehall is undermining our ability to deliver growth and prosperity for the whole country'.
The Commission makes the case for devolving power downwards and 'more equally across the country' to revive 'people's faith that we can all benefit from a responsive and accountable system of government'. As such, the report is organised around five central themes:
The themes are supported by over 40 policy recommendations, a useful summary of which can be found here.
Much of the political-media commentary in response to Labour’s report has focused on the proposals to abolish the House of Lords. This commentary has encouraged a disappointingly arid discussion reflecting two separate lines of argument: firstly, why would a Labour Government wish to divert so much political capital to a low salience venture, when there are much more pressing issues at play, not least the current cost of living crisis? And secondly, while the principles of underpinning an unelected second chamber may appear less than appropriate for a modern, twenty-first century democracy, in practice the understated breadth of wisdom, balance, and scrutiny the Lords brings to the legislative process is a precious commodity that once lost, will never be rediscovered.
At the launch of the Report, Starmer emphasised that Lords reform was only one necessary component of Labour’s wider constitutional reform package to address the numerous shortcomings in the operation of UK politics. On this point, he was, of course, correct. Previous approaches to reform have essentially been an exercise in grafting change onto the existing Westminster model. The cumulative effect has been to further distort the very pathologies underpinning the overly centralised state that each incremental reform sought to address. As we argued elsewhere, instead a system-wide approach to a new governance framework is required whereby 'decision-making and policy implementation properly accommodate de-centred forms of network governance ... [requiring] the meaningful transfer of power from the centre, as part of a wider growth strategy to address the UK's regional imbalances and associated geography of discontent'.
If the UK is to tackle the fundamental issues of weak productivity, anaemic growth and long-standing regional economic disparities highlighted by Brown and Starmer, it will have to address the structures of decision-making and governance that are shaped by the existing constitutional settlement. This linkage between political and economic reform is explicitly acknowledged by the Brown Commission. To make substantive progress, a future Labour administration will need to consider whether the current ad hoc devolution settlement is likely to prove effective, particularly given the historical reluctance of the ‘Imperial Treasury’ to cede control over fiscal powers.
The Commission proposes greater devolution of responsibility over important policy competencies such as post-16 skills and welfare to work programmes. Nonetheless, it is essential that city-region and county combined authorities have the power to borrow and raise revenue in order to leverage capital investment in productive infrastructure, rather than depending - as they have for decades - on Whitehall’s largesse. Labour’s plans address this point but may need to go further.
The greatest challenge for Starmer’s party is to maintain the momentum for reform as it makes the transition from opposition to power. A future Labour Administration would confront major obstacles to its constitutional reform agenda, even if it won a decisive majority in the House of Commons at a subsequent general election. Attempts to alter the composition and function of the House of Lords would be strongly opposed by vested interests (many of which are located inside the Labour party), as the Blair Government found after 1997, despite its landslide victory. There is also considerable disagreement within the party about the future of devolution, given that some Labour politicians fear granting increased (and in some cases differential) powers to localities within England, as well as further devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, represents a threat to the universal rights underpinning the national welfare state.
At present, Labour can articulate a compelling reform narrative because it regards itself as the outsider bringing change to an outdated, anachronistic and some would say increasingly corrupt, political system. Yet as soon as the party enters government, Labour becomes an insider with a stake in the existing constitutional settlement, no doubt discerning that there are distinctive advantages to largely untrammelled executive power. The Labour party’s mind-set inevitably goes from being an insurgent to an incumbent, and like Labour parties of the past, it may well find itself increasingly content to work within the parameters of the existing UK constitution and state.
David Richards is Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester. Patrick Diamond is Professor of Public Policy at Queen Mary, University of London, and the Director of the Mile End Institute.