



BANK OF ENGLAND

The Fall in Productivity Growth: Causes and Implications

The 2018 Peston Lecture

Silvana Tenreyro

Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England

15 January 2018




BANK OF ENGLAND

Preview of main points

- **Finance** and **manufacturing** account for most of the fall in UK productivity growth.
- Post-crisis **drag from finance** should disappear as deleveraging ends.
- Slower **manufacturing** productivity growth may relate to a **reduced impact of cheap imported inputs** from emerging markets.
- **Weak investment** has been **increasingly important** for manufacturing and aggregate productivity.




Productivity growth has fallen




BANK OF ENGLAND

2018 Peston Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London

Productivity fell below trend



Historical productivity growth




BANK OF ENGLAND


2018 Peston Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London

International productivity comparisons

Current price GDP per hour worked, 2016



Constant price GDP per hour worked, average annual growth rates, 2007-16




BANK OF ENGLAND

2018 Peston Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London


Why we care about productivity

It matters for welfare: consumption, leisure



Why we care about productivity





It matters for welfare: real wages



BANK OF ENGLAND

2018 Peston Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London

Why we care about productivity: It matters for monetary policy



BANK OF ENGLAND

2018 Peston Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London


Full growth accounting decomposition

Sector	Pre-crisis (2000-07) average, pp	Crisis (2007-09) average, pp	Post-crisis (2009-15) average, pp	Change in contribution, pp	(% of total)	of which, change in capital deepening contribution, pp	of which, change in labour quality contribution, pp	of which, change in TFP contribution, pp	of which labour reallocation/other, pp	Share of Sector in nominal GVA, 2007, %	Actual change in quantity productivity growth, pp	Actual change in revenue productivity growth, pp
A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing	0.0	-0.1	0.1	0.0	(-2)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	3.2	6.2
B: Mining and quarrying	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	(1)	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	3	-6.2	-13.5
C: Manufacturing	0.5	-0.1	0.1	-0.5	(31)	-0.1	0.0	-0.3	0.0	12	-3.5	1.3
D: Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	(4)	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	1	-4.9	-0.8
E: Water supply, sewerage and waste	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(1)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	-2.1	-6.1
F: Construction	0.0	-0.3	0.2	0.1	(-10)	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	8	1.8	0.6
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of vehicles	0.4	-0.4	0.3	-0.2	(12)	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	13	-1.1	-1.0
H: Transportation and storage	0.1	-0.3	0.1	0.0	(3)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5	-0.7	2.6
I: Accommodation and food service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(3)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	-1.3	2.1
J: Information and communication (ICT)	0.3	0.1	0.1	-0.2	(13)	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	7	-3.0	-1.0
K: Financial and insurance	0.4	0.2	-0.3	-0.6	(43)	-0.1	0.0	-0.5	-0.1	9	-7.1	-11.7
L: Real estate (excluded)												
M: Professional, scientific and technical	0.3	-0.1	0.1	-0.2	(14)	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	8	-2.7	-1.2
N: Administrative and support service	0.0	-0.1	0.2	0.1	(-8)	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	5	2.4	0.0
O: Public administration and defence	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	(0)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6	0.3	0.6
P: Education	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	(-2)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7	0.7	-3.3
Q: Human health and social work	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	(1)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8	-0.4	-3.1
R: Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(1)	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	-1.0	-0.1
S: Other service activities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(-3)	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	2	1.7	0.1
Total	2.0	-1.6	0.4	-1.5	(100)	-1.0	0.1	-0.8	0.2	100		
Manufacturing, finance, prof. and ICT only	1.5	0.0	-0.1	-1.5	(103)	-0.4	0.0	-1.1	-0.1	36		
Other sectors	0.5	-1.7	0.5	0.0	(-3)	-0.6	0.1	0.2	0.3	64		




Sectoral decomposition of productivity growth

Slowdown: difference between pre and post crisis periods



Decomposition of manufacturing productivity growth

Slowdown: difference between pre and post crisis periods



Measurement of value added

- Statistical offices aim at capturing:

$$q_t - p_0^m \times m_t$$

- In practice, they deflate nominal value added,

$$p_t^y \times q_t - p_t^m \times m_t,$$

And obtain:


$$\text{SD: } \frac{1}{\pi_{t \rightarrow 0}^y} (p_t^y \times q_t - p_t^m \times m_t)$$

$$\text{DD: } \frac{1}{\pi_{t \rightarrow 0}^y} p_t^y \times q_t - \frac{1}{\pi_{t \rightarrow 0}^m} p_t^m \times m_t$$



Decomposition of finance productivity growth

Slowdown: difference between pre and post crisis periods




Slowdown: factor decomposition

Factor	Pre-crisis (2000-07)	Crisis (2007-09)	Post-crisis (2009-15)	Post-crisis difference	(% of total)
TFP	0.6%	-3.3%	-0.2%	-0.8%	(54%)
Capital services	1.1%	1.0%	0.1%	-1.0%	(66%)
Labour services	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%	0.1%	(-7%)
Labour reallocation	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	(-13%)
Other	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	(0%)
Total	2.0%	-1.6%	0.4%	-1.5%	



Slowdown: international comparison



Take away

- Manufacturing and finance account for most of the UK productivity slowdown.
- The Finance boom and bust can be traced to the pre-crisis growth in leverage and the subsequent deleveraging post-crisis.
 - As deleveraging runs its course, finance should stop detracting from average productivity.
- Pre-crisis productivity growth in manufacturing may be related to offshoring and rapidly falling prices of imported inputs.
 - Going forward, global growth momentum should give a boost to UK manufacturing.
- In aggregate weak investment has been the main drag on labour productivity growth.
 - As uncertainty is removed, investment could help recover lost ground.





BANK OF ENGLAND