



Queen Mary
University of London



Brexit:

The scapegoating of the EU for
the failures of British Neoliberalism?



NEXTEUK Working Paper Series, 2020

Editor: Sarah Wolff, Director of the Centre for European Research, Queen Mary University of London

Disclaimer: "The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which only reflect the views of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use of the information contained therein"

The NEXTEUK Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research of the Centre for European Research, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on the Future of EU-UK Relations, in a format that benefits both policymakers and the wider public. It is aimed to provide and interpret new, cutting-edge data stemming from robust research on matters concerning European and EU politics. The NEXTEUK project aims to study the future of EU-UK relations in light of Brexit. It provides cutting-edge research as well as teaching and engages in innovative policy and public engagement activities in a wide range of policy areas involving young and senior academics, students, the general public as well as policymakers. The two main objectives of NEXTEUK are to promote excellence in teaching and research in EU studies, and to foster a dialogue between the academic world and policymakers, in particular to enhance the governance of the EU's policies and its relations with the UK. In so doing, the project maps the historical achievements in the context of the EU-UK relationship and analyses the emerging challenges to this relationship

*About the author: **Humaira Mahmud** is recipient of the 'Best Dissertation Prize 2019' in the field of European Studies from the Centre for European Research and the winner of 'Dissertation of the Year' as awarded by the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. Having recently graduated with distinction from the MA International Relations program, she has a prior academic background in Economics and postgraduate Law, with professional experience in the software and technology industries. Pursuing a career change, her interests reside in the international political economy, political affairs and the humanitarian sector.*

Brexit: The Scapegoating of the EU for the failures of British Neoliberalism?

Humaira Mahmud

Executive Summary

The fallout and aftershocks from the United Kingdom's (UK) decision to exit the European Union (EU) in 2016 are still reverberating. With a nationwide schism dividing the countries that comprise the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to discord and resentment amongst the populace, the fissures created by this unprecedented occurrence have yet to be fully understood. Despite the contribution and coalescence of varying factors in determining the referendum result, this paper will put forth the case that the underlying pressures of economic insecurity caused by decades of neoliberal globalisation (NLG) were at the root of people's disaffection, particularly following the global financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity measures enacted thereafter. Onus has been placed on the reclaiming of sovereignty, control over national borders and immigration from within the EU – factors that have been given the mantle of proxy scapegoat for what are essentially issues derived from the overarching theme of economic insecurity that prevails in the UK. Economic insecurity fed by socio-economic policies of past and present governments that have resulted in de-industrialisation and a squeeze on regional economies due to increased global competition, whilst simultaneously diverting investment into the financial and services sector in the South East of England to the detriment of the rest of the country. Such disparities in wealth and increasing inequalities provided fertile ground for the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the Leave campaign to leverage anti-immigration messaging tied to national identity politics in order to propel the electorate into making one of the most contentious and significant decisions the UK has faced in the post-war era.¹

¹ The Leave campaign was a cross-party alliance endorsing the UK's leaving the EU in the run-up to the 2016 referendum.

1) Introduction

On June 23, 2016 the eligible voting electorate of the UK were asked the following question: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ (Gov.uk, n.d.). Although the result was predicted to be close it was nonetheless unexpected. With a 72.2% overall voter turnout, what became apparent was that the United Kingdom was no longer ‘united’ with Northern Ireland and Scotland voting to Remain in the EU, whilst Wales and England (bar Greater London) voted to leave (Swales, 2016: 9). With 51.9% of the voting electorate choosing to ‘Leave the European Union’ (also referred to as Brexit / Leave) shockwaves were felt not only domestically but within the EU and internationally, producing reams of analysis and literature as to ‘why’ the British people provided the mandate to sever ties with the world’s largest trading bloc (EU Commission, 18 February 2019).² The Brexit result heralded the entry of a catchall buzzword into the lexicon of everyday parlance, ‘populism’. Cited as the reason and used by media pundits, politicians and academics extensively to rationalise the voter disaffection that led to the radical countermovement away from the status-quo and establishment, a victory for populism and populist rhetoric has been given as the simplistic answer as to the question of ‘why?’.

“The political movement that wanted the UK to leave the EU was populist...It was anti-establishment by defying the views of elected politicians, banks, academics, scientists, the government and the leaders of the EU. The movement trusted the wisdom of the ordinary people over the “corrupt” establishment” (Arnorsson & Zoega, 2018: 304). This paper will place itself amongst literature that defines populism as a counterforce against the hegemony of economic globalisation (interchangeable with NLG), with populist scapegoating not only having been used to leverage public opinion against the EU due to its cornerstone of freedom of movement (FoM) vis-à-vis immigrants and immigration, but also with the conferring of responsibility onto the EU for the increased economic hardships faced by UK citizenry following 2008’s Great Recession (GR). Positing a correlation between the UK’s heightened inequality and shrinking development space due to domestic policies pursuing NLG, what follows is an examination as to how austerity measures implemented following the 2008 financial crash saw public sector spending reduced, household debt increase and a decline in real wages manifesting themselves as populist discourses that resulted in the UK deciding to separate itself from the EU (Rodrik, 2018:20). Similarly, it will be shown that due to economic globalisation’s free market tenets, the level of import penetration in certain regions of the UK has reduced manufacturing output and employment opportunities whilst leading to wage stagnation – with regional areas experiencing a greater ‘import shock’ having had a higher tendency to vote Leave (Colantone & Stanig, 2016:22).

With the stalling of economic growth and a lack of redistributive measures to compensate those who have suffered negatively from the impact of NLG, the inherent risks of globalisation are trickled down to the public sphere and have created areas of the country and segments of the population that can be classified as the ‘losers’ of globalisation (MacLeod & Jones, 2018: 113). Producing a populist backlash on both the left and right-wings of the political spectrum, a phenomenon which is evident globally, the outcome of the referendum can be seen to be a pushback against economic globalisation. Presented as a reclaiming of national sovereignty, the referendum campaign to leave the EU was centred on right-wing populist cleavages that appealed to voters along ethno-nationalist lines with the negative impact of globalisation being ascribed to the influx of immigrants (specifically EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)); whilst the left-wing rallied against the income / social class divide and specifically the corporations, supranational institutions (such as those within the EU) and the elites that perpetuate a landscape of increasing inequality (Rodrik, 2018: 13).

² ‘British’ will be used to denote all the peoples from the United Kingdom of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, whilst ‘Britain’ will be used interchangeably with the ‘UK’.

Brexit as will be demonstrated, can be viewed as the result of populist sentiment in the UK reaching critical mass. However, rather than being attributable to one defining cause or catalyst there “appear to be multiple causes and different levels of explanation [that require] an approach that locates Brexit as a critical moment in a wider conjuncture” (Clarke & Newman, 2017: 102). By placing Brexit in this wider conjuncture as opposed to one moment in time, the temporality and timeline of events leading up to the referendum play a crucial role in endeavouring to understand and analyse the factors influencing the vote. In order to perform such a ‘conjunctural analysis’, this paper will focus on the main factors and issues attributed to the Leave vote with the case being made that although Brexit was a manifestation of multiple causes colluding together, the underlying commonality was one of economic insecurity attributable to the failings of NLG and the ramifications of the GR. From the UK’s first referendum as regards its terms of membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1975, together with the evolution of Euroscepticism in British political spheres to Margaret Thatcher’s introduction of neoliberalism’s free-market policies and the resultant shift in the country’s socio-economic landscape, the ongoing saga of the UK’s involvement and participation within the EU has been tumultuous and hesitant. Superimposed on this historic temporality of Europeanisation and financialisation comes an ever increasing polarisation and disconnect between the people and the institutions of governance (both national and supranational) with the “conditional consent given by the popular classes to the long period of neoliberal rule in the UK, in which political disenfranchisement was traded for the rewards of economic consumerism” making way for a loss of that very consent in the form of Brexit (Clarke & Newman, 2017: 106).

In order to provide a substantiated claim as to the factors attributable to the result, existing post-referendum research based on exit poll data is used on an individual level to identify commonalities in demographic factors and characteristics amongst those who voted to Leave, with a regional / area level focus to establish a socio-economic basis for voting behaviour. However, to conduct a more thorough examination in the light of conjunctural analysis, it is necessary to go beyond the snapshot provided by the aforementioned metrics and use linear time-based datasets to identify trends that give credence to the deeper disenfranchisement that have resulted in the disruptor that is Brexit. Using such datasets also allows for the overlapping of specific events onto a timeline that affords a wider perspective so to provide a corollary basis for cause and effect. This paper will therefore, not only explore the historical developments leading to the referendum, but specific events that have acted as further catalysts to the widening gulf between the UK and its European partners, together with the main factors that have been established as the drivers to voting Leav

2) Core Thematics

Whilst existing work in the field ranges in topics from immigration, sovereignty, the impact of import shocks, neoliberal globalisation to the consequences of austerity, it is nonetheless possible to coalesce all the varying discourses so to reach the non-contentious conclusion of Brexit being at its most basic, a rejection of the status-quo. The phenomenon that is Brexit has been defined in a multitude of ways with Hopkin (2017: 465) classifying it as a “new anti-system politics”, Inglehart and Norris (2016: 1) consider it a “retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change”, Calhoun (2016: 50) likens it to “a mutiny against the cosmopolitan elite”, and Clarke and Newman (2017: 107) as a “potent disruptor of established politics”. With the literature primarily focusing on NLG, immigration and sovereignty, this section will link the main themes to the overriding issue of populism and its emergence during the referendum as a counterforce to the hegemon that is globalisation.

Populism

The vote to Leave the EU was not based on one factor alone but a combination of issues that were both deep seated and festering. Clarke and Newman (2017: 103) point to the forces of globalisation, Europeanisation and the financialisation of the UK as being the longstanding issues at the heart of the discontent felt by the British electorate. However, despite the Brexit vote externalising the ills of the British socio-economic landscape so to place culpability onto the EU, the momentum given to those forces came from inside the British establishment. By adopting neoliberal policies from the time of Thatcher onwards, the UK has experienced accelerated deindustrialisation, uneven development and social dislocations which have only been exacerbated by the onus placed on the City of London’s relationship with global financial capital; leading to disparities that have propped up the south of England at the expense of other regions (Ibid.). With the fallout of such uneven development being deindustrialisation, desocialisation and decollectivisation which in turn result in the death of industries, job losses, the increase in zero-hour contracts and self-employment while breaking the bonds of the collective in terms of trade union membership and community, “the outcome has been a highly fragmented working class...opening the way for the articulation of new collective identities based on an insurgent national-popular imagery” (Clarke & Newman, 2017: 105). This newfound identity rejects cosmopolitanism and revives the concept of the ‘white working class’ in the vein of Shilliam’s (2018: 136) work which ties this demographic group to those ‘left behind’.

The left behind have borne the brunt of neoliberal failings and as Shilliam asserts, it was the white working class who were decisive in the vote to Leave. With both the Labour and Conservative parties framing the left behind into a singular electoral constituency, the Eurosceptic messaging from both parties over the years has been racialised. The Conservatives have played on an English nationalism in constructing a “racialized defence of national sovereignty” whilst Labour “mounted a defence of the working class, but in a wider political context where such a defence supported the integrity of the national compact and its informal colour bars” (Ibid.). This platform was adopted by UKIP at the height of the GR in 2009, with a defence of England championed by the lambasting of EU immigration and by aligning Euroscepticism to populist nationalism such that immigration was held responsible for ‘indigenous’ workers’ reduced welfare provision and wages (Shilliam, 2018: 153). By leveraging a racialised platform to defend the English and England, there becomes a connect between immigration and identity politics such that the EU becomes the ‘other’ in allowing for the very Freedom of Movement that is being vilified. Adding support to the racialised basis of the white working class (as opposed to the working class in general) having voted for Brexit, Bhambra (2017) reinforces the reality of ethnic minorities as a segment of the working class most at risk of economic disadvantage and yet who did not vote to Leave in as high a numbers as their white brethren. This is corroborated by the post referendum findings that show the most likely to have voted Leave were those with low levels of education, in the

lower income brackets, those who identified mainly as English (versus British), were over the age of 65, white and male (Swales, 2016: 8).

However, the left behind thesis is not supported by all the literature as Dorling (2016) argues that most people who voted to Leave were middle class and residing in the south of England as opposed to the working classes of the North. Citing austerity as the motivator, a causal factor which is also relevant to the left behind category, the anti-immigration dimension to the Brexit vote seems to become moot in terms of a populist reaction based on ethno-nationalist principles. After all, cheap labour from inside the EU is more of a threat to the low-skilled with fewer qualifications as compared to the well-to-do middle classes of the Home Counties. Nevertheless, if one gives credence to Shilliam's (2018: 159) contention that "sovereignty...[is] in fact a proxy critique of immigration" for the middle classes, this then ties in to a more recent paper by Tomlinson & Dorling (2019: 1) which places Brexit as "the last gasp of Empire" and a nostalgia for days gone by in an era prior to the UK's joining of the EEC. The scapegoating of immigrants for worsening socio-economic conditions vis-à-vis FoM rights within the working classes, can be extrapolated to the Eurosceptic sloganeering in the vein of 'Take Back Control', specifically over borders and immigration policy in relation to the middle classes. If 'Take Back Control' was one of the key motivators of the Leave campaign and its supporters, the implication would be that control had been ceded to the EU and as such, the balance of power transferred from the nation state to the supranational. The paradox being the Leave campaign's quest for sovereignty in terms of the EU, bypasses the reality of British policy choices that ceded power to the forces of NLG and the world markets resulting in increased inequalities and uneven development – "to distract us from these national failings, [the electorate has] been encouraged to blame immigration and the EU" (Dorling, 2016: 1). Globalisation inherently requires an openness to trade, the lowering of barriers to technology, goods, services and peoples and yet regardless of the advancements it has engendered, has failed to bring a uniform prosperity. Provoking a populist reaction, the vilifying of immigrants has at its core the fear of the erosion of the welfare state and the redirection of social benefits, inherently masking a pervading sense of economic anxiety which has only been exacerbated by the imposition of austerity (Rodrik, 2018: 17).

If right-wing populist movements emphasise ethno-nationalist cleavages against people of different nationalities, cultures, races and religions as a threat to the popular will of the 'indigenous' people, the left-wing embraces an economic cleavage. Taking a stance against corporations, the elite and supranational bodies such as the EU that transcend national boundaries, the popular struggle revolves around defending the interests of the lower income groups. Jessop (2018) considers Brexit an 'organic crisis' of the British state and society - a consequence of NLG whereby the shrinking development space is overlooked so to favour competitiveness over social cohesion. Emphasis on capital at the expense of labour has weakened the working classes and "[prioritised the] exchange value and the rights of capital over hard-won economic, juridico-political and social rights for workers and citizens or a broader sense of national solidarity" (Jessop, 2018: 1734 – 1735). With the failure of successive governments to deliver policy initiatives centred on sustainable prosperity, whilst at the same time creating a climate susceptible to financial crises such as the GR, in bailing out the culprit banks at the expense of austerity for the masses, a space has grown in which populism has thrived. If neoliberalism is at the root of Britain's organic crisis, Pettifor (2017, 127) goes further in claiming that Brexit was a collective effort by those in Britain to protect themselves from being further victimised by the "predatory nature of market fundamentalism". The loss to the labour share of capital is borne out when recognising that the UK financial services industry grew by 320.3% between 1979 to 1989, with manufacturing only increasing by 12.8% in the same time period (Pettifor, 2017: 129).

Uneven Development and Disembedding

Simultaneous to the uneven development taking root within Britain from the 1970s onwards, uneven development was also occurring globally with the newly industrialised countries (NICs) gaining a foothold in the world markets. With profits based on wage differentials as opposed to economies of scale, the NICs were able to leverage the largest and cheapest of labour markets, with China being at the

forefront of such competitive advantage. “Thus if the domestic content of neoliberalism was the break-up of statist regulation and socialized provision, it had the crucial international dimension too, leveraging this global unevenness of development and thereby facilitating a faster and deeper change than could otherwise have occurred” (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 39). China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 was the catalyst for what has become known as the ‘China shock’. With an export surge at the moment of maximum openness of Western markets, the China shock resulted in a fall in UK manufacturing and a ‘hollowing out’ of employment within the same industries as which the imports replaced, leading to increased inequalities (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 44). Colantone and Stanig (2016) having preceded Rosenberg and Boyle in researching the impact of the China shock on the UK economy, highlight the consequences in terms of not only increased inequalities, but higher unemployment and a fall in real wages, showing that support for Leave was greater in areas suffering from the largest import shocks. Rosenberg and Doyle (2019) however, in complementing earlier literature on China’s impact on the global economy, place their work on Brexit in a unique setting by using Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development (UCD³) to go beyond the two main accepted categories of causation as first developed by Inglehart and Norris (2016: 1), the economic insecurity perspective and the cultural backlash theory.⁴ By placing Brexit in an international context going beyond Europe, the authors examine uneven world development in light of China’s ‘primitive accumulation’ developmental stage overlapping with advanced Western neoliberalism. Harnessing the technologies and processes of the advanced industrialised nations, without incurring the time lag or costs of development, China was able to deploy its surplus of low wage labour to compete with the Western economies on a scale hitherto unknown. In having compressed its development so that ‘catch-up’ growth occurred more rapidly, the impact of China’s export surge induced a much bigger shock to the labour and employment structures of the advanced capitalist economies than was experienced by the late industrialising of countries such as Japan and Germany (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 41). Appropriately placing Brexit in an international context that goes beyond the UK and its relationship with the EU, highlights the necessity of a multifaceted analysis that transcends the deliberate oversimplification of the Leave campaign’s rhetoric on immigration, border control and sovereignty as the primary causes for voter disaffection (Voteleavecontrol.org). “The social processes that led to the conjecture of 2016 – from the break-up of both Maoism and Bretton Woods, through the super-charging of China’s industrial take-off and its impact on the world economy, and on to the political polarization of British [society] – were rooted in causes that arose... from the co-existence of multiple societies at different levels of development” (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 52).

The school of Marxist thought in relation to Brexit is not only limited to Trotsky’s theory of UCD, but the writings of Karl Polanyi as advanced by Hopkin (2017). Writing in the early 1940s, Polanyi discusses the onset of modern capitalism in the 19th and 20th centuries and the phenomenon of ‘commodification’ whereby market logic seeps into all aspects of socio-economic life. Traditional institutions and social frameworks that are inconsistent with the capitalist paradigm become obsolete, with labour markets suffering as financial markets take priority over social needs. “Polanyi describes this process as a ‘disembedding’ of the economy from social life, which brought not only material deprivation and economic insecurity but also social and cultural distress as communities and places were transformed or even destroyed in the name of economic progress” (Hopkin, 2017: 467). As a reaction against this displacement and disconnect, a ‘re-embedding’ of the economy into social life is required and the oscillation between the two states described as a ‘double movement’; the hegemony of market forces (contemporary NLG) being offset by a protective countermovement that re-establishes an equilibrium (ibid.). Pettifor (2017) concurs with Hopkin (2017) in using Polanyi’s work to give a basis to Brexit and in turn, complements the position of this paper which understands the vote to Leave as a protectionist backlash following decades of NLG which were further compounded by the GR and austerity. In impacting the British more so than citizens of other EU member states, Hopkin defines Brexit as a “lagged

³ Formulated to explain the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 by placing it in the context of the wider international order (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 34).

⁴ Further discussion to be found in the ‘Cultural Backlash’ section.

consequence of the process of liberalisation and marketisation [of] the British economy... [and is] fundamentally an economic phenomenon...which has taken on a strongly nationalist character” (Hopkin, 2017: 466). British Euroscepticism has focused on the EU as a supranational monolith eroding the stability and prosperity of the UK, no more so than following the GR which precipitated the Eurozone crisis of 2009. By placing the onus on the EU in having enforced austerity, fiscal discipline and budget cuts on those member states requesting financial bailouts, the Eurosceptic narrative fails to recognise that it was a domestic policy choice to impose draconian austerity measures, as opposed to any mandate given by the European Commission (Hopkin, 2017: 468). “British Euroscepticism rails against the transfer of powers from the national to the supranational level, but it also reflects the loss of political control over the economy more broadly, as governments forego the right to intervene to protect their societies from market forces” thus, precipitating a protectionist and populist backlash against the status quo (Pettifor, 2017: 467).

Political Polarisation

The disenfranchisement of the British electorate is a common thread that encompasses the range of commentaries. Whether focusing on immigration, sovereignty or economic anxiety as a result of NLG, the prevailing sentiment for the need for change underlies the vote for Brexit. With the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reporting the UK as having the largest regional income gap among its member states in 2011, political polarisation has been deepening. Unlike Germany with its multiple centres of industry, its strong export sector and robust labour protection legislation, the regions experiencing economic decline in the UK were given scant government support even whilst they were subjected to higher levels of austerity (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 49). Exacerbated by the loss of agency and reduced bargaining power of the labour share of capital in favour of global capital and financial flows, the voter anger against corporate greed, increased inequality and social injustice was used by British Eurosceptics to foment grievances against the EU and its institutions. By claiming a loss of sovereignty to Brussels, the messaging has been propagandist in spreading the perception that the EU has hampered British governments in their ability to govern and at the same time eroded the powers of its institutions. These perceptions of a democratic deficit to Brussels similarly apply to those who voted to Leave on the issue of immigration. With FoM restricting domestic immigration policy in terms of migration from other EU countries, the corrective mechanisms that would allow for a government response to increasing public worries over immigration numbers was no longer applicable. The outsourcing of public policy decisions to the EU and their simultaneous removal from the domestic sphere of political debate, has reinforced a belief that there is no political authority that can be held accountable (Hopkin, 2017: 473). The feelings of political polarisation, marginalisation and lack of representation have led to an exhaustion of consent, whereby the majority have lost their belief and trust in the political elites to execute their stewardship effectively.

Despite the competing and conflicting hypotheses that focus on numerous factors so to ascribe a rationale to Brexit, there is no disagreement in crediting the vote to Leave as being populist. Acting as a bulwark against further globalisation and its encroachment into the domain of the nation state, the referendum result is ultimately a protectionist reaction. Advanced capitalism has led to changes in global financial structures and its embedded nature has shifted the balance of power between states and the world markets. The state’s authority in society and the economy can be perceived on some levels to be shrinking and the fear of Britain’s subordination to the EU, acted as a primary motivator for those who had already experienced a personal loss of agency. A substantive account of the historic and thematic elements to the UK’s momentous decision to end its membership of the EU will now follow.

3) Europe's 'Awkward Partner'

The term 'awkward partner' describing the UK in its relations with the EU was coined by Stephen George, an expert in EU politics in his book published in 1990; and nearly three decades later it remains an apt adjective (Startin, 2015: 311). Having first been invited to join the EEC in 1957, Britain declined. It was only on having the six EEC member states outperforming the British economy in the 1960s did the UK apply for membership – both applications to join (1961 and 1967) being vetoed by President de Gaulle (Menon & Salter, 2016: 1298). In 1973, when “two of the foundation stones of the Bretton Woods system – dollar-gold convertibility and stable exchange rates – had been removed, the outcome of the fundamental shift in the international balance of economic power that had occurred since the war and which the political arrangements for international economic organisation had proved incapable of handling”, did the UK finally secure membership (Brett, 1985: 125). With the collapse of Empire and former colonies having attained independence, combined with a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, Britain needed to ensure its place on the international stage and having once been a great power was loathed to lose its standing. Yet just two years later in 1975 as a foreshadowing of what would transpire in 2016, the Labour government under Harold Wilson called a referendum on the newly negotiated terms of the Common Agricultural Policy and tangentially on British membership to the EEC thus, starting the country on its long and winding road as the EU's awkward and reluctant partner (Menon & Salter, 2016, 1299).

Figure 1 shows the referendum results from 1975 alongside those of 2016 broken down by the UK's component countries (Henderson et al., 2016: 190).⁵ The 'Yes' response in the 1975 referendum is equated with 'Remain' in 2016 and thus 'No' to 'Leave'. The final column entitled 'Change' represents the variance between the two. What is obvious from the 1975 data is the nationwide approval given to EEC membership, with England having the highest approval rating and Northern Ireland the lowest, yet still above 50%. 41 years later, popular consensus has had a dramatic swing with England having a 22.1% shift in attitude in the opposite direction towards Leave. The constituent countries that were more supportive of European partnership in 1975, England and Wales, are now the most fervently against. If 1975 acts as a baseline, the question arises as to what happened in the intervening years to produce such a turnaround in public opinion so to make Euroscepticism the prevailing sentiment?

Figure 1: 1975 and the 2016 Referendums

	1975 Referendum		2016 Referendum		Change
	Yes	No	Remain	Leave	1975 - 2016 No minus Leave
	%	%	%	%	%
England	68.7	31.3	46.6	53.4	-22.1
Wales	64.8	35.2	47.5	52.5	-17.3
Scotland	58.4	41.6	62	38	3.6
Northern Ireland	52.1	47.9	55.8	44.2	3.7

Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism although applicable to debates within other EU member states has not been as widely accepted as part of the political and public lexicon as it has in the UK. Drawing on geographical and historical contexts, the UK has a unique place among EU countries that may account for its separatist stance. From its geographical separation from mainland Europe, “an ‘island mentality’ has undoubtedly developed...allied [to] historical links with Commonwealth countries...as an explanation for its more

⁵ The data in Figure 1 has been updated to include actual results from the 2016 referendum due to Henderson et al. having published their paper just prior to the referendum using average polling results.

isolationist and independent approach in terms of its relationship with the EU... A shared language with Commonwealth countries, combined with a monolingual culture, has also been advanced as an explanation for British Euroscepticism” (Startin, 2015: 313). The ‘special relationship’ with the US is of paramount importance not only due to a common language and cultural similarities, but for the trans-Atlantic alliance formed during the Second World War (WW2) and the shared experience of never having been occupied unlike the ‘continental European’ allies. This fundamental historic difference between the UK and its European partners lends itself to the divergence in ethos as regards the EU being a pact to ensure peace and cooperation between countries that were once at war and not purely a free-trade agreement. Therefore, British ‘exceptionalism’ remains a part of the culture and arises from a historic legacy that is nostalgic of Empire, from a time when ‘Britannia ruled the waves’ and from its ‘finest hour’ during WW2. Such beliefs are prevalent not only among the populace but within the political classes and lend themselves to an isolationist mentality that does not feel the need to share a common European trajectory. So much so, that although the results of 1975’s referendum were unequivocal with two-thirds of the electorate voting to Remain in the EEC, a MORI poll undertaken just four years later in 1979 found that 60% would support leaving (Menon & Salter, 2016: 1302).

With a newly elected Thatcher at the helm of government espousing neoliberal free-market policies, the early 1980s were generally a time of successful engagement with the benefits of membership outweighing Eurosceptic qualms. This cooperative alignment was shattered by what has become known as the ‘Bruges Speech’ of 1988 when Thatcher addressed the College of Europe declaring: ““We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels””, with one prescient European diplomat commenting afterwards, ““Maybe all her speech at Bruges was intended to keep her nationalist-minded rightwingers happy while the serious business in Europe is done more discreetly ”” (Palmer, 1988). Having set the tone to Britain’s relationship with Europe and with this backdrop in mind, it is now necessary to scrutinise why Euroscepticism increased so dramatically between 1975 and 2016 and the specific events that triggered peaks in anti-European sentiment.




Figure 2: Long term rise in Euroscepticism (Swales, 2016: 4)

Figure 2 depicts trends in Euroscepticism over a period of 24 years with major events indicated along the timeline.⁶ Euroscepticism is variegated as a whole and comprises those wanting to leave the EU outright

⁶ It should be noted that 2015’s European refugee / immigrant crisis has been omitted from the timeline.

and those who would reduce its powers. If the 1980s could be considered a period of calm as regards the British – European relationship, stirrings of discontent emerged in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on European Union) which heralded further integration with the EEC transforming into the European 'Union' (ECB, 15 February 2017). Evolving from being more than a single market by laying the foundations for the Euro and monetary union, Maastricht also enshrined the principle of Freedom of Movement. Having joined the EEC on a purely economic basis, the shift from being a trading bloc to a union of increasingly integrated nation states was a milestone moment in the British context. From this point on, the politicisation of Europe became a primary issue of contention (particularly in the Conservative Party) and took precedence over the economic case for membership, whilst pushing the matter of parliamentary sovereignty to the forefront of debate (Startin, 2015: 314).

Freedom of Movement

The quest for national sovereignty and control over borders were two of the main platforms of the Leave campaign and leveraged by UKIP and Brexiteers (the proponents of Brexit) within the main political parties. The issue of FoM became salient post 2004 with the EU's enlargement to encompass the CEE countries that had formerly been behind the 'Iron Curtain'. "The emergence of an EU immigration dimension... occurred only after this decision... central to which was the inability of the government... to respond to rising public concern about immigration... British immigration policy had previously responded to public opinion... by restricting its levels, this was no longer possible as free movement... is a fundamental EU principle" (Evans & Mellon, 2019: 77). Immigration to the UK prior to Maastricht and the embedding of FoM had mainly been from Commonwealth countries, with the Home Office having the powers to restrict and reject applications. With this no longer possible as regards EU member nationals, the issue of immigration became tied to anti-EU sentiment, a linkage that begins in 2004 and only becomes stronger over time. Investigating the relationship between anti-EU feeling and anti-immigration sentiment from 1975 and 2015, Evans & Mellon (2019: 81) find no alignment between the two factors in 1975, with anti-immigration views not acting as predictors for Euroscepticism. Unlike 2015, at which point there is a direct correlation between those who feel that there are too many immigrants and those who would support leaving the EU.

It should be noted that the UK's decision to allow immediate entry to the eight CEE accession states was a political decision made by the Labour government of Tony Blair. The other EU member states (excluding Sweden and Ireland) took advantage of the seven-year transitional period outlined in the 2003 Accession Treaty thus, prompting a flow of migrants towards the UK, Ireland and Sweden, countries that had chosen to open borders immediately. It is suggested that such a policy decision came about due to incorrect initial estimates, with the Home Office reporting a net increase of between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per annum, when the actual figures were closer to 127,000 per year (Evans & Mellon, 2019: 78). The Labour government's decision not to take advantage of the seven-year transition period can be considered as one of the main catalysts to increasing anti-European sentiment in the subsequent years. However, the Eurosceptic narrative within the UK has chosen to overlook domestic policy choices whilst placing the onus of blame at the feet of the EU and its supranational framework. What was a milestone event of European expansion was mishandled and misjudged by the British government, leading to growing resentment among the populace to increased migration from CEE countries and resulting in increased support for UKIP with its manifesto pledge to reduce immigration and reassert controls over UK borders. In order to understand why the increase in migration from the new accession states had such a profound impact on Eurosceptic tendencies, it is necessary to give context to the socio-economic space that had evolved since the Thatcher era and in which these new entrants to the British labour market found themselves – a context in which NLG had taken a foothold and become the primary paradigm.

4) The Impact of Neoliberal Globalisation

With the collapse of the Bretton Woods' system and its ethos of state managed development which had brought stability in the post-war years, neoliberalism first gained traction in the UK during Thatcher's tenure. In transferring power from the nation state to global market forces, neoliberals argue that such liberalisation promotes economic growth which in turn alleviates poverty, for increased market competition results in greater efficiencies of production thereby raising world output whilst lowering prices (Kiely, 2005b: 38). The structural adjustments initiated by Thatcher were based on a triumvirate of policies – privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation (Kiely, 2005a: 98). Expansion of the private sector occurred by selling state-owned industries in the confidence that greater competition would lead to increased efficiency; with deregulation taking a similar form in the cutting back of the public sector whilst simultaneously implementing reforms to encourage competition such as that inherent in the private sector. Liberalisation applied not only to trade with the reduction of cross-border barriers to entry (a primary motivation for the UK in joining the EEC) but also with regards to investment, so that the liberalisation of the capital account would ease the flow of capital from domestic to foreign exchanges (Ibid.). Keynesian fiscal policy and welfare economics became a thing of the past and monetarism became the mode of government control over the economy. High inflation was curbed by controlling the money supply and increasing interest rates, whilst high unemployment was tackled by reducing the power of trade unions in the belief that such action would facilitate greater efficiency in the labour supply thus, supposedly reducing unemployment. In order to actively increase inflows of global investment, corporate taxation was reduced so to attract financial investors looking for high returns on investment.

The speculative nature of such capital flows, whereby wealth accumulation becomes the overriding objective, redirects financial investment not only from production and trade, but the long-term capital investment necessary for stable growth and development (Kiely, 2005b: 110). The financialisation of the UK markets in the 1970s and 1980s led to the 1986 'big bang' deregulation of the City of London, with investment being funnelled into the financial and services sectors in the South East resulting in the traditional manufacturing sectors of the North being squeezed and then abandoned. "Political economic restructuring through a selective 'rationalization' and privatization of key industrial sectors...saw numerous towns and cities in the 'northern periphery' alongside erstwhile 'manufacturing heartlands' in the midlands subjected to a 'rapid and sustained geography of deindustrialization...[resulting in] a 30 per cent reduction in manufacturing employment between 1979 and 1987" (MacLeod & Jones, 2018: 118). These were the death throes of Northern industry which had been in decline even during the 'Golden Age' of capitalism,⁷ with output falling by 3% so that the national share equalled 25% (1951 to 1971), whilst London and the South East increased output by 2% to a total of 36% in the same period. The North-South "divide deepened...under [Thatcher's] rule, the Conservatives tightened austerity;...carried through the industrial shakeout...attempted a decade earlier; broke the back of the labour movement...and completed the transformation of the City of London from a British into a free-wheeling international oligarchy" (Hazeldine, 2017: 56).

Neoliberal policies on the domestic front resulting in the roll-back of the public sector and the welfare state were simultaneously undertaken with accelerated European integration and subsequently subjected the UK to a "double dose of 'market fundamentalism'", more so than any other member state (Hopkin, 2017: 468). The deregulation of the labour market not only curbed the power of trade unions but subjected the British labour force to a form of 'commodification' such that collective bargaining and workers' protections were reduced, ultimately leading to a downward pressure on labour's share of income. Despite efforts to secure a standardised European level of social protections, the British government under the Conservatives opted out of European labour protection policies as mandated by

⁷ The decades following WW2 which saw economic growth and social progression on an unprecedented international scale.

the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. This is notable as it was a decision taken by the British government to promote their own domestic neoliberal agenda, but which was paradoxically leveraged by Eurosceptics to fan the flames of discontent. The consequent ‘race to the bottom’, whereby interest-bearing capital is prioritised over profit producing capital and commodities, transformed the socio-economic landscape of the UK. The workforce and labour market became low-skilled, low-wage and low-tech with no counter movements to retrain, no efforts made to promote a knowledge-based economy, no investment in R&D nor inflows of capital investment into production (Jessop, 2018: 1737). Such policy failings and neglect of the deindustrialised regions only intensified inequality and uneven development such that the Gini coefficient (the measure of income and wealth distribution of a country) “for disposable income inequality increased from 0.25 in 1979 to 0.34 in 1991; measures of absolute and relative poverty and wage inequality all saw dramatic increases. In the course of the 1980s, Britain became a much more unequal society, and this had little to do with changes at the European level” (Hopkin, 2017: 469).

The Great Recession

The economic climate improved slightly with the New Labour government under Tony Blair, in that the Blairite ‘Third Way’ attempted to mix neoliberal policies with a more redistributive social state and although overall levels of poverty were reduced, the Third Way failed to combat overall inequality. The regional divide remained, with London continuing to prosper whilst Northern Ireland, Wales and the North of England continued to see falls in average household incomes such that they only stood at 60% in comparison to Greater London (MacLeod & Jones, 2018: 119). The global financial crash of 2008 scuppered any further prospects of rectifying the imbalance in the British economy. Comparable to the Great Depression of 1929, the Great Recession as it has become known has seen public sector spending drastically cut and severe austerity measures implemented – so widespread were the ramifications of the financial crisis, that Poland was the only country within the EU to have avoided a recession (Pleitgen & Davies, 2010).

The gross domestic product (GDP) of the UK shrunk by over 4%, a level of contraction not seen since WW2, with close to one million jobs lost between 2008 and 2010 (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 48). For comparative purposes, UK household debt stood at £268 billion in 2008 and had risen to £428 billion in the third quarter of 2018 (Brignall, 2019). What the GR has highlighted is that the inherent risks of globalisation are trickled down to the public sphere, with corporations enjoying the profits of trade liberalisation whilst forgoing the liabilities as highlighted by taxpayers’ money being used to bail out the investment banks that were culpable for the financial crisis. “The Bank of England...launched a £200bn programme of quantitative easing (QE) under New Labour...By May 2012, QE had run to £325bn and pushed up the value of assets held by the richest 10 per cent of households, clustered in and around London, by as much as £322,000 per household...[with the result that] London would post twice the growth rate (17%) of any other UK region” (Hazeldine, 2017: 65). Whilst QE was being used to protect London and the banking industry, austerity was being imposed in parallel. Public investment was slashed, local government funding greatly reduced, tax credits cut, housing and disability benefits negatively impacted and average real wages between 2008 – 2014 fell by 8% – 10%; the OECD reporting that only Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic had fared worse as regards economic performance (Hopkin, 2017: 470). Analysis of average GDP growth over different periods in British history shows that following the end of the GR in 2010, growth rates were just slightly higher than in the era of stagflation almost three decades earlier (Bailey (2018: 54). As Bailey (2018: 53) asserts, whatever recovery has been achieved is at the expense of employment protections and a downward pressure on real wages due to the British government’s ‘flexibilisation’ of the labour market and not due to any increases in productivity or output.

The people and places that have been the most disadvantaged by NLG in the post-industrial global economy have been classified as the ‘losers’ of globalisation or the ‘left behind’. Feeling the impact in terms of falling real wages, increased unemployment and rising household debt, those impacted and the

most susceptible are the lowest skilled workers with the least qualifications who do not have the flexibility and resources to relocate themselves. The post referendum analysis based on demographic data shows that of the twenty 'least educated' areas, fifteen voted to Leave whilst out of twenty of the 'most highly educated' areas, all voted to Remain. Supplementing these findings with income level data, support for Leave was 10% higher in the under £20,000 per year bracket as compared to those with incomes above £60,000 per annum (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). If one adds the factor of regional disparities as regards the North-South divide, "economic growth in Britain [is] concentrated in spatial terms, with London and the South East enjoying high growth rates, and little progress elsewhere. Levels of productivity in much of post-industrial Britain are similar to the poorest countries in the EU" (Hopkin, 2017: 470).

With the failure of successive governments to deliver sustainable national prosperity, uneven development has become embedded leading to intensified geographical, economic, political and social schisms that make the UK the most skewed economy among the EU member states barring Greece, the only country where real wages have fallen faster (MacLeod & Jones, 2018: 119). NLG not only induces uneven development by promoting speculative capital flows at the expense of expansionary policies that would result in increased employment, but also tends to lead to financial crises. For as easily a capital investment can flow into a country, it can just as easily be withdrawn resulting in falling share value, an increase in debt and a depreciation of the national currency, all of which negatively impact the real economy having a knock-on effect as regards unemployment, wage stagnation and increased inequality (Kiely, 2005b: 111). As this paper will develop further, it is the pervasive economic insecurity at the heart of the British socio-economic landscape that was the cornerstone for anti-EU sentiment that resulted in the vote for Brexit – with the Eurosceptic political elites and mainstream media more than willing to leverage populist sentiments in scapegoating the EU as a perpetrator for domestic ills. For despite the internal failings of British policy, the GR and the Eurozone crisis aided and abetted the Eurosceptics in negating the economic benefits of EU membership.

If Brexit was determined in England and specifically the South of England,⁸ the case for the 'losers of globalisation' thesis seems rather facile in light of post referendum demographics' data that reveals that 59% of all those who voted to Leave were middle class, whilst 41% were working class (Hennig & Dorling, 2016: 20).⁹ Taking sociotropic voting into account, Liberini et al. (2019: 287) go one step further in examining micro-economic predictors that have influenced anti-EU sentiment and find that it is not a person's actual income that determines economic anxiety, but an individual's subjective 'feelings' as to their income. These financial 'feelings' were twice as influential as one's actual income in predicting a vote to Leave and are among the strongest predictors when it comes to a person's views on the desirability of Brexit (Liberini et al., 2019; 294 - 295). Taking this empirical research into account, one does not have to experience a real decline in financial circumstances to be susceptible to feelings of insecurity and therefore, it is not only those who suffered hardship due to NLG that were likely to vote Leave, but also the middle classes in the South of England. From the subjective and slightly intangible metric of one's 'feelings', the vote for Brexit in the South of England can be linked to worsening socio-economic conditions as a result of austerity, even if that impact has been cushioned due to the North-South divide. As Dorling (2018: 35) highlights, the suburbs of south-east England were not wholly immune to economic decline and experienced the highest increases in poverty between 2001 and 2011 whilst having the largest numbers in rental accommodation due to the exorbitance of homeownership in the region (a pertinent indicator as to economic conditions in a country which emphasises property ownership as opposed to other EU member states that have a predominantly rental culture). Together with the falling standards of public services as experienced by the rest of the country and the highest mortality rate since 1945 recorded in 2015, "Middle England, suburbia, the bulk of the middle class and

⁸ Based on "differential turnout and the size of the denominator population" (Dorling, 2016).

⁹ Demographic classifications of 'working' and 'middle' class are based on the NRS social grades system (NRS, n.d.).

the south have not been having a good time of it lately and when offered a chance to vote for ‘anything but this’ did so” (Dorling, 2018: 37, 40). For comparative purposes and to corroborate Dorling’s assertion in terms of healthcare, as a percentage of GDP, figures from 2016 reveal Germany’s public health spending at 9.5% whilst the UK lags behind at 7.7%. Germany’s investment has always exceeded the UK’s and over time has increased, whilst the UK’s pattern of spending has been inconsistent and as of 2015, been on a downward trajectory (DW.com, n.d.).

Import Shocks

In conjunction to the double dose of market fundamentalism experienced by the UK, international trade liberalisation was occurring simultaneously leading to an increase in imports from the low-income economies of the Far East, particularly China. Due to globalisation, the level of import penetration in certain regions of the UK has reduced manufacturing output and employment opportunities leading to wage stagnation and increased unemployment. This was certainly the case with China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which precipitated the ‘China shock’ which saw considerable increases in exports to the UK and an associated decline in wages, coupled with a fall in UK manufacturing employment of between one-fifth to one-third between 2000 and 2015 (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 46). Not only did the China shock accelerate deindustrialisation, but created a “hollowing out of the manufacturing sector [leading] to rising levels of inequality as growing demand for highly-skilled labour...drove up wages at the top end of the jobs market, while [pushing] less-educated workers into lower-paid employment...with Britain experiencing a particularly steep rise in the growth of low-skilled jobs...from 1996 to 2008” (Ibid.). The polarisation in the labour market was exacerbated not only by technical advancements and increased automation, but by multinational corporations wanting to increase profits by leveraging low-cost foreign labour leading to increased unemployment in their home market and a downward pressure on domestic wages.

As per the empirical research conducted by Colantone and Stanig (2016: 14), those impacted the most by the China shock are the workers in the same manufacturing industries competing against Chinese imports and the regions in which those industries are based. On analysing disaggregated referendum returns together with individual level data, the authors find that support for the Leave vote was higher in areas that had greater Chinese import penetration and were impacted the hardest by economic globalisation. These results are supported by the work of Arnorsson and Zoega (2018: 323) who have conducted analysis on the voting patterns of the 2016 referendum, concluding that the Leave vote was highest in regions which had benefitted from the industrial revolution but have since declined due to NLG. However, the import shock’s effect is not limited to workers within the same industries as the competing foreign goods nor the regions in which those industries are located, but applicable to the whole population (excluding the retired members of society) due to the sociotropic pattern of voting. “In other words, support for incumbent parties is driven by (perceptions of) general economic conditions at the macro level, not by (potentially idiosyncratic) economic conditions at the individual or household level. These general economic conditions, in turn, do not reflect merely the state of the economy at the national level but importantly, also at the local level” (Colantone & Stanig, 2016: 4). Sociotropic voting trends also allow for an explanation as to why the regional variations in the level of the China shock allowed the Leave vote to triumph in areas that were not so severely impacted by Chinese import penetration in terms of loss of industry and jobs (Rosenberg & Boyle, 2019: 50). Although the link between import penetration and the Leave vote is true of England, Northern Ireland and Scotland having also seen a decline in manufacturing due to increased global competition, voted to Remain. This discrepancy highlights the paradoxes inherent in attempting to gain insight into people’s voting behaviour and assign one cause or reason to their voting choice and accordingly, brings the theme of conjunctural analysis to the fore as regards the need to explore other possible motivations for why the British electorate voted to Leave.

5) Cultural Backlash

With the middle classes comprising two-thirds of all those who voted to Leave, the cultural backlash theory to Brexit attempts to explain the phenomenon as being a ‘silent revolution’ that has occurred in the post-war years as a counterforce to the change in Western societies, with progressive values championing multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism challenging traditional values and familiar norms (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3). Sectors of society that have historically experienced privilege such as the older generation and the white population resent the loss of status imposed by an increasingly post-materialist world that promotes secular values, supports diversity and open-mindedness whilst having a cosmopolitan ethos as regards international cooperation and humanitarianism (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 13). The generational divide is inherent when looking at post referendum analytics in that nineteen out of twenty of the ‘oldest’ local authorities voted to Leave versus sixteen out of the twenty ‘youngest’ local authorities voting to Remain (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). With the perception of the erosion of traditional values, comes not only a nostalgia for days gone by and better times, but resentment and anger that fuels not only intolerance to racial minorities and migrants, but supranational bodies such as the EU, whereby membership is considered a cultural threat (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 15). Going further, Brexit can be attributed to a vote based on nostalgia, “on an old idea of sovereignty, old English ideas about the difference between the island nation and the mainland of Europe, alarm over immigrants...and for English nationalism” (Calhoun, 2016: 50 – 51).

Identity Politics

Research reveals the disparate attitudes among the constituent countries of the UK as to feelings of national identity and associated sentiments towards the EU. Whilst in Scotland and Wales there is no underlying trend as to national identity (either as British or Scottish / Welsh) being connected to views on EU membership, the English who identify themselves as strongly or purely English (as opposed to British) had a greater likelihood to Euroscepticism and propensity to vote Leave (Henderson et al., 2016: 195). This is further corroborated by the British Social Attitudes Survey charting ‘Euroscepticism by English region, 1993 – 2014’ which reveals a linear relationship between increased feelings of English identity giving rise to increased opposition to EU membership (Ibid.). Strong feelings of national identity that exclude other territorial identities (for example, being English vs. British) have been found to equate to greater Euroscepticism and in turn, been linked to greater intolerance and hostility towards minority groups, other cultures and migrants (Hobolt, 2016: 1265). However, returning to 1975 when there was no link between anti-immigration feeling and anti-EU sentiment, a trend which had changed by 2015, the question arises as to whether an increase in nationalism and feelings of identity played a role? Clarke et al. (2017: 66) maintain that variables such as national identity are slow to change, if at all, [with] “the exception perhaps [being] the ‘fear of the other’ component of identity, which might change quickly, particularly if it is linked to an event...The implication is that the balance of attitudes towards continuing EU membership...is likely to reflect the operation of factors that are more mutable than deeply rooted historical identities”.

The EU as a threat to English identity can be traced back to the accession of the CEE states in 2004 and the UK government decision to forgo the in-built transition period resulting in an influx that had been wholly underestimated by the Home Office. This event was also the catalyst for UKIP’s rise to prominence with increased immigration becoming linked to EU membership. As per the loss of agency experienced by those having suffered from the impact of globalisation, the democratic deficit felt by voters with fears of rising immigration was exacerbated by no major political party occupying an anti-EU and anti-immigrant space, bar UKIP which heeded the call of the disenfranchised and positioned itself with the sole purpose of instigating a popular vote on EU membership (Menon & Salter, 2016: 1303). With Euroscepticism already heightened due to the GR and the resultant Eurozone crisis, anti-immigration fervour intensified from 2015 onwards due to the migrant / refugee crisis which further highlighted

Europe's failings, not only as regards to a common immigration policy but in its inept handling of allocating intake quotas among member states (Calhoun, 2016: 57). Added to the spike in Eurosceptic sentiment invoked by the crisis a year prior to the referendum as indicated by Figure 2, the potential terrorism threat in allowing vast numbers of people to enter the Schengen territories without adequate identity checks added to hostility towards the EU and had a discernible effect on voting Leave (Clarke et al., 2017: 163).

The NatCen Social Research survey (Swales, 2016) conducted after the referendum identified three primary policy issues of importance to voters: the economy (21%), immigration (20%) and sovereignty (17%), with 88% of those believing immigration to be the most important, voting to Leave (Swales, 2016: 13). Sovereignty, cited as the third most important policy issue for voters in the referendum has been conjectured to be a proxy for immigration owing to the middle classes engaging in issues of race and immigration on an abstract level, as compared to working classes that focus on immigration as having a micro-level impact acting as a drain on the welfare state (Shilliam, 2018: 159). Therefore, although the issues of sovereignty and immigration are presented as separate issues in the wider debate about Brexit, the British Election Study team of analysts have tended towards a different interpretation: "The clear picture we get from this analysis is that leavers are concerned primarily about sovereignty and immigration. In fact, reading responses shows that many respondents mention both sovereignty and immigration together, showing that these two issues were closely linked in the minds of British voters" (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017: 456). Addressing the issues of national identity, sovereignty and immigration as drivers to the decisive vote in the south of England (where the 'losers of globalisation' argument holds less traction), Hutchings and Sullivan (2019: 3) suggest prejudice towards 'outgroups' as playing a significant role in voter behaviour. Forgoing the use of the term 'racism' in favour of the wider definition of 'prejudice' encompassing social psychological perspectives such as racism, sexism, homophobia etc., their findings reveal that prejudice exists in over 70% of the population and consequently, it is necessary to "move away from the idea of prejudice and discrimination as being hot, direct, in your face racism...[as] it is joined by a more ambiguous 'life would be so much nicer without all these foreigners around', 'I don't feel comfortable with people who aren't like me' othering" (Hutchings & Sullivan, 2019: 4). Going further in regards to the notion of British identity and a nostalgia for 'days gone by', Patel & Connelly (2019: 270) point to the Leave campaign's platform on immigration, border control and the reclaiming of British 'exceptionalism' as an erasure of the historic legacies of racism incumbent to Empire. By appealing to those voters struggling to accept the UK's position in the modern world order and who have a perception of the country's diminished standing, the Leave campaign offered "newer forms of racism...to present themselves as rooted in seemingly non-racial discourses of cultural preservation and nationalism [such that in] a 'post-racial' context, concerns around immigration are reframed as legitimate and seemingly non-racial" (Patel & Connelly: 2019, 272). Such 'post-racial' discourses were not only manifest on the campaign trail but were given fertile ground in which to take root in the mindsets of the electorate by the media.

Media and Misinformation

The issues of sovereignty and immigration were cloaked in slogans such as 'I want my country back' and 'Take back control', both verging on nationalistic, insular and protectionist tropes appealing to nostalgia and Empire (Menon & Salter, 2016: 1310). What is highly relevant is the fact that the Leave campaign and Euroscepticism in general could not have gained the support of the British public without the endorsement of the tabloid media. Tracing the history of tabloid hostility back to 1973 and the UK's joining the EEC, it has been argued that the role of the British media has oscillated between "'permissive consensus' to 'destructive dissent'", with nationalistic and xenophobic messaging on EU affairs unlike that of any other EU country (Startin, 2015: 317). With headlines such as: "'EU wants migrants to take our jobs', 'Migrants must get benefits say EU', 'New EU guide to claim British benefits' and 'You pay £6,000 to be in the EU'... [the tabloids] have helped to undermine rational choice, economic interest or utilitarian arguments in favour of UK membership" (Startin, 2015: 319). The linking of increased EU

immigration with the charge of leeching off the British welfare state or reducing employment opportunities for the citizenry, wholly unfounded.

The Financial Times' research tells a very different story. CEE migrants contribute more in tax than they claim in benefits or public services, are more likely to be employed than any other group in Britain whilst making a positive net contribution to the UK's public finances and only exert a downward pressure on wages for the lowest income groups, but even then the change is small in comparison to overall wage growth (Giles, 18 September 2018). Added to the misinformation propagated by the tabloid media, Evans and Mellon (2019: 80) have found evidence that overall fear of immigration is not based on direct observation or local experience but is facilitated by media coverage. Their research provides data that ties levels of reporting on immigration with levels of public concern, so much so that tabloid media reporting directly feeds the public's fears. This is borne out by post-referendum statistics which indicate that high levels of exposure to EU migrants did not determine a vote for Leave (London being a case in point), the salient factor instead being the rate of change at the local level where a demographic shift and an increase in ethnic diversity can impact a community's sense of identity and cohesion, potentially leading to a cultural backlash (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017: 452).¹⁰

The political strategy linking economic insecurity with immigration was not only used by UKIP, but by the Conservative party in the years prior to the referendum. On the heels of the GR and the subsequent implementation of crippling austerity measures, the Party's 2010 manifesto stated: "immigration today is too high and needs to be reduced. We do not need to attract people to do jobs that could be carried out by British citizens...So we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s...tens of thousand a year, not hundreds of thousands" (Bailey, 2018: 55). With a mainstream political party using anti-immigrant nationalism to appeal to the marginalised, the suggestion is that circumstances and daily lives would be improved if immigration was limited thus, bypassing the culpability of neoliberal fiscal policies and austerity on people's hardship. Fuelling such fear was the Vote Leave election broadcast aired a month prior to the referendum depicting the spurious scenario of Turkey's 'impending' membership to the EU, with the resultant hordes of new immigrants blighting the already overstretched NHS (Shaw, 2020). The politicising of British capitalism, but more importantly its failings, has given rise to an embedded culture that lays the blame for all shortcomings on externalities (specifically the EU), with such narratives being symptomatic of populist discourses within societies that experience profound schisms (Rodrik, 2018:23). Regardless of which form it takes, populism can be defined as a movement that speaks for the people against the ruling elites and is characterised by an anti-establishmentarianism that is opposed to globalisation in all its guises (Rodrik, 2018: 12). The UK's referendum to extricate itself from the EU was based on compulsions appealing to nationalist sentiments and underlined by a festering resentment over a supposed loss of sovereignty to Brussels. With the Leave campaign leveraging a groundswell of public opinion against immigration and free movement, the pervasive economic anxiety resulting from policies of austerity was channelled into support for Brexit.

¹⁰ 15/20 regions with the lowest levels of EU migration voted to Leave; whilst 18/20 regions with the highest levels voted to Remain (Menon & Salter, 2016: 1313).

6) Conclusion

Brexit has caused bewilderment, fear and a fraying of the fabric of British society. An unprecedented event in the annals of EU history, the rupture extends to beyond the UK's borders and with the extent of the fallout yet unknown, has afforded a sombre time for reflection within other member states. Brexit as an existential crisis of the socio-political economy cannot be simplified and is a combination of multiple issues that have evolved over time and been exacerbated by specific events, precipitating a steady increase in Eurosceptic sentiment. Despite the complexities inherent in trying to apply logic to the highly subjective matter of electoral behaviour, the research indicates three main issues of importance – the economy, immigration and sovereignty.

Undertaking an analysis of the UK's economy since the adoption of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, the case has been made that the repercussions of NLG have induced ever increasing inequalities and the shrinking of development space. In the UK, this has been punctuated by a total relinquishing of investment in the manufacturing industry of the North in favour of the financial and services sectors in the South, resulting in huge disparities in regional prosperity. With no effective means of compensating the losers of globalisation, particularly those in industries which have been impacted by foreign import shocks, wealth generation has been concentrated regionally, leaving the North to bear the brunt of deindustrialisation with no recourse to growth or enterprise. Following the GR of 2008 and the austerity measures enacted thereafter, the situation has only worsened with culpability being placed on immigration and a lack of national self-determination. The accepted narrative within the British Eurosceptic environment, encompassing the political classes and propagated by tabloid media misinformation is of domestic circumstances that have been worsened and exaggerated by membership of the EU. Reality seems otherwise and despite the apparent failings of NLG within the UK and the resultant scapegoating of the EU, the paradox remains that the UK will be situating itself in the hyper-globalised world of 'WTO rules' in the worst case scenario of a 'No Deal Brexit' – an end game that serves to benefit the few whilst once again ignoring the welfare of the masses.

Bibliography

Altman, R. C. (2009). The Great Crash, 2008. A Geopolitical Setback for the West. *Foreign Affairs*, [Online] 88 (1), 2 – 14 Available from: https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/stable/20699430?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [Accessed 14 November 2018].

Annorsson, A. and Zoega, G. (2018). On the causes of Brexit. *European Journal of Political Economy*, [Online] 55, 301 – 323 Available from: <https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0176268016302701> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Bailey, D. J. (2018). Misperceiving matters, again: stagnating neoliberalism, Brexit and the pathological responses of Britain's political elite. *British Politics*, [Online] 13 (1), 48 – 64 Available from: <https://linkspringer-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fs41293-018-0072-1.pdf> [Accessed 15 January 2019].

Bhambra, G. K. (2017). Brexit, Trump, and 'methodological whiteness': on the misrecognition of race and class. *The British Journal of Sociology*, [Online] 68 (S1), 214 – 232 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-4446.12317> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Brett, E. A. (1985). 'Chapter 5: American Deficits, Global Boom and Crisis', *The World Economy since the War: The Politics of Uneven Development*. [Online] London, Macmillan. Available from: https://learn.online.qmul.ac.uk/courses/40/discussion_topics/995?module_item_id=3850 [Accessed 10 October 2018].

Brignall, M. (7 January 2019). Average UK household debt now stands at record £15,400. *The Guardian*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jan/07/average-uk-household-debt-now-stands-at-record-15400> [Accessed 7 January 2019].

Calhoun, C. (2016). Brexit Is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elite. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, [Online] 33 (3), 50 – 58 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/abs/10.1111/npqu.12048> [Accessed 21 June 2019].

Clarke, H.D., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P. (2017). *Brexit, Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union*, [Online] Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Available from: <https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/core/books/brexit/886A6967560FE7FD7CDB16F66B81C682> [Accessed 21 June 2019].

Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (2017). 'People in this country have had enough of experts': Brexit and the paradoxes of populism. *Critical Policy Studies*, [Online] 11 (1), 101 – 116 Available from: <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2017.1282376> [Accessed 3 July 2019].

Colantone, I. and Stanig, P. (2016). Global Competition and Brexit. [Online] Available from: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=RESConf2017&paper_id=315 [Accessed 16 January 2019].

Curtis, J. (2016). A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in Britain. *The Political Quarterly*, [Online] 87 (2), 209 – 218 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.12250> [Accessed 3 June 2019].

Dorling, D. (6 July 2016). Brexit: the decision of a divided country. *BMJ*, [Online] Available from: <https://www-bmj-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/content/354/bmj.i3697> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Dorling, D. (2018). Brexit and Britain's Radical Right. *Political Insight*, [Online] 9 (4), 36 – 39 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/2041905818815197> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Dorling, D. (2019). Dying Quietly: English Suburbs and the Stiff Upper Lip. *The Political Quarterly*, [Online] 90 (1), 32 – 43 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.12579> [Accessed 3 April 2019].

DW.com (n.d.). *Welfare state: Who's bigger on benefits, Germany or the UK?* [Online] Available from: <https://www.dw.com/en/welfare-state-whos-bigger-on-benefits-germany-or-the-uk/a-42522407> [Accessed 14 August 2019].

ECB (15 February 2017). *Five things you need to know about the Maastricht Treaty* [Online] Available from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html [Accessed 11 July 2019].

EU Commission (18 February 2019). *EU Position in World Trade* [Online] Available from: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/> [Accessed 2 July 2019].

Evans, G. and Mellon, J. (2018). Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP. *Party Politics*, [Online] 25 (1), 76 – 87 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354068818816969> [Accessed 8 May 2019].

Ferguson, N. (2016). Populism as a Backlash against Globalization – Historical Perspectives. CIRSD, [Online] Available from: <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2016--issue-no-8/populism-as-a-backlash-against-globalization> [Accessed 3 January 2019].

Fetzer, T. (2018). Did Austerity Cause Brexit. [Online] Available from: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/181359/1/cesifo1_wp7159.pdf [Accessed 7 May 2019].

Giles, C. (18 September 2018). The effects of EU migration on Britain in 5 charts. *Financial Times*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/797f7b42-bb44-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5> [Accessed 25 July 2019].

Goodwin, M. and Heath, O. (31 August 2016). Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities. *Joseph Rowntree Foundation*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities> [Accessed 9 May 2019].

Goodwin, M. and Milazzo, C. (2017). Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, [Online] 19 (3), 450 – 464 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148117710799> [Accessed 8 April 2019].

Gov.uk (n.d.). *EU Referendum* [Online] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/eu-referendum/about> [Accessed 12 February 2019].

Hazeldine, T. (2017). Revolt of the Rustbelt. *New Left Review*, [Online] 105, 51 – 79 Available from: <https://newleftreview-org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/issues/II105/articles/tom-hazeldine-revolt-of-the-rustbelt> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Lineira, R., Scully, R., Wincott, D., and Jones, R. W. (2016). England, Englishness and Brexit. *The Political Quarterly*, [Online] 87 (2), 187 – 199 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.12262> [Accessed 8 April 2019].

Henning, B. D., and Dorling, D. (2016). The EU Referendum. *Political Insight*, [Online] 7 (2), 20 – 21 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/2041905816666142> [Accessed 24 February 2019].

Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, [Online] 23 (9), 1259 – 1277 Available from: <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785?needAccess=true> [Accessed 15 January 2019].

Hopkin, J. (2017). When Polanyi met Farage: Market fundamentalism, economic nationalism, and Britain's exit from the European Union. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, [Online] 19 (3), 465 – 478 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148117710894> [Accessed 8 April 2019].

Hutchings, P. B. and Sullivan, K. E. (2019). Prejudice and the Brexit vote: a tangled web. *Palgrave Communications*, [Online] 5 (5), 1 – 5 Available from: <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0214-5> [Accessed 24 January 2020].

Inglehart, R. F. and Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. [Online] Available from: <https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401> [Accessed 8 May 2019].

Jessop, B. (2018). Neoliberalization, uneven development, and Brexit: further reflections on the organic crisis of the British state and society. *European Planning Studies*, [Online] 26 (9), 1728 – 1746 Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/09654313.2018.1501469?needAccess=true> [Accessed 17 January 2019].

Kiely, R. (2005a). 'Chapter 5: The Global Economy: US Hegemony from Bretton Woods to Neoliberalism', *Empire in the age of globalisation: US hegemony and neoliberal disorder*. [Online] London, Pluto Press. Available from: <https://www.dawsoneracom.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/readonline/9781849642989/startPage/88> [Accessed 11 October 2018].

Kiely, R. (2005b). Capitalist expansion and the imperialism-globalization debate: contemporary Marxist explanations. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, [Online] 8 (1), 25 – 57 Available from: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800043> [Accessed 24 October 2018].

Liberini, F., Oswald, A. J., Proto, E., and Redoano, M. (2019). Was Brexit triggered by the old and unhappy? Or by financial feelings?, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, [Online] 161, 287 – 302 Available from: <https://www.sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0167268119301015> [Accessed 7 May 2019].

MacLeod, G. and Jones, M. (2018). Explaining 'Brexit capital': uneven development and the austerity state. *Space and Polity*, [Online] 22 (2), 111 – 136 Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13562576.2018.1535272?needAccess=true> [21 May 2019].

Menon, A. and Salter, J. (2016). Brexit: initial reflections. *International Affairs*, [Online] 92 (6), 1297 – 1318 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-2346.12745> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

NRS (n.d.). *Social Grade* [Online] Available from: <http://www.nrs.co.uk/nrs-print/lifestyle-and-classification-data/social-grade/> [Accessed 30 July 2019].

Palmer, J. (21 September 1988). September 21 1988: Thatcher sets face against united Europe. *The Guardian*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/1988/sep/21/emu.theeuro> [Accessed 10 July 2019].

Patel, T. and Connelly, A. (2019). 'Post-race' racisms in the narratives of 'Brexit' voters. *The Sociological Review*, [Online] 67 (5), 968 – 984 Available from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0038026119831590> [Accessed 24 January 2020].

Pettifor, A. (2017). Brexit and its Consequences. *Globalizations*, [Online] 14 (1), 127 – 132 Available from: <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/14747731.2016.1229953?needAccess=true> [Accessed 17 January 2019].

Pleitgen, F. and Davies, C. (29 June 2010). How Poland became only EU nation to avoid recession. *CNN*, [Online] Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/06/29/poland.economy.recession/index.html> [Accessed 5 January 2019].

Polanyi, K. (2001). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, [Online] Boston, Beacon Press. Available from: <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/lib/gmul-ebooks/reader.action?docID=3117969> [Accessed 12 July 2019].

Rodrik, D. (2018). Populism and the economics of globalization. *Journal of International Business Policy*, [Online] 1 (1-2), 12 – 33 Available from: https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/danirodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf [Accessed 3 January 2019].

Rosenberg, J. and Boyle, C. (2019). Understanding 2016: China, Brexit and Trump in the history of uneven and combined development. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, [Online] 32 (1), 32 – 58 Available from: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/epdf/10.1111/johs.12217> [Accessed 22 May 2019].

Shaw, M. (8 January 2019). Vote Leave relied on racism. Brexit: The Uncivil War disguised that ugly truth. *The Guardian*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/08/vote-leave-racism-brexit-uncivil-war-channel-4> [Accessed 23 January 2020].

Shilliam, R. (2018). *Race and the Undeserving Poor*. [Online] Newcastle upon Tyne, Agenda Publishing. Available from: <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/stable/j.ctv5cg8m6> [Accessed 15 May 2019].

Startin, N. (2015). Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK. *International Political Science Review*, [Online] 36 (3), 311 – 323 Available from: https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/stable/24573394?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [Accessed 9 July 2019].

Stone, J. (19 December 2018). Has Brexit trashed any chance of other countries leaving the EU?. *The Independent*, [Online] Available from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-nexit-irexit-meaningful-vote-mark-rutte-theresa-may-latest-a8689621.html> [Accessed 16 August 2019].

Swales, K. (December 2016). Understanding the Leave vote. *NatCen*, [Online] Available from: http://natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf [Accessed 3 April 2019].

Tomlinson, S. and Dorling, D. (20 February 2019). (Mis)Rule Britannia: Brexit is the last gasp of empire, *LSE Blog*, [Online] Available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/02/20/misrule-britannia-brexit-is-the-last-gasp-of-empire/> [Accessed 26 February 2019].

Voteleavetakecontrol.org (n.d.). *Why Vote Leave* [Online] Available from: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html [Accessed 9 August 2019].

Wincott, D., Peterson, J., and Convery, A. (2017). Introduction: Studying Brexit's causes and consequences, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, [Online] 19 (3), 429 – 433 Available from: <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148117713481> [Accessed 8 April 2019].



Queen Mary
University of London

NEXTEUK
Centre for European Research
Queen Mary University of London
Tel: +44 (0)20 7882 8600
email: cer@qmul.ac.uk

qmul.ac.uk/nexteuk

If you require this publication in a different accessible format we will endeavour to provide this, where possible. For further information and assistance, please contact: designandbranding@qmul.ac.uk