The Post-9/11 Securitisation of the Hijab and International Human Rights Law: the Strasbourg Court, Article 9 and Hijab Restrictions

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Abstract

Following 9/11, there has been an increasing global trend of state restrictions on the freedom of Muslim women to wear the hijab. Despite freedom of religion or belief being enshrined within numerous provisions in international human rights law, hijab restrictions have been upheld by supranational courts. Using case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), pertaining to Article 9 of the European Convention, this paper will argue that this deferential phenomenon stems from a judicial securitisation of the hijab and Muslim women. It will do so by identifying five problematic patterns that are evident in the ECtHR case law, and demonstrating that they are best understood using securitisation theory. The wider implications of this securitisation, both on the global context of human rights and the legitimisation of ‘headscarf persecution’, will then briefly be explored, and a ‘de-securitisation’ will be recommended.

Keywords

Article 9 ECHR - European Court of Human Rights - Muslim women - Hijab Restrictions - Securitisation - Headscarf.

1. Introduction: Hijab Bans and Hate Crimes

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the United States of America (US), three phenomena have emerged in the ‘West’ that require exposition in order to contextualise the research topic of this paper. First, minority Muslim populations residing in Western democracies have been securitised.¹ Edmunds aptly describes this phenomenon as a ‘hyper-legalisation’ of settled Muslim populations in Western Europe, spawned by micro-surveillance

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measures, which has resulted in a curtailment of their human rights.\textsuperscript{2} Although many examples typify this trend, one need not look further than the government’s counter-terrorism strategy in the United Kingdom: a ‘Prevent Strategy’ was created to combat extremism, defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values’,\textsuperscript{3} which led to a statutory duty being placed on schools to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’.\textsuperscript{4} The anti-radicalisation programme has been criticised as disproportionately targeting Muslims,\textsuperscript{5} inherently Islamophobic, essentially a ‘spying programme\textsuperscript{6} and pejorative to freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{7}

It is within this broader context of the hyper-legalisation of Muslims that securitisation has been extended to the dress of visibly Muslim women. The relationship between hijab bans and securitisation theory will be fully explored in Section Five, but it is imperative at this stage to highlight that post-9/11, restrictions on the freedom of Muslim women to wear the hijab have sharply increased and been normalised. Starting in France, Law 2004-228\textsuperscript{8} was enacted in 2004 to ban conspicuous religious symbols from public primary and secondary schools. Although the law did not expressly identify a particular religious symbol, many felt its main purpose was to ban the hijab in public schools.\textsuperscript{9} This was followed by a 2010 French ban on the wearing of face-covering headgear in public, which included niqabs and burqas,\textsuperscript{10} making France the first European country to ban full-face Islamic veils in public spaces.\textsuperscript{11}

Many other European countries have followed the trend initiated by France by also placing restrictions on the hijab.\textsuperscript{12} Starting with national legislation, similar total bans on Islamic full-face coverings in public spaces, commonly referred to as ‘burqa bans’ despite including a prohibition on niqabs as well, have been imposed in Belgium

\textsuperscript{3} Home Office, Prevent Strategy (Cm 8092, 2011) 107.
\textsuperscript{4} Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 26.
\textsuperscript{8} Loi no. 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law No. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools]; Journal Officiel de la République Française (no. 65, 17 March 2004, p. 5190).
(2011),\textsuperscript{13} Bulgaria (2016),\textsuperscript{14} Austria (2017)\textsuperscript{15} and Denmark (2018).\textsuperscript{16} Partial burqa bans, meaning the same prohibition but in some public spaces, such as schools or public transport, or in some scenarios on certain individuals, have been approved nationally in the Netherlands (2016),\textsuperscript{17} Germany (2017)\textsuperscript{18} and Norway (2018).\textsuperscript{19} There have also been legislative plans to impose a ‘burqa ban’ in Latvia.\textsuperscript{20}

Non-nationwide hijab restrictions have also been imposed in the localities of European countries. In Russia, headscarf-hijabs are banned in schools and universities in two regions, the Stavropol territory (2013) and the Republic of Mordovia (2014), and both bans have been upheld by the Russian Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{21} Several municipalities in the Catalanian region of Spain, including Barcelona, had imposed forms of ‘burqa bans’ in 2010, but these were overturned by the Supreme Court of Spain in 2013.\textsuperscript{22} ‘Burqa bans’ were also introduced in the Lombardy (2015)\textsuperscript{23} and Liguria (2017)\textsuperscript{24} regions of Italy. In Switzerland, Ticino was the first Swiss canton to approve a total burqa ban in 2013,\textsuperscript{25} and St Gallen introduced a partial burqa ban in 2017.\textsuperscript{26}

The above description is by no means an exhaustive list of hijab restrictions around the world. Other arguably European countries such as Turkey famously had many headscarf-hijabs restrictions until the majority of them were removed in 2008 and 2013.²⁷ This post-9/11 phenomenon is also not limited to Europe. Following suicide bombings and the spread of Boko Haram, African countries have imposed ‘burqa bans’: Chad (2015), Cameroon (2015), Congo-Brazzaville (2015) and Niger (2016).²⁸ A ‘burqa ban’ was also imposed in Syrian universities in 2010, although this was then relaxed the following year,²⁹ and most recently in Sri Lanka (2019) following terrorist attacks.³⁰

It is clear then that post-9/11 there has been a global trend of increasing hijab restrictions, and that on the current trajectory this trend is likely to continue. Either states with hijab bans already in place will increase their severity, by extending restrictions to other public spaces and more popular forms of hijab, or states currently without bans will adopt them.

The second phenomenon is that, after 9/11, there has been a sharp rise in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes. This is evident from the hate crime data in the US that is annually tabulated by the FBI. In 2001, 481 anti-Muslim hate crimes were reported, in comparison to 28 the year before. In 2015, a 67% increase from the previous year was recorded with 257, and in 2016, this increased further to 307 anti-Muslim hate crimes.³¹ A similar trend is illustrated by the statistics of the Metropolitan Police Service: in comparison to a figure of 318 in 2011, 1660 Islamophobic hate crimes were recorded in London during 2017 (a 422% increase), with annually increasing rates in between.³²

A poignant layer of nuance is added to this phenomenon by the UK-based anti-Muslim reporting agency, Tell MAMA, who highlight that anti-Muslim hatred is ‘evidently gendered’.³³ Not only are the majority of victims female,³⁴ but anti-Muslim incidents ‘disproportionately target visible Muslim women (i.e. wearing Islamic clothing such as a headscarf, face veil, abaya, etc)’.³⁵ For example, in anti-Muslim hate incidents reported to Tell MAMA during 2015, 75% of all female victims were visibly Muslim.³⁶ Thus, not only are visibly Muslim women, who are the topic of this paper,

²² BBC 2017 (n 11).
²⁷ See ‘Islamophobic’ in drop-down menu, select ‘List’ view, adjust start/end dates, e.g. Jan–Dec 2011 or 2017, and highlight all Borough Figures to attain ‘SUM(Count)’ on ‘Hate crime or special crime dashboard’ (Metropolitan Police Service) <www.met.police.uk/stats-and-data/hate-crime-dashboard> accessed 1 April 2018.
²⁹ ibid.
³⁰ ibid 11.
susceptible to the global increase in Islamophobia, but they are rendered particularly vulnerable due to their Islamic visibility.

The third phenomenon, which will be discussed in Section Three, is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has largely upheld these post-9/11 hijab restrictions, despite the legal protections outlined in Section Two and the vulnerability of this group of people. This is an indictment of international human rights law for its failure to protect the rights of visibly Muslim women. It also places a pressing duty on academics to interrogate the decisions of the supranational court, and to unearth the hidden and underlying reason for their outcomes, especially since such decisions have legitimised the oppression of a particularly vulnerable group of people, and potentially encouraged ‘headscarf persecution’ (see Section Six). The decisions of the ECtHR will be focused on in this paper because, thus far, most of the case law on hijab restrictions at the supranational court level has been generated in the Strasbourg Court. This is attributable to, inter alia, recent hijab restrictions being concentrated in the European continent, as outlined above. Nonetheless, the spill-over effect of ECtHR case law on other jurisdictions and international human rights law as a whole will be discussed briefly in Section Six.

How then is the third phenomenon, the failure of international human rights law, attributable to securitisation? This paper will argue that the problematic patterns evident in the case law of the ECtHR, pertaining to hijab restrictions, stem from the Court’s securitisation of the hijab and Muslim women, and that this has serious implications for international human rights law globally and Muslim women personally. In order to make this argument, the paper will be structured into five substantive sections. Section Two will outline some key concepts relevant to the discussion, and then explain the legal international human rights provisions that protect the right of Muslim women to wear the hijab, with a focus on the right to freedom of religion or belief. Section Three will embark on a critical analysis of the case law, and Section Four will identify five problematic patterns that call for an alternative and unifying theoretical framework of securitisation. Section Five will elucidate securitisation theory, and the expansive concepts of the ‘politics of exception’ and the ‘politics of unease’. It will then apply this theoretical framework to the five problematic patterns, demonstrating that the counter-productive trends stem from the Court’s securitisation of the hijab and Muslim women. Section Six will explain the implications of this securitisation, both on the global context of human rights, and for how it has legitimised the oppression of Muslim women. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made, and a ‘de-securitisation’ will be recommended.

2. The Hijab and International Human Rights

A. Key Concepts and Definitions

In order to discuss the post-9/11 securitisation of the hijab in international human rights law, the meaning of hijab itself must first be elucidated. When discussing the dress of Muslim women, inconsistent terminology and imprecise language permeates academic literature, as well as political and media discourse. McGoldrick suggests that commonly used terms in English (headscarf and veil), French (foulard, voile and
chador), and even the Arabic term hijab, lack precision.\textsuperscript{37} In its literal sense, hijab is an Arabic word meaning barrier, partition or curtain, though in Islam it adopts a broader meaning that incorporates the principle of modesty, behavioural norms and dress codes.\textsuperscript{38} These obligations are often argued to also be imposed upon Muslim men, in addition to women, albeit differently.\textsuperscript{39} This understanding of hijab is distinguishable from its narrow use in the English-speaking world, as a term simply denoting the head-covering of Muslim women.\textsuperscript{40}

Added to this semantic difficulty is the disagreement within the Muslim community over what constitutes correct hijab, and whether it is even mandated by Islam.\textsuperscript{41} This is reflected in the diversity of how different Muslim women express their hijab. In addition to covering their body to varying degrees, some Muslim women observe a headscarf that covers their hair, ears and neck, but not their face, whilst others may leave their neck exposed. McGoldrick’s term of ‘headscarf-hijab’\textsuperscript{42} will be used to describe this specific form of veiling in this paper. Those who wear the niqab veil their whole body and face, leaving a slit for their eyes. The burqa on the other hand omits this slit and covers the whole face. Some Muslims criticise several forms of these face-veil hijabs as being cultural as opposed to religious, and even oppressive, whilst others may argue that the hijab is limited to behavioural modesty.\textsuperscript{43}

The validity of the competing claims over what is the true hijab prescribed by Islam is outside the focus of this paper. It is submitted that as different Muslim women choose to identify their varied forms of Islamic dress as hijab and an expression of their Islamic faith, the different forms of dress should all be treated as such.\textsuperscript{44} For this reason, and for simplicity, hijab will be used in this paper as a general umbrella term that incorporates all of the aforementioned forms of Islamic dress that Muslim women wear, which make them visibly and identifiably Muslim. Where possible, however, distinctive forms of the hijab, such as the niqab or burqa, will be identified for accuracy as they raise different factual and legal issues.

\textsuperscript{40} BBC (n 38).
\textsuperscript{41} McGoldrick (n 37) 8.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid 4.
\textsuperscript{43} For an overview of some contrasting perspectives, see Chouki El Hamel, ‘Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe: The Islamic Headscarf (Hijab), the Media and Muslims’ Integration in France’ (2002) 6(3) Citizenship Studies 293, 301-304.
\textsuperscript{44} This is not an uncontroversial stance to take. For example, in HJH Halimatussaadiah BTE HJ Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia and Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61, the Malaysian Supreme Court upheld a ‘purdah’ (face-veil) prohibition, partly on the basis that it was not required by Islam and therefore not protected under the nation’s constitutional right of freedom of religion. Such arguments, however, are not typically relied upon in the context of the ECtHR, and are thus outside the focus of this paper.
B. Legal Context

(i) Freedom of Religion or Belief

The right of Muslim women to wear the hijab is typically viewed within the context of freedom of religion or belief, which is a human right protected under different international and regional legal instruments.

In regard to the universal legal instruments, freedom of religion or belief was alluded to in the founding Charter of the United Nations (UN), in the sense of promoting human rights without discriminating against religion.\(^{45}\) Freedom of religion or belief found its more particular and recognised form in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).\(^{46}\)

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)\(^{47}\) expanded on this, and is the most widely accepted of the texts, with 170 state parties and six additional signatories without ratification.\(^{48}\) Article 18 provides that:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Article 18 of the ICCPR importantly distinguishes between the ‘freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief’ and the ‘freedom to manifest religion or belief’, as highlighted by General Comment 22 of the UN Human Rights Committee.\(^{49}\) The former, enshrined in Article 18(2), is an absolute and inalienable right that is ‘protected unconditionally’ and ‘does not permit any limitations whatsoever’.\(^{50}\) This is usually referred to as forum internum. The latter, on the other hand, as outlined in Article 18(3),

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\(^{45}\) Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 1(3), 55(c).


\(^{50}\) ibid.
is a qualified right that is subject to ‘limitations’ (interferences by the state) that are
‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary’ for the ‘legitimate aims’ identified, of protecting
‘public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others’.51 This is referred to as *forum externum*.

A Muslim woman’s right to wear the hijab falls under the ‘freedom to manifest’
category of freedom of religion or belief, because it concerns the external manifestation
of a religion (*forum externum*) as opposed to a person’s inner thoughts and beliefs
(*forum internum*). As such, it is protected by Article 18(3) ICCPR. This is again evident
from General Comment 22, which states that the ‘freedom to manifest religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts’,
and that ‘observance’ and ‘practice’ may include ‘the wearing of distinctive clothing or
headcoverings’.52 It is therefore a qualified right subject to limitations by the state.

Moreover, freedom of religion or belief is also protected under the UN Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief (1981)53, the first international legal treaty devoted exclusively to the freedom of
religion, and to a lesser extent under the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966),54 as well as the Universal Islamic Declaration on Human
Rights (1981).55

Moving onto the regional legal texts, freedom of religion or belief is a recognised
right under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (1969)56 of the
Organization of American States, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Arab Charter) (2004)58 of the League of Arab States. In the European context, freedom
of religion or belief is protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (EUCFR),59 however, the principal text for the purpose of the analysis
in this paper is the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (1950),60 and more
specifically, Article 9, which provides:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to

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51 ICCPR (n 47) Article 18(3).
52 ibid para 4.
53 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
54 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
10, 12, 13. Available at: Salem Azzam Secretary General, ‘Universal Islamic declaration of human
56 American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José", Costa Rica (adopted 22 November 1969,
entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 143, art 12.
8.
59 arts 10, 14(3), 21, 22; Freedom of religion is interpreted by reference to the standards in the ECHR,
see EUCFR, arts 52(3), 53.
60 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention
on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR).
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Despite some controversies, there is a consensus around the core of freedom of religion or belief, and the universal and regional texts are largely similar. All of the regional texts, like Article 18(3) ICCPR, place limitations on the forum externum dimension of freedom of religion or belief, highlighting a consensus around the qualified nature of the right: Article 9(2) ECHR, Article 12(3) ACHR, Article 8 ACHPR and Article 30(2) Arab Charter.

Article 9 ECHR operates in the same way as Article 18 ICCPR, and this is evident from their almost identical wording. To assert that a limitation is not in breach of Article 9(2) ECHR, the interfering State will have to satisfy three requirements that are imposed by the provision, as outlined in the decision of S.A.S. v France. (S.A.S.).

First, the limitation or interference must be ‘prescribed by law’ by the national authorities, as stipulated by Article 9(2) of the ECHR. Second, the limitation must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9(2) ECHR, which are the protection of ‘public safety’, ‘public order, health or morals’, and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. According to S.A.S., this list is ‘exhaustive’, ‘their definition is restrictive’, and the limitation must pursue an aim that ‘can be linked to one of those listed’. Third, according to Article 9(2), the limitation must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve the aim or aims concerned. Murdoch succinctly summarises this third requirement as ‘the interference complained of must: correspond to a pressing need, be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and be justified by relevant and sufficient reasons’. Thus, a proportionality test is an inherent part of this assessment. The third requirement will necessitate a balancing between conflicting rights and interests, or more specifically, between freedom of religion or belief and the legitimate aims. The ECtHR has acknowledged that in such cases, a ‘fair balance … must be struck between the various interests at stake’.

To analyse ECtHR decisions pertaining to the hijab effectively, it is imperative to also briefly elucidate the reasons given by the Court for this balancing act, as well as the Court’s approach towards it. Limitations on Article 9(2) and a ‘fair balance’ are needed as democracies are pluralistic societies where ‘several religions coexist within one and the same population’, and it therefore ‘may be necessary to place restrictions

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61 McGoldrick (n 37) 26; though there are some subtle and important differences, as outlined in the comparative study of PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion – UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2005).
63 ibid.
64 S.A.S. (n 62) para 113.
on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected’.  

The role of the Court, however, is a supervisory one, and the ‘role of the Convention machinery is essentially subsidiary’. It is for ‘the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the ‘necessity’ for an interference’, and their decision will be ‘subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention’. Absolute uniformity between states is not required. In this way, states are afforded a ‘margin of appreciation’, or a margin of state discretion. This doctrine is justified on the basis that ‘national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions’. In determining the scope of the margin of appreciation afforded to states, and thus the concurrent level of scrutiny applied by the ECtHR, the Court in Leyla Sahin identified four pertinent guiding factors: the importance of the Convention right in question, the nature of the restricted activities, the aim of the restriction, and whether ‘the relationship between State and religions are at stake’. If the latter relationship is concerned, a wide margin of appreciation is given because ‘opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely’ on such questions.

To summarise then, a Muslim woman’s freedom to wear the hijab is protected by a human rights provision that is recognised by several international and regional legal instruments. However, it is a qualified right that may be interfered with by states. In the context of the ECHR, Member States will be afforded a wide discretion to strike their own balance between competing interests, and the ECtHR will only exercise a supervisory role over such decisions.

(ii) Other Rights

Freedom of religion or belief intersects with many other rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, fair trial, private and family life, education, work and freedom of expression and the right to not be discriminated against. It is thus why in the ECHR case law pertaining to hijab restrictions, in addition to a complaint as to a violation of Article 9 ECHR, other Convention rights are often invoked.

Despite this, Article 9 ECHR and the Court’s approach towards it will be the focus of this paper for three reasons. First, most of the cases pertaining to hijab restrictions are raised on the basis of Article 9 violations, and Article 9 is put forward as the central right at issue in such cases. Second, the rationales provided by the Court for allowing limitations on Article 9, and their judicial analysis in regard to it, provide the most interesting basis for a discussion of securitisation theory. Third, the world limit of this paper does not permit a detailed exegesis of the other rights at stake.

Framing hijab cases through freedom of religion or belief is not, however, without controversy. Vakulenko for example criticises the use of Article 9 ECHR as the primary legal referent for Islamic dress issues, contending that it produces several

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68 Sahin 2004 (n 66) para 100.
69 ibid.
70 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No. 1) (1979) 2 EHRR 245 (Commission Decision), para 61.
71 ibid para 100.
72 ibid para 101.
73 ibid.
counterproductive trends in its judicial reasoning and public discourse.\textsuperscript{74} Although Vakulenko correctly identifies counterproductive trends that are evident in the case law, several of which will be discussed in this paper, she attributes them to the Article 9 framing itself, whereas it is submitted in Sections Four and Five that these problems stem from an underlying securitisation of the hijab, irrespective of the Article 9 framing. Further, although Vakulenko raises the question of alternatives to Article 9, she leaves it unanswered.\textsuperscript{75} Thus, the primacy of Article 9 as a legal referent for hijab cases remains a reality, and this paper must treat it as such.

Although practical constraints do not permit an analysis of rights other than freedom of religion or belief, it is worth noting that the right to not be discriminated against is commonly invoked in conjunction with freedom of religion or belief, and brief attention will be paid to it in this paper.

Religious discrimination has two important dimensions that must be distinguished. Direct religious discrimination occurs when one receives less favourable treatment because of one’s religion or belief.\textsuperscript{76} Indirect religious discrimination, on the other hand, takes place where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put those of a particular religion or belief, or lack of, at a disadvantage. An apposite example of this would be a law prohibiting the wearing of anything on top of the head. Prima facie this would be neutral, as it applies to everyone in the same way and does not single any group out. However, on closer inspection, such a ban would place Muslim, Jewish and Sikh people at a particular disadvantage, because they could not wear the head covering that their religion mandates (e.g. headscarf-hijab, skull caps and turbans, respectively).\textsuperscript{77}

This right is protected under Article 14 of the ECHR, as the ‘Prohibition of discrimination’, which provides that:

\begin{quote}
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
\end{quote}

The right is parasitic, meaning it must be pleaded in relation to some other substantive right.\textsuperscript{78} It is thus why the ECtHR typically avoids an analysis of Article 14 in hijab restriction cases, because it is reliant on first finding a violation of Article 9, or some other right. Article 14 has been interpreted to prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{75} ibid 738, 739.
\textsuperscript{77} ibid.
\end{flushleft}
Non-discrimination is also guaranteed by European Union (EU) law, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently, for the first time, decided on cases involving religious discrimination. The more recent Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) both have anti-discrimination provisions.

3. Justifying Hijab Restrictions: Legitimate Aims of the European Court of Human Rights

This section will critically discuss the ECtHR case law, drawing out the problematic rationales of the Court. It will be organised based on the legitimate aims that are relied upon for Article 9(2) ECHR limitations, namely the protection of: public order, public safety and the rights and freedom of others. Based on this critical analysis, five problematic patterns will then be identified in Section Four, and it will be argued that these patterns call for an alternative and unifying theoretical framework to better understand the approach adopted by the ECtHR. By doing so, it will seek to build a foundation for, and justify the necessity of, the application of securitisation theory in Section Five.

As previously mentioned in Section Two, states can interfere with the right of Muslim women to wear the hijab as it is typically framed through freedom of religion or belief, which is a qualified right under international human rights law, including the ECHR. When cases pertaining to hijab restrictions have been argued before the ECtHR, they have largely been upheld on the basis that the limitations pursue legitimate aims in a proportionate manner. In regards to the ECtHR decisions concerning bans on religious symbols worn by individuals, the Court has held them to be within the state’s margin of appreciation in the majority of cases. Only in two cases has the ECtHR found a violation of Article 9 ECHR, which concerned in one case the prohibition of wearing a turban and distinctive male dress of a minority Islamic sect on the streets of Turkey, and in the other a Christian cross necklace by a British Airways female employee whilst at work in the UK. With respect to the types of bans on religious head-coverings that occur most frequently across Europe, however, the ECtHR has never found a violation of Convention rights. It is these cases that involve

81 See Section Six, part A in this article for discussion.
85 ibid.
86 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey (2010) ECHR 2260.
87 Eweida and Others v UK (2013) ECHR 37.
88 Brems (n 84) 900.
hijab restrictions that will be focused on below. As will be evident from the discussion, many of the legitimate aims overlap theoretically, and they are invoked alongside each other in the case law.

A. Public Order

Of the legitimate aims listed in Article 9(2) ECHR, the ‘protection of public order’ and the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ are the most commonly invoked when justifying hijab restrictions. However, public order is an amorphous legitimate aim, and it is usually invoked by states alongside the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and public safety. In Dahlab v Switzerland for example, the hijab restriction was deemed proportionate to all three aims. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between the legitimate aims on a practical or even conceptual level, especially since the ECtHR has in many of its judgments avoided delineating between them in its proportionality analysis. The muddled approach in Dahlab, for example, can be contrasted to the more structured approach of S.A.S., where public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are distinguished. The ambiguity of public order and its dangers has not gone unnoticed, as Evans highlights, it ‘has the potential to be interpreted widely to allow states to intervene in religious practices at any time that they become inconvenient or annoying to those in power’. It is likely that because public order is rarely relied upon as a singular and distinct legitimate aim, that McGoldrick groups it together with protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and Howard categorises it jointly with public safety. For these reasons, it is more useful to discuss public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in more depth as distinct legitimate aims.

B. Public Safety

Public safety is explicitly recognised as a legitimate aim under Article 9(2) ECHR. What is particularly questionable, however, is not the aim itself, but the ECtHR’s proportionality assessments of what is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to realise this aim.

In El Morsli v France, a Muslim woman who visited the French Consulate in Marrakesh, to request an entry visa into France, was denied entry into the consulate premises as she refused to remove her ‘veil’ for the purposes of identification. The ECtHR relied upon what it deemed to be an analogous case, of Phull v France, to find that the interference with Article 9 was necessary in a democratic society to ensure

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89 McGoldrick (n 37) 247, 250; Howard 2012 (n 76) 109.
90 See for example Sahin 2005 (n 66) para 99.
92 ibid.
93 S.A.S. (n 62) para 137-143.
95 McGoldrick (n 37) 250.
96 Howard 2012 (n 76) 108.
97 App No 15585/06 (ECtHR, 4 Mar 2008).
98 App No 35753/03 (ECtHR, 11 Jan 2005).
the legitimate aim of public safety. The Court’s proportionality assessment, or lack thereof, is problematic on three fronts.

First, the Court used the ambiguous term of ‘veil’ throughout the judgment, and it is not made clear whether the applicant wore a headscarf-hijab or face-veil. If the former, this would raise obvious questions as to why the Court would find identification impossible, and the measures proportionate, if the face was not concealed. Second, by placing emphasis on the obligation to remove her veil being ‘necessarily very limited in terms of time’ as a justification for its decision, the Court demonstrated ignorance towards the applicant’s beliefs. It is not the duration of having the veil removed, but the act itself, as a matter of principle, which perturbed the applicant’s religious beliefs.

Third, the Court’s dismissal of the applicant being prepared to remove her veil in the presence of a female officer exemplifies its shallow judicial reasoning. The Court stated that the consular authorities not assigning a female officer to carry out the identification ‘does not exceed the State’s margin of appreciation in these matters’, but does not explain why. If the duration of identification was a pertinent factor for the Court’s proportionality assessment, it is unclear why the French Consulate’s ability to assign an officer of female gender does not warrant the same weight and is instead instantly dismissed as within the State’s margin of appreciation. As a caveat, although it was not clear from the facts of the case that the consular authorities were actually asked for a female officer, it is irrelevant for our purposes as the Court assumed that they were in its judgment.

As mentioned in Section Two, the level of scrutiny that the ECtHR applies will depend on the margin of appreciation afforded to states. This explains the lack of rigorous scrutiny applied in this case – the Court implicitly deemed the state warranted a wide margin of appreciation, but it does not explain why such width was granted. Evans outlines several factors identified by the ECtHR as being relevant to the width of the margin: ‘the level of consensus on the issue among Contracting States, the extent to which the matter interferes with the core of an applicant’s private life, the importance of the right to democratic and pluralistic society and the circumstances and the background of the particular case’. None of these factors were explicitly relied upon by the ECtHR in El Morsli to justify the wide margin of appreciation.

This deference is endemic in the other cases involving the removal of religious clothing, albeit non-hijab, whereby public safety has been invoked as a legitimate aim for limitations on Article 9. By deploying a similar lack of scrutiny, the Court has found no violations of Article 9 in any of these cases. In the aforementioned case of Phull v France for example, where a Sikh man was obliged to remove his turban at airport security, the Court relied upon applying X v UK for its proportionality assessment of public safety in order to reach ‘a like conclusion’. This is despite X v UK being a Commission decision decided on in 1978, a one-page judgment, with neither a proportionality assessment nor any explanations for the conclusions it reached, and a
case where ‘public health’ was accepted as a legitimate aim, instead of public safety, and therefore not analogous to *Phull*. As in *El Mor*, other less intrusive means to achieve the legitimate aim of public safety were not explored in *Phull*, and instead the Court deferred to the State’s margin of appreciation, without explaining why. It is thus why Howard questions the proportionality assessment of the Court in these public safety cases and highlights that Mr Phull had ‘already walked through a security scanner and had been checked over with a hand-held security detector’.107

Moreover, in *Mann Singh v France*,108 where a Sikh man was refused a duplicate of his driver’s license for refusing to provide a photograph ‘bareheaded’ and without his turban, the ECtHR found no violation of Article 9(2) ECHR. This runs in contradiction to a decision of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), five years later, regarding the same applicant but concerning a turban prohibition on his passport photograph.109 The UNHRC found the measure to be disproportionate for the aim of public safety as, inter alia, less intrusive means were not sought, and thus a violation of Article 18(3) ICCPR. The divergence between the two human rights bodies, despite almost identical legal provisions and facts, leads one to question why the ECtHR seems incapable of asking basic questions in its proportionality assessments as the UNHRC was able to do,110 and whether invoking the doctrine of margin of appreciation without justification is a sufficient answer.

The above approach is further problematised by the ECtHR’s application of a ‘less restrictive means’ reasoning in the more recent decision of *S.A.S.*. The Court found the French blanket ban on full-face-veils to be disproportionate for the aim of public safety, as such an objective ‘could be attained by a mere obligation to show their face and to identify themselves’ when safety or fraud detection required it.111 Such a proportionality assessment, involving more intense scrutiny, runs in contradiction to the previous case law identified above. The precedent set by *S.A.S.*, as Brems highlights, creates the possibility for a ‘less restrictive means’ test to be applied in future cases involving public safety and other legitimate aims.112 Nonetheless, the inconsistency in the case law supports criticisms of the Court’s earlier approach.

### C. Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Others

Protection of the rights and freedoms of others was accepted as a legitimate aim in the hijab restriction cases, in chronological order, of *Dahlab*,113 *Leyla Sahin*,114 *Dogru v France*115 and *S.A.S.*116 In pursuing this overarching aim of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, three ‘subordinate’ aims have been successfully linked to it by the Court. These (henceforth ‘linked aims’) are those of pursuing: gender equality, state neutrality or protection from proselytism, and ‘living together’. Each of these linked aims will be discussed in turn.

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107 Howard 2012 (n 76) 107.
110 ibid para 7.3.
111 *S.A.S.* (n 62) para 139.
112 Brems (n 84) 902.
113 *Dahlab* (n 91).
114 *Sahin* 2005 (n 66) para 99.
(i) Gender Equality

The ECtHR has previously relied on the viewpoint that the hijab is contrary to gender equality, and thus hijab restrictions would increase or maintain equality between the sexes and improve women’s rights. In Dahlab, the headscarf-hijab of a Swiss Muslim primary-school teacher, of children aged between four and eight, was viewed as ‘hard to square with the principle of gender equality’, and ‘difficult to reconcile ... with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils’. For this reason, inter alia, the Court found the national authorities’ prohibition on the applicant wearing her hijab during the performance of her professional duties to be ‘justified in principle and proportionate’ to the stated aims. Similarly, both the Chamber and the majority in the Grand Chamber in Sahin accepted that the headscarf-hijab was contrary to the principle of gender equality and the protection of the rights of women, also citing Dahlab with approval, when justifying that the hijab restriction in question was linked to the rights and freedoms of others.

The gender equality justification is, however, based on a false premise – that wearing the hijab is necessarily forced and oppressive – with no empirical evidence to support such a claim. Judge Tulkens rightly criticises this assumption in his dissenting opinion in Sahin, stating that there are a ‘variety of reasons’ why women wear the headscarf-hijab, and that ‘it can even be a means of emancipating women’ in some cases. Tulkens’ assertion is supported by academic scholarship and several empirical studies conducted in Europe. Based on this research, Lister summarises the different motivations for wearing headscarf-hijab as: conveying a religious and ethnic signal; affirming identity; responding to familial pressure; being a political act, or a symbol of interpreting their faith in a new way. Even in regards to what would have been viewed as more ‘oppressive’ forms of hijab, such as the burqa and niqab, the reality is very different to the image presented by the majority in Dahlab and Sahin. In a qualitative study investigating the motivations of niqabi women in Denmark, for example, based on interviews with eight former and current niqabi women, all said that wearing the niqab was ‘a personal, voluntary choice motivated by personal piety in the relationship with God’, and these findings correlate with those in other European countries. Although this may seem like a small sample size, one should bear in mind that the estimate for total niqabi women in Denmark at the time, arrived at in the quantitative part of the study, was 150. Ironically, some research demonstrates that there may be a greater number of women who desire to wear face veils but are...
prevented from doing so due to familial pressure or worry over the reactions from their environment. Despite these findings, as Lyon and Spini point out, there is no real attempt by the Court ‘to engage with the debate on what it means to wear the headscarf’ in Dahlab, and the analysis instead appears ‘very superficial’. Further, even if one were to accept a connection between hijab restrictions and the promotion of gender equality in principle, the Court’s proportionality assessments of that purported linked aim in these cases are dubious. Firstly, the Court does not take into consideration that, in both Dahlab and Sahin, the women wore their hijab of their own free will. Nor do they take into account, as Evans points out, that both applicants were ‘strong-minded and intelligent women who refused to be oppressed by what they considered to be illegitimate regulation of their clothing’. Both were professional women, who were ‘prepared to litigate in domestic and international courts to protect their rights’; Ms Dahlab was a working mother, and Ms Sahin attended student protests against the Turkish hijab restrictions. Neither appeared to be subordinated. By not adding this evidence or attaching any weight to it in their judgments, one can only conclude that the Court accuses the applicants of false consciousness. Evans characterises this logic of the Court as: ‘whatever evidence the women in the cases gave (and indeed whatever they may genuinely but mistakenly believe about their own motivation), those who wear the veil demonstrate their own acceptance of gender inequality’. The Court thus engages in paternalism, criticised not least by Judge Tulkens, which robs these women of their agency, prescribing imagined gender oppression with forced liberation as the antidote.

Second, if the aim was gender equality, it is questionable whether the hijab restrictions would have actually achieved it. The assumption that women subjected to these restrictions will unveil themselves in order to continue their work or studies, and embrace the Court’s conception of gender equality untainted by the hijab, is not borne out in reality. Both the applicants in question persisted with their hijab but suffered severe consequences: Ms Dahlab, as a matter of practice, could not work in any Swiss public school; and Ms Sahin was forced to complete her medical training in Vienna. Even the group that such bans aim to help, those who have been pressured into veiling, may suffer the most, as such restrictions would ‘stop them from going out, from gaining more emancipation through education and work’.

Although the gender equality rationale was subsequently rejected by the ECtHR in S.A.S., in the context of invoking gender quality ‘to ban a practice that is defended by women – such as the applicant’, thus vindicating some of the above criticisms, it still begs the question of why the Court adopted such peculiar positions and assessments in the past. Moreover, the notable absence of an explanation for why the

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127 Erica Howard, ‘Islamic veil bans: the gender equality justification and empirical evidence’ in Brems (n 125) 212.
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 Sahin 2005 (n 66) para 12 (Tulkens).
133 Howard 2012 (n 76) 111.
134 Howard 2014 (n 127) 215.
135 S.A.S. (n 62) para 119.
Court adopted this new reasoning, and the inclusion of the vague proviso of ‘unless it were to be understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms’, \(^\text{136}\) leaves open the possibility for gender equality to be invoked in future hijab cases.

(ii) State Neutrality and Proselytism

Preserving the secular, and therefore, neutral and tolerant nature of the state is another linked aim that has been accepted as a necessary element for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or public order. Although some academics have categorised proselytism separately from state neutrality, \(^\text{137}\) it is useful to consider both jointly due to their overlapping themes and common pursuit of ‘tolerance’.

In *Dahlab*, the ‘powerful external symbol’ of the teacher wearing a headscarf-hijab was viewed to have a ‘proselytising effect’ on the children, and ran contrary to the ‘message of tolerance, respect of others … and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils’. \(^\text{138}\) This reasoning is problematic on two main fronts.

First, the assertion of proselytism by the Court was at best, baseless, and at worst, deliberately imagined. There was no evidence of *direct* proselytism. The facts make clear that Ms Dahlab’s teaching was secular in nature, and that she had received no complaints from pupils or their parents. As Evans points out, the evidence of *indirect* proselytism was also tenuous, and based entirely upon the mere wearing of the headscarf-hijab. \(^\text{139}\) The Court itself conceded this in its judgment, admitting that it is ‘very difficult to assess the impact’ of the children being exposed to the sight of their teacher’s headscarf-hijab, \(^\text{140}\) but then proceeded to disguise the absence of evidence for such an impact through the use of oblique wording, such as ‘it cannot be denied outright’ and it ‘might have some kind’ of effect. \(^\text{141}\) An impression of potential and unknowable effects is created and embraced by the Court in lieu of the material facts.

The problematic nature of the indifference towards evidence in *Dahlab* is accentuated when it is juxtaposed with the subsequent decision of *Lautsi and Others v Italy*, \(^\text{142}\) where the Court held that Christian crucifixes fixed to the classroom walls of a school in Italy did not violate the Convention rights of a secular mother and her two children. There, the Court interpreted the crucifix as ‘an essentially passive symbol’, which could not be deemed to ‘have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities’. \(^\text{143}\) It was above all a ‘religious symbol’, and there was ‘no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils’, such that ‘it cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young persons whose convictions are still in the process of being formed’. \(^\text{144}\) This begs the question of why Ms Dahlab’s headscarf was viewed as an ‘active’ religious symbol, and why evidence

\(^{136}\) ibid.
\(^{137}\) Evans 2006 (n 129) 62; Brems (n 84) 902.
\(^{138}\) *Dahlab* (n 91) ‘THE LAW’ para 1.
\(^{139}\) Evans 2006 (n 129) 63.
\(^{140}\) *Dahlab* (n 91).
\(^{141}\) ibid.
\(^{142}\) (2011) ECHR 2412.
\(^{143}\) ibid para 72.
\(^{144}\) ibid para 66.
of proselytism was demanded in Lautsi but not in Dahlab. The applicants in Lautsi highlighted the significance of Dahlab, and the lower Chamber had already acknowledged that the crucifixes fell within the Dahlab meaning of ‘powerful external symbols’, but the Grand Chamber distinguished the two cases because the facts ‘are entirely different’ without explaining how so – it merely describes Dahlab without explaining the purported lack of analogy. As Zucca highlights, the inconsistency between the two cases suggests ‘a differential treatment between different faiths’ and ‘that some symbols are more neutral than others’. Second, the Court is parochial in limiting the possible impacts of headscarf-hijab, on ‘curious’ and ‘vulnerable’ children, to proselytism. As Ovey and White highlight, ‘positive messages about the equality of different religious and cultural groups’ are not explored, which is strange considering how much emphasis the Court places on the diversity of Europe and importance of pluralism. Nor does the Court consider the negative messages that may be sent by the teacher’s dismissal: to the Muslim children at the school who also wore traditional clothing; or to children ‘already inclined towards mistrust, religious hatred or racial discrimination’, that their fears and stereotypes were justified.

In regards to the subsequent case of Sahin, the Court found it ‘understandable’ that Turkey ‘should wish to preserve the secular nature’ of universities by banning religious attire, including the headscarf-hijab, from being worn. The decisions of both Sahin and Dahlab are susceptible to five broad criticisms, drawing on Evans’ arguments. First, the implication of promoting intolerance is not substantiated by evidence. As in Ms Dahlab’s case, there was no evidence of Ms Sahin promoting intolerance directly. Both applicants were only guilty of observing the hijab. The position of the Court seems to be that ‘anyone who is sufficiently serious about advertising the fact that they are Muslim must be, by definition, intolerant’.

This leads onto the second criticism, that the Court equates Islam, and the hijab, with intolerance. The lower Chamber in Sahin, later cited with approval by the Grand Chamber, finds it necessary, when discussing the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, to stress that ‘the majority of the population’ in Turkey ‘adhere to the Islamic faith’, presenting this fact as a sort of risk factor making the country more prone to intolerance. Despite this population ‘professing … a secular way of life’, it does not suffice as a bulwark. Their secularism is presented as disingenuous by virtue of their subscription to Islam. It is thus why the Court viewed the hijab restrictions as necessary to remedy the ‘pressing social need’ of intolerance that is created by their religion. Perhaps even more controversial in Sahin was the emphasis on two factors.

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145 ibid para 42.
146 Lautsi v Italy (2009) ECHR 1901 (Second Section), para 54.
147 Lautsi 2011 (n 142) para 73.
150 Evans 2006 (n 129) 64-65.
151 Sahin 2005 (n 66) para 116.
152 Evans 2006 (n 129) 69-73.
153 ibid 69.
154 Sahin 2005 (n 66) para 115.
155 Sahin 2004 (n 66) para 108.
156 ibid.
157 ibid.
in the ‘Turkish context’: the headscarf-hijab had ‘taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years,’ and ‘there are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts’.\(^\text{158}\) By stressing these two factors, the Court essentially politicised the hijab and implicitly linked it to fundamentalism.

Third, the Court placed emphasis on the ‘State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser’ of different beliefs.\(^\text{159}\) however, as Brems points out, the neutrality principle can be done in an ‘inclusive manner, by equally allowing the wearing of religious signs to all’.\(^\text{160}\) Neutral dress codes of both users and officers of public service, in the sense of restricting all forms of religious dress, need not automatically stem from such an objective. This insight is notably overlooked by the Court in its proportionality assessments of both \textit{Sahin} and \textit{Dahlab}.

Fourth, state secularity is assumed to be unquestionably neutral, and what Evans terms, a ‘non-controversial guarantor of minority rights’.\(^\text{161}\) On the contrary, secularism is closer to what Denli describes as a ‘normatively prescriptive model’, favouring certain forms of religions over others.\(^\text{162}\) The Court fails to appreciate not only that ostensibly neutral bans on religious dress are being imposed primarily to curb Islamic dress, but that such measures will discriminate against Muslim women more than other religious and non-religious groups. The Court seems to concentrate its concern for ‘those who choose not to wear’ the headscarf-hijab,\(^\text{163}\) over those who do.

Fifth, the Court presents two contradictory stereotypes of Muslim women, without recognition of the ironic conflict between them. Ms \textit{Sahin} and Ms \textit{Dahlab} are simultaneously victims of gender inequality, oppressed by their own internalised misogyny, and aggressors, with ‘such personal force that their mere presence is enough to amount to problematic proselytising’.\(^\text{164}\) The oxymoronic nature of the Court’s approach is summarised best by Evans, who highlights that ‘[i]n the course of a single sentence’, Ms \textit{Dahlab} is transformed ‘from a woman who needs rescuing from Islam to an Islamic woman from whom everyone else needs rescuing’.\(^\text{165}\)

The precedent set by these cases has been reproduced in subsequent case law. In \textit{Dogru},\(^\text{166}\) the Court also relied upon the principle of secularism to hold that a secondary school, which expelled a Muslim girl for refusing to take her headscarf off during physical education and sports classes, did not violate Article 9. Other subsequent cases include \textit{Kurtulmus v Turkey},\(^\text{167}\) \textit{Fatma Karaduman v Turkey},\(^\text{168}\) and \textit{Tandogan v Turkey},\(^\text{169}\) and \textit{Melek Sima Yilmaz v Turkey}.\(^\text{170}\) It is for these and other reasons that numerous academic commentators have criticised \textit{Sahin} for its lack of

\(^{158}\) ibid 108-109.  
\(^{159}\) \textit{Sahin} 2005 (n 66) para 107.  
\(^{160}\) Brems (n 84) 899.  
\(^{161}\) Evans 2006 (n 129) 70.  
\(^{163}\) \textit{Sahin} 2004 (n 66) para 108.  
\(^{164}\) Evans 2006 (n 129) 72.  
\(^{165}\) ibid 73.  
\(^{166}\) \textit{Dogru} (n 115) para 62.  
\(^{167}\) (2006) ECHR 1169.  
\(^{168}\) App No 41296/04 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008).  
\(^{169}\) App No 41298/04 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008).  
\(^{170}\) App No 37829/05 (ECtHR, 3 September 2008).
objective or rigorous examination of the facts and linked aims used to justify the hijab restrictions.\textsuperscript{171} Judge Tulkens’ statement in \textit{Sahin}, that ‘European supervision seems quite simply to be absent’,\textsuperscript{172} seems like an apt summary of the case law in its entirety, which has afforded States extraordinary and seemingly inexplicable deference. This deference cannot be attributed to the doctrine of margin of appreciation alone, because \textit{Sahin} raised ‘not merely a “local” issue, but one of importance to all the member States’,\textsuperscript{173} as did the other cases. The next logical question to ask then is: what can this deference be attributed to? This question will be answered in Section Four.

(iii) ‘Living together’

As noted previously, the ECtHR in \textit{S.A.S.} rejected the linked aims of public safety and gender equality: the former on a proportionality assessment,\textsuperscript{174} the latter in principle.\textsuperscript{175} The Court also rejected a proposed linked aim of human dignity.\textsuperscript{176} Instead, the French ban on face covering\textsuperscript{177} was upheld by the Court on the basis that it pursued an aim linked to the rights and freedoms of others, namely the ‘respect for the minimum requirements of life in society’, or guaranteeing the conditions of ‘living together’, and in a proportionate manner.\textsuperscript{178} However, both the accepted linked aim of living together, and the Court’s proportionality assessment of it, are highly problematic.

The living together aim utilised by the Court is susceptible to two overarching criticisms. First, the aim presupposes that the ‘practice’ or ‘attitude’ exhibited by wearing the face-veil would ‘fundamentally call into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships’, which is contended to be an ‘indispensable element of community life’ within society.\textsuperscript{179} But it is unclear why ‘interpersonal relationships’ cannot be forged by, or with people who wear the face-veil. Only the theoretical assertions of the French Government are relied upon, that ‘the face plays a significant role in human interaction’, and the effect of concealing it would ‘break social ties’ and ‘manifest a refusal’ of the living together principle.\textsuperscript{180} However, no empirical evidence is adduced to support such a claim. Facial expressions are by no means the only method of human interaction, as Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom highlighted in their dissenting opinion: ‘[p]eople can socialise without necessarily looking into each other’s eyes’.\textsuperscript{181} Oral communication and body language would still be possible.

If one were to extend the Court’s logic, those who close other significant forms of communication channels in the public space would also violate the ‘living together’ principle. Commuters on the train who use earphones to listen to music, thus blocking others from verbally communicating with them, would also be susceptible to a justifiable state ban. Such a position, however, would be dismissed as egregious. In reality then, it cannot be seriously contended that the loss of one form of non-verbal

\textsuperscript{171} For list of case comments, see Howard 2012 (n 76) 62.
\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Sahin} 2005 (n 66) para 3 (Tulkens).
\textsuperscript{173} ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{S.A.S.} (n 62) para 139.
\textsuperscript{175} ibid para 118-119.
\textsuperscript{176} ibid para 120.
\textsuperscript{177} Law 2010-1192 (n 10).
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{S.A.S.} (n 62) paras 121, 142.
\textsuperscript{179} ibid (n 62) para 122.
\textsuperscript{180} ibid para 82.
\textsuperscript{181} ibid para 9 (Dissenting Opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom).
communication endangers living together. The real danger to social cohesion then must lie in the minds of those who do not wish to communicate with a veiled woman, for reasons of fear or prejudice. The Court’s solution to this tension is to permit the forcible unveiling of Muslim women, violating a crucial part of their Article 9 Convention right, so as to mollify the prejudicial angst of the majority population or the State. In this way, the burden and responsibility of social cohesion is placed brutally on the veiled Muslim woman. This runs in contradiction to the Court’s reasoning for rejecting the human dignity argument. In the very same judgment, the majority underscored that despite being ‘perceived as strange’ to many observers, cultural identity expressed through the face-veil ‘contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in democracy’. \(^{182}\)

Second, the link between the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and ‘living together’ is highly tenuous. The Court fails to explain the required connection to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in the same way it did for the other linked aims. Instead, it invents a new legal right to plug the hole, ‘the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier’,\(^{183}\) but this is problematic for several reasons. Such a right has no legal basis in any Strasbourg precedent, which is evidenced by the Court not referring to any of its case law. The Court effectively, as Adenitire puts it, recognised a ‘legal right for people to see each other’s smiles and frowns’ in public spaces, enforced through criminal sanctions, as well as a corresponding legal duty on people ‘to socialise with one another’.\(^{184}\) This was ‘incompatible with the spirit of the Convention’ because, as the minority outlined, ‘the right to respect for private life also comprises the right not to communicate and not to enter into contact with others in public places – the right to be an outsider’.\(^{185}\)

Furthermore, even if ‘living together’ were a legitimate linked aim, the Court’s proportionality assessment of it was inadequate. This is despite the Court acknowledging that ‘careful examination’ was required, because of the ‘flexibility of the notion’ and ‘the resulting risk of abuse’.\(^{186}\) There is no analysis of whether the French ban would actually achieve its aim of social cohesion. The third-party intervener had adduced weighty evidence demonstrating that the ban does not achieve its stated purpose, and instead ‘the women concerned [avoid] going out, leading to their isolation and the deterioration of their social life and autonomy’.\(^{187}\) The French government doubted the scientific merits of the study relied upon,\(^{188}\) but the Court does not consider either claim. Neither is there a contemplation over the type of social interaction that would result from coerced unveiling, as the women are ‘unlikely to greet their coercers with friendly smiles’, but with ‘spite and bitterness’.\(^{189}\) The Court expresses concern that ‘certain Islamophobic remarks marked the debate’ which preceded the adoption of the legislation,\(^{190}\) but there is no acknowledgement of the increase in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes in society post-9/11, and how that interplays with whether the ban would really facilitate ‘living together’.

\(^{182}\) ibid para 120.
\(^{183}\) ibid para 122.
\(^{184}\) John Adenitire, ‘Has the European Court of Human Rights recognised a legal right to glance at a smile?’ (2015) 131(Jan) Law Quarterly Review 43, 46.
\(^{185}\) S.A.S. (n 62) para 8 (Dissenting Opinion).
\(^{186}\) ibid para 122.
\(^{187}\) ibid para 96.
\(^{188}\) ibid para 82.
\(^{189}\) Adenitire (n 184) 48.
\(^{190}\) S.A.S. (n 62) para 149.
The lack of scrutiny is perhaps rooted in the majority finding that a wide margin of appreciation was warranted as ‘there is no European consensus against a ban’,\(^{191}\) but this is difficult to accept considering that at the time, ‘forty-five out of forty-seven member States of the Council of Europe, and thus an overwhelming majority, have not deemed it necessary to legislate in this area’.\(^{192}\) It is telling that even when the majority selectively applies rigorous scrutiny to counter certain proportionality arguments made against the ban, dismissing the criminal sanctions as ‘the lightest that could be envisaged’,\(^{193}\) they are also based on assumptions and do not take into account ‘the multiple effect of successive penalties’.\(^{194}\)

It is also worth noting that the ‘living together’ justification of \textit{S.A.S.} was subsequently approved, and heavily relied upon by, the ECtHR in \textit{Belacemi and Oussar v Belgium}\(^{195}\) and \textit{Dakir v Belgium}\(^{196}\) to uphold the Belgian burqa ban, thus cementing its place in the Court’s jurisprudence.

4. **Understanding the Problematic Patterns**

Based on the aforementioned review of the ECtHR case law pertaining to hijab restrictions, five seemingly interlinked patterns emerge which suggest the need for an alternative and unifying theoretical framework.

i. **Pattern One:** the Court relies upon stereotypes and assumptions as central justificatory rationales. In the linked aims of gender equality, state neutrality and protection from proselytism, for example, contradictory caricatures of Muslim women are deployed, that of the victim and the aggressor. Islam is equated to intolerance, juxtaposed with the supposedly neutral and secular order. The hijab is politicised, linked to fundamentalism, and treated as a threat to ‘living together’.

ii. **Pattern Two:** the legitimate aims overlap at a conceptual and practical level. Public order, public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are typically invoked alongside each other, and the ECtHR does not always clearly delineate between which aim is being relied upon in its judgments. This immediately suggests a common and underlying rationale.

iii. **Pattern Three:** evidence is given little weight. Assertions and stereotypes are maintained without evidence, and sometimes even in the face of contrary evidence that is adduced before the Court.

iv. **Pattern Four:** as a general observation, the Court goes to great lengths, partly by relying on the above, to justify that hijab restrictions do not violate Article 9 ECHR. Even when other legitimate and linked aims fall through, the Court relies upon a novel concept of ‘living together’ by inventing a new and precarious legal right to see other people’s facial expressions in public.

\(^{191}\) ibid para 156.

\(^{192}\) ibid para 19 (Dissenting Opinion).

\(^{193}\) ibid para 152.

\(^{194}\) ibid para 22 (Dissenting Opinion).

\(^{195}\) (2017) ECHR 655.

\(^{196}\) (2017) ECHR 656.
v. **Pattern Five:** the Court applies a low level of scrutiny in its proportionality assessments and an unjustifiably wide margin of appreciation is granted to States. A ‘less restrictive means’ test is rarely applied, and often there is little assessment of whether the restrictions actually achieve their purported aims.

Academics have highlighted many of the above trends, but have stopped short of identifying the connections between them, which this article argues uncovers the underlying and common cause for the Court’s approach. Brems contends that the ECtHR has failed to see through ‘window dressing’ justifications of hijab restrictions, and is ‘unable or unwilling to seriously uncover and address headscarf persecution’.197 The question of why the Court fails in this endeavour, however, remains unanswered by the vast majority of scholarship. Vakulenko applies post-colonial feminism to posit that the ‘counterproductive trends’ stem from ‘the very construction of hijab issues as those of “religious identity”’, using Article 9 ECHR as the primary legal referent.198 Yet this absolves the Court of its contribution to these trends despite the Article 9 framing. Relying on stereotypes, ignoring factual evidence, applying a low standard of scrutiny and adopting novel concepts such as ‘living together’ are not inescapable features of Article 9 adjudication. As Brems points out, S.A.S. demonstrates that the Court is ‘capable of critically deconstructing the invoked aim of a ban’.199 It did so for the linked aims of gender equality and human dignity, but not for ‘living together’. The cause then must stem from something more insidious than the legal referent relied upon.

Evans perhaps comes closest to identifying the common cause, as he asserts that the underlying link between the two contradictory stereotypes presented in Dahlab and Sahin, that of the victim and aggressor, is the ‘idea of threat’.200 However, his analysis is limited to some of the aims linked to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and the idea is not comprehensively explored. In actuality, the ‘idea of threat’ can be applied to the other legitimate aims if it is underpinned by an expansive conception of securitisation theory. Brems mentions the idea of ‘unease’ with the Islamic other,201 but unlike Evans, she uses such terms to describe the drivers behind the hijab restrictions, and not the Court’s approach. Howard goes further, stating that the ‘fear of this threat has obviously penetrated the ECtHR as well’.202 Nonetheless, all have only scratched the surface of ideas associated with securitisation that can help explain the Court’s approach, and scholarship would greatly benefit from a fleshing out and application of securitisation theory, which this paper turns to in the next section.

5. **Applying the Lens of Securitisation**

This section will elucidate securitisation theory and its concepts, and then apply it to the five problematic patterns identified in the previous section. By doing this, it will demonstrate that the hijab and Muslim women have been securitised by the ECtHR, and the counter-productive patterns stem from this securitisation. Having already identified the five problematic patterns will avoid the need for repeating the analysis.

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197 Brems (n 84) 900, 904.
198 Vakulenko (n 74) 717.
199 Brems (n 84) 902.
200 Evans 2006 (n 129) 73.
201 Brems (n 84) 899, 903.
202 Howard 2012 (n 76) 63.
of the case law when applying securitisation, but cross-references will be made where appropriate.

A. Securitisation Theory

Securitisation, drawn from International Relations theory, can serve as a useful theoretical framework to help better understand the patterns that emerge from the ECtHR case law pertaining to hijab restrictions. In order to apply it to the case law, the theory itself and its concepts must first be elucidated.

Although its definition is widely contested, securitisation can be broadly understood as a ‘move’ that transforms issues, framing them either as a ‘special kind of politics or as above politics’; it can thus be seen as a ‘more extreme version of politicization’.\(^\text{203}\) Public issues can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised, through politicised, to securitised, with the latter requiring and ‘justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’.\(^\text{204}\) For Buzan, a securitising move, a ‘discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object’, should be distinguished from when the object actually becomes securitised, which is ‘if and when the audience accepts it as such’.\(^\text{205}\) The theory therefore facilitates an appreciation that such securitising moves along the aforementioned spectrum are not a natural phenomenon to be taken for granted, but carefully constructed by a ‘securitising actor’: ‘securitisation is not a neutral act but a political one’.\(^\text{206}\) A securitising actor has ‘the social and institutional power to move the issue “beyond politics”’, by attributing labels to it such as “dangerous”, “menacing”, “threatening”, “alarming” and so on’.\(^\text{207}\)

Before applying the theory to the case law, two more concepts of securitisation need to be outlined to allow for a more expansive framework: the politics of exception and unease.

(i) Broadening Securitisation: Politics of Exception and Unease

In the context of migration, Bigo contended that it had been securitised as a result of a ‘creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society’.\(^\text{208}\) This idea of ‘unease’ was later expanded upon by Huysmans and Buonfino to pioneer two novel concepts of securitisation that are useful for our purposes: the politics of exception and unease.\(^\text{209}\)

After analysing parliamentary debates to see how British political elites had securitised migration and asylum post-9/11, Huysmans and Buonfino noticed a


\(^{204}\) ibid 23-24.

\(^{205}\) ibid 25.


\(^{207}\) ibid 104.


‘considerable reluctance … to introduce or especially sustain the connection between migration and terrorism too intensely in public debate’. In other words, there was a ‘relative absence of explicit securitising moves in the name of counterterrorism’. However, this did not mean that migration had not been securitised, rather it suggested a more nuanced ‘format’ of securitisation was at play, which mainstream security framing was not equipped to explain.

From this observation, Huysmans and Buonfino were able to characterise two processes of securitisation. The politics of exception focuses on ‘the state of threat to the life of the nation’ and ‘the legitimacy of exceptional policies justified by this threat’, central to counter-terrorism debates. It is dependent on ‘particular crisis moments, such as 9/11 and the July bombings’. The politics of unease, on the other hand, ‘does not focus on existential threats’, or threats of ‘radical violence to the sovereignty and functional integrity of the state’. It is primarily a ‘question of protecting legal and social order in various sites within the state’. Its central characteristic, as Bigo alluded to earlier, is the ‘construction of a continuum of threats and unease’ that facilitates ‘the political exchange of fears and beliefs’. These ‘uneasy societal relations’ are structured and contested by the politics of unease, which legitimates the need for governance over ‘a wide range of societal questions’, enforced through policing techniques.

Although they were conceptualised in the context of migration, both of these distinctive strands of securitisation serve as useful theoretical tools for understanding the ECtHR case law on hijab restrictions. Whereas one may view the legitimate aim of public safety as more obviously connected to securitisation, as it relates to threats of terrorism that typify the politics of exception, the politics of unease uncovers securitisations in other legitimate and linked aims that are less obviously so. Using the dual concept in this way, as ‘two discretely different framings of insecurity’, cautions against a parochial view of securitisation that only recognises existential threats to the state and provides a more expansive and nuanced theoretical framework.

B. Applying Securitisation to the Problematic Patterns

The applicability of the previously mentioned concepts of securitisation to the ECtHR’s reasoning is evidenced by Bigo explicitly mentioning ‘judges’ as a securitising actor—in addition to politicians, a ‘significant fraction of general public opinion’ and many others. He also notes that security actors exchange ‘their fears and beliefs’. This helps clarify the interplay of securitisation between States and the ECtHR. The logic of this interplay can be described as such: States (securitising actors) project fears of the hijab and Muslim women (the threats), in regards to gender equality, tolerance, state

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210 ibid 766.
211 ibid 781.
212 ibid 767.
213 ibid.
214 ibid 785.
215 ibid 767.
216 ibid 785.
217 ibid 782.
218 ibid 785.
219 ibid 786.
220 Bigo (n 208) 63.
221 ibid.
neutrality or public order (the referent objects or ideals), through the legitimate aims they raise before the Court, and how they frame the issues relating to them. The Court, also a securitising actor due to its institutional power, co-opts these fears into its judgments. By doing so, it transforms the purported threats from being subject to securitising moves by States, into actually being securitised.

This section will first demonstrate that the stereotypes mentioned in Pattern One result from the Court’s securitisation of the hijab and Muslim women, and secondly, that the rest of the patterns ultimately stem from this a priori securitisation.

(i) Pattern One: Securitisation of the Hijab and Muslim women

As mentioned before, Pattern One indicated that the Court relies upon stereotypes as central justificatory rationales for upholding hijab restrictions. These stereotypes are created through both processes of securitisation explained above. Starting with the politics of exception, this is most evidently done when hijab restrictions are justified on grounds of public safety. In El Morsli,\(^ {222}\) for example, the refusal to unveil for identification was treated as a public safety issue. Similarly in S.A.S., the Court accepted the view of national authorities that concealing the face ‘might be dangerous for public safety’, though it found the measures to be disproportionate for that aim.\(^ {223}\)

More controversially, the Court presented the hijab through the politics of exception in Sahin by implicitly linking it to ‘extremist political movements’ that pose a threat to the life of the nation.\(^ {224}\) In general, however, the Court has been reluctant to make such connections. It securitises the hijab through the politics of exception only in regards to face-veils and issues of identification, though in El Morsli it is not made clear whether the applicant wore a headscarf or face-veil.

More common, but less appreciated by scholars, is the Court’s securitisation through the politics of unease in the aims linked to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, which is achieved through constructing more subtle unease and fears that do not involve the life of the state being at risk. As mentioned previously, the Court presents two contradictory stereotypes of Muslim women, who are simultaneously victims and aggressors.\(^ {225}\) Evans observes that the idea of threat underlies both images. Not only is the ‘woman who is too powerful, too intolerant, too aggressive’, a threat, but ‘the victim is a threat too’. A threat to: ‘the liberal, egalitarian order’; ‘control by the state and secular authorities because their coercion is less effective than that of the family and the subculture’.\(^ {226}\) In Dahlab and Sahin, the referent objects being threatened are either: individuals, such as vulnerable children, those who choose not to wear the headscarf-hijab, and even those who do, like the applicants; or ideals, such as gender equality, tolerance, non-discrimination, state neutrality and secularity, and pluralism. This runs in stark contradiction to Lautsi, where the Court resists securitising a Christian crucifix, which it instead views as a ‘passive symbol’.\(^ {227}\)

\(^ {222}\) El Morsli (n 97).
\(^ {223}\) S.A.S. (n 62) para 115.
\(^ {224}\) Sahin 2004 (n 66) para 109; see Section 3(C)(ii) for discussion.
\(^ {225}\) See discussion in Section 3(C), especially (ii). The Muslim women in Dahlab and Sahin are simultaneously victims of their patriarchal religion and internalised misogyny, in need of rescuing, and proselytising aggressors, who threaten children, the secular order, tolerance etc. The Muslim woman in S.A.S. is an aggressor towards social cohesion.
\(^ {226}\) Evans 2006 (n 129) 73.
\(^ {227}\) See discussion of inconsistent approaches between Dahlab and Lautsi in Section 3(C)(ii).
The somewhat ironic implication is that the Christian symbols of the dominant group are passive and to be tolerated, whereas the Islamic symbols of the minority group are security threats, to be feared and in need of control.

Academic scholarship has lacked an application of securitisation theory. Nevertheless, it has nonetheless noted that the Court exhibits a continuum of fear and unease towards the hijab, Muslim women and Islam in general. For Skjeie, the decision in Sahin is ‘strongly influenced by the court’s general ambition to curb political Islam’ and Rorive also notes that it is ‘driven by the fear of Islamic fundamentalism’. In relation to Dahlab, Rorive observes that ‘what comes out from this decision is a distrust of the European Court of Human Rights towards the Islamic headscarf itself.’

Moreover, the Court in S.A.S. accepts the securitising move of the face-veil presented by France. The referent ideals being threatened are ‘living together’ or social cohesion, and even communication. As previously demonstrated, this is not rooted in empirical evidence, or plausible logic regarding communication channels, but in a fear and prejudice towards the face-veil. The Court completes the securitisation by co-opting this angst instead of challenging it.

(ii) Patterns Two, Three, Four and Five: Consequences of Securitisation

The following patterns can be understood as a consequence of the securitisation discussed in Pattern One. Starting with Pattern Two, the overlap between the legitimate aims is likely the result of securitisation being the common denominator. In cases like El Morsli, the Court does not find the need to explicitly distinguish between public safety and public order in its proportionality analysis. Similarly, in Dahlab the hijab restriction was not only accepted to pursue all three legitimate aims (of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, public safety and public order), but the Court held that it was proportionate to all three aims without a separate analysis for each. The fluidity of the legitimate aim of public order particularly suggests a common rationale. This is testimony to a common and underlying logic of security framing: the legitimate aims are mere interchangeable labels invoked to pursue a common aim of curbing the same security threat. Pattern Four can also be attributed to this reasoning. Even when the usual legitimate or linked aims could not be relied upon in S.A.S., the Court relies upon a new concept of ‘living together’ and creates a new legal right to justify its link to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. That is because the security threat persists and must be curbed, regardless of which ‘window dressing’ label is invoked.

Moving onto Pattern Three, the lack of weight given to evidence is also attributable to the initial securitisation. As Huysman points out, ‘[i]nsecurity is a politically and socially constructed phenomenon’ – it is not necessarily contingent upon evidence;

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230 ibid 2680.
231 See Section 3(C)(iii).
232 See Section 3(B).
233 See Section 3(A).
234 This pattern permeates throughout Section Three.
and even if it is based on some evidential support, how one defines the situation or
governs it is also a constructed phenomenon.235 Neither are the fears and stereotypes
the Court adopts through its securitisation reliant upon the material facts. This pattern
is also linked to Pattern Five, because deference involves a low level of scrutiny over
the facts and evidence submitted. But why does the Court continually invoke the
margin of appreciation principle, as previously demonstrated, when it is
unwarranted?236 A clue may lie in Bigo’s assertion that security actors not only exchange ‘their fears and beliefs’, but also the ‘legitimacy they gain from struggles
against terrorists, criminals, spies, and counterfeiters’, which is transferred ‘toward other targets’.237 The legitimacy that states gain from their ‘struggles’ against security
threats is respected by the Court, which exhibits deference and invokes the margin of
appreciation principle to demonstrate an acknowledgement of this legitimacy. As
outlined in Section Two, the principle is justified by local expertise, which supports the
idea of transferred legitimacy.

In conclusion then, because the Court securitises the Hijab and Muslim women
(Pattern One), it finds the need to apply a low level of scrutiny and a wide margin of
appreciation (Patterns Three and Five), accepting new linked aims that justify the
persisting security threat (Pattern Four). This threat underlies all of the legitimate aims,
thus avoiding the need to delineate between them (Pattern Two).

6. Implications of Securitising the Hijab

The main focus of this paper has been to demonstrate that the ECtHR has securitised
the hijab, and that this approach plays an important role in the Court’s reasoning – this
is a significant finding in its own right. The wider implications of this securitisation are
complex enough to warrant their own respective studies.238 Thus, this section will not
attempt to explore these implications in any depth, but rather briefly draw attention to
two wider implications that warrant particular concern. First, the securitisation within
the ECtHR case law is likely to influence the approach of other supranational courts,
when or if they are approached with is
sues of hijab restriction. Second, the ECtHR’s
securitising decisions have real life consequences, particularly on visibly Muslim
women, as the Court, at the very least, could be perceived to legitimate their
oppression within the post-9/11 climate. Both of these implications further compound
the failure of international human rights law to protect the freedoms of visibly Muslim
women.

A. Spill-over Effects of ECtHR Securitisation on the Global Context of
International Human Rights Law

The influence of the ECtHR and the securitisation that pervades its case law should
not be understated. It is the ‘most active international court‘ and has issued over ten

236 For discussion of unwarranted invocation of margin of appreciation, see the end of Section 3(C)(ii)
and (iii).
237 Bigo (n 208) 63.
238 For example, exploring whether there is a relationship between judicial securitisation and hate crimes
could constitute the subject of a detailed analysis.
thousands of judgments over a 50-year period. Not only will the domestic courts of the Council of Europe Member States be affected by its reasoning, but judicial borrowing between international courts is likely to be facilitated by, as outlined in Section Two, the international legal texts. They have very similar provisions in regards to freedom of religion or belief, all providing almost identical limitations. It is likely then that other supranational courts may find ECtHR case law persuasive and guiding when interpreting the similar provisions of their own regional human rights charters.

In the European context, the CJEU has already followed suit in securitising the hijab. When dealing with its first cases involving religious discrimination, the CJEU in Achbita recently held that the dismissal of an employee who refused to remove her headscarf did not violate Anti-Discrimination Directive 2000/78/EC, either on direct or indirect discrimination. The internal rule of the company did not directly discriminate against Muslim women. And although it was ‘not inconceivable’ that it could indirectly discriminate against them, this was justified under the relevant provisions, since it pursued the legitimate aim of neutrality. Moreover, the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. As was the case in the ECtHR, the hijab is treated as a threat to neutrality, and inclusive neutrality is not considered in the proportionality assessment of the Luxembourg Court.

B. Legitimising Oppression

As has been outlined already, the ECtHR has largely upheld hijab restrictions, finding they do not violate Article 9 ECHR. It has been submitted that this stems from the Court securitising the hijab and Muslim women, which produces a number of counter-productive patterns, including unwarranted judicial deference. Not only does this result in an exhaustion of the possible legal avenues available to the applicants, but it also serves as a final vindication that the interference with their rights is warranted, at the highest and most binding judicial level.

Many authors have thus criticised the case law for essentially legitimising the oppression of Muslim women. Evans poignantly summarises the pejorative effect of Dahlab and Sahin:

> When those who are not Christians but whose rights have been violated can gain no relief from the Court because the Court employs stereotypes and refuses to engage with the complexity of modern religious pluralism, then religious freedom and pluralism are undermined and the notion of human rights degraded.

Brems views the Court in S.A.S. as having ‘legitimized a dominant majority group’s monopolizing of the entire public sphere and using the criminal law to force

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241 Framework Directive (n 80).
242 Achbita (n 240) para 30.
243 Ibid paras 35-43.
244 Evans 2006 (n 129) 73.
expressions of minority identity to conform to majority preference. Edwards echoes this sentiment, contending that S.A.S. ‘sends out the message that matters of interest and habit that may characterise a minority, where disapproved of by the majority, will in fact not be tolerated but simply eradicated and erased and extinguished’. Adenitire acknowledges that the outcome of the case has put an ‘outstanding arrow in the bow of advocates’ of burqa bans in other European countries, ‘who will now be able to claim that it has been sanctioned by the court’. Supranational courts, with their institutional capacity and far reaching influence, have the power to complete securitisations and legitimise what is seen by many as cloaked Islamophobia and the persecution of minorities. In a rare occurrence, the ECtHR acknowledged in S.A.S. that the hijab restriction in question was characterised by Islamophobic debates during the legislative phase, and that this risked ‘contributing to the consolidation of stereotypes’ and ‘encouraging the expression of intolerance’. The Court, however, seems oblivious to how their own judgments and reasoning run the very same risks. The recent Achbita judgment, for example, was hailed by far-right leaders across Europe. In light of this, it is worth listening to the voices of those affected by such judgments and their marginalising effect. When speaking on the face-veil ban, one French interviewee, Karima, said: ‘They say that it’s our husbands who are locking us away but it’s actually they who are locking us away. Now my husband doesn’t want me to go out alone as he saw how people were abusing me when he was with me’.

7. Conclusion

This paper has argued that the problematic patterns evident in the case law of the ECtHR, pertaining to hijab restrictions, stem from the Court’s securitisation of the hijab and Muslim women, and that this has serious implications for international human rights law globally and Muslim women personally. The failure of international human rights law to provide effective protection against hijab restrictions is thus inextricably linked to a judicial securitisation at the supranational court level. This finding of judicial securitisation correlates with the broader socio-political context mentioned in Section One, of increasing securitisation of Muslims following 9/11.

It does not follow from the hypothesis that securitisation is the only plausible reading of the case law. Indeed, many other readings of the case law, such as post-colonial feminism, are very plausible. Post-colonialism and feminism in particular have many overlaps with the broadened securitisation theory that has been relied upon, as is evidenced by the referencing of such academic perspectives throughout this paper.

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246 Brems (n 84) 904.
248 Adenitire (n 184) 44.
249 S.A.S. (n 62) para 149.
Instead, it is submitted that the modus operandi of the Court, which exhibits seemingly disconnected and counter-productive trends, can be convincingly and holistically understood through securitisation. It is hoped that this novel application of securitisation theory will inspire further scholarship into how Muslim women have been securitised by supranational courts, which is currently lacking. It is also hoped that this will inspire analysing the other rights mentioned in Section Two (relating to anti-discrimination, work, education, and private and family life, for example), or decisions pertaining to other minorities, such as Sikhs, through the lens of securitisation. It is through this new understanding that academia can begin to incisively critique the courts and hold them accountable to their own principles and human rights standards.

Finally, if the hijab has indeed been securitised, how can it be de-securitised? Understanding that securitisation has taken place is the first and crucial step. As Huysmans notes, a focus on security framing introduces a question to security actors: ‘to securitize or not to securitize?’. Essentially, it ‘opens up the option to develop security knowledge’ that frames issues in a way that ‘facilitates a political de-securitization’. De-securitisation is the ‘process of unmaking the fabrication of domains of insecurity’. Thus, the fears and unease that have been woven into hijab issues, by supranational courts, can be unwoven. Securitising moves put forward by states can and must be resisted by supranational courts if they are to deploy a more objective and rigorous scrutiny. Brems’ idea of adding evidential requirements, to assess whether legitimate aims are actually at stake, may help in this regard. But whether or not the hijab and Muslim women are de-securitised, the least that can be done is to acknowledge that they have been securitised.

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252 Huysmans 2006 (n 235) 125.
253 Brems (n 84) 904.