A note from the Editor

Welcome to the first edition of the 2018/2019 QMUL Undergraduate History Journal! The theme of this issue is Superpowers.

This is my first note to you as the new Editor-In-Chief, and I must give a big thank you to Jasmin Bath, who ran the Journal last year wonderfully.

The Journal team would also like to give a big thank you to all the students that contributed to the journal by submitting in their essays for this theme. Every single essay we received was informative, and a great read. Our editors worked hard to narrow these essays into just six essays which will be published in this essay.

I would like to thank every member of the QMUL History Journal, without whom the Journal could not survive and flourish. Thank you to all those who worked on the committee, your hard work is inspiring and it shows in the wonderful Journals that you have put out these past two years. I’d also like to welcome the new members to the committee. I look forward to working with you all!

You can find us on Twitter @QMULHJ, Facebook under ‘Queen Mary History Journal’ and by email at qmhistoryjournal@gmail.com. Should you have pieces that you wish to submit, or any general enquiries, please contact us.

Graciously Yours,
Iman Mustafa (Editor and Chief)
# Contents

What role did Britain Play in Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis?  
*Billie Rainer*  
4

Was the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America a marriage of convenience?  
*Olivia Martin*  
24

To what extent has class proved more significant a factor than gender in shaping men and women’s political behaviour?  
*Dominique Pope*  
35

Why did the United States go to war with Spain in 1898?  
*Freddie Stoker*  
55

Was Britain's entry to the European Community on 1 January 1973 simply the result of Edward Heath's personal agency?  
*Thomas Chadwick*  
59

What effect did the urban expansion of New York City have on the lives of working-class men and women who lived in the city between 1800-1840?  
*Jasmin Bath*  
89
What role did Britain play in Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Billie Rainer

The Cuban Missile Crisis marked a new age of the Cold War and, with the world on the brink of nuclear destruction, the crisis has often been reduced to a conflict between the two nuclear superpowers: America and Russia; omitting the role of smaller powers such as Britain in Kennedy’s management of the crisis.¹ Thus much of the historiographical focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis has examined events from the US and Soviet perspective, and American scholarship, especially the Camelot school of thought, has focused on creating a romantic and mythicised account of John F. Kennedy in an independent standoff against Nikita Khrushchev.² As a result, less attention has been paid to the role of other nations, including Britain. This essay, by contrast, will examine the Cuban Missile crisis through the prism of the Anglo-American relationship, discussing the role which Britain did indeed play as a figure to provide advice and reassurance to Kennedy during his management of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Britain’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis can easily be described as one which was present to offer advice and support to the Kennedy administration, rather than to consult the President

~ 4 ~
Superpowers
directly on how the crisis should be managed. There was truly little Macmillan could do to influence the course of events and discussions within the White House, primarily due to various internal pressures within the administration over the establishment of a naval blockade in Cuba. However, Macmillan was still able to voice his concern over what Khrushchev may do in Berlin if the US were to invade Cuba, and advise Kennedy to favour the blockade over an invasion of Cuba, providing Kennedy with the affirmation he desired. Turner has even suggested that the fundamental decisions over the crisis had already been made by the time information was conveyed to Macmillan, and the fact that Kennedy contacted Macmillan and asked his opinion on the situation highlights the value of the relationship between the two countries, whilst also reinforcing the idea that Kennedy was a man who needed reassurance.

Britain’s key role of reassuring Kennedy of his management of the crisis was especially apparent when considering US actions in Cuba and any wider implications or repercussions it may have in Berlin. It was feared that if Kennedy authorised an invasion of Cuba Khrushchev might use it as a bargaining counter to get the western powers out of Berlin. Macmillan’s anxieties over this are especially apparent in the telephone call between him and Kennedy on the 26th October. A Conversation between Ormsby-Gore and William R. Tyler similarly highlights the anxiety among the British government that American intervention in Cuba would have a detrimental effect
on the Berlin situation. Britain however, were not consulted on America’s choice to blockade or invade and Kennedy even seemed opposed to the idea of reaching out to Macmillan for counsel stating that ‘they’ll just object.’ This statement from Kennedy is revealing of his attitude towards the role Britain should play in his management of the crisis, and it can be argued that, although Kennedy wanted reassurance from Macmillan, he only wished to share information on matters that had already been decided upon, and only if he knew Macmillan would approve of the decision made. This is telling of the fatherly figure Kennedy saw in the Prime Minister, and the overall role Britain played in assuring Kennedy that he was acting correctly.

Developing this, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in his observation of the crisis argued that Macmillan’s replies to Kennedy featured nothing that the Americans had not already thought of, and therefore further highlights Britain’s role as simply just being informed of US policy which had already been decided. Furthermore, Rusk also states that Kennedy would not have been swayed by European voices, but the fact that Kennedy contacted Macmillan is of high importance, as it ultimately supports the view that the President was looking for affirmation on his Cuban policy, from this ‘father figure’ that he saw in Macmillan. However, this view of Macmillan and Britain as the father figure to Kennedy and the USA tends to romanticise the relationship between Kennedy and
Macmillan, and the influence the Prime Minister had over the President’s management of the crisis. Specifically, Richard Lamb maintains that Kennedy and US policy makers were influenced by Macmillan and altered their views to accommodate the PM’s opinions. Despite this romanticism, it is clear that the role Britain and Macmillan played was just to reassure Kennedy, and did not have as clear-cut of an effect on US policy as Lamb would suggest. This can specifically be seen within one of the many telephone calls between Kennedy and Macmillan which occurred during the crisis when Macmillan makes a suggestion to Kennedy on matters of immobilising the Thor missiles which were present in England at the time. Kennedy replies: ‘let me put that into the machinery’, an arguably polite way for Kennedy to ignore a suggestion which did not fit with his plans and overall management of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Later in the conversation, when Macmillan agrees on actions made by Kennedy, the President is more cooperative with the Prime Minister, reasserting the view that Britain’s role was to simply support and reassure.

In this context it is useful to consider the Camelot school of thought, and their effect on historiography, as they especially bolster the view that Britain had little influence on Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile crisis as a direct result of their creation of a mythicised history of the Kennedy administration. The sudden rush to establish John F. Kennedy as a martyr following his death in 1963
has ultimately clouded the judgement of these Camelot historians on his presidency, especially during the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.\textsuperscript{17} The Camelot school have established this ‘hero like’ image of Kennedy as the only arbiter of peace in the face of this unprecedented global nuclear threat, thus diminishing the role Macmillan and his government played in order to uphold this independent view of Kennedy.\textsuperscript{18} The issues raised by this historiographical school are particularly intriguing and can tell us a lot about the special relationship, especially when considering why they have chosen to diminish Britain’s role in the Kennedy’s management of the crisis.

This can be explained in two ways: either the Camelot school and popular media have omitted Britain’s role and portrayed the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis with Kennedy acting independently because Britain didn’t truly play a role, or Britain has been omitted purposefully by these historians to reinforce this romantic image of Kennedy, the American hero in an independent standoff between himself and Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{19 20} Through examination of conversations between Kennedy and Macmillan it is evident that the latter is the case. Britain did indeed play a role in the management of the crisis; a role which is often forgotten by Camelot historians and popular media as it does not fit in with their romanticised view of the Kennedy presidency. Specifically, the Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram T488/62 highlights the close
cooperation between the President and Prime Minister, with Kennedy urging the two to ‘act more closely together’ to meet the challenge of Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{21} Nigel Fisher has also suggested that Kennedy put a high premium on Macmillan’s advice and that the daily telephone calls and correspondence went far beyond the requirements of co-operation between allies.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, Kennedy himself even told Lord Home that he ‘valued being able to talk to Mr. Macmillan’, therefore supporting the claim that he was a leader who needed reassurance.\textsuperscript{23} The romanticised view of Kennedy presented by the Camelot school omits the role Britain, and Macmillan especially, played as a figure to reassure Kennedy of the decisions he made during the crisis.\textsuperscript{24} In regards to this however, it must be asserted that Britain’s role during this time was to advise, rather than consult the President directly on his policies and therefore it is understandable why these historians have omitted Macmillan from their telling of history as his role, although useful, was undoubtedly small especially in the ‘emerging age of the two superpowers’.\textsuperscript{25}

The power of personalities is especially significant when considering Britain’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as the overall Anglo-American relationship during the latter half of the twentieth century. It is evident that the personalities of the politicians in charge of the two countries undoubtedly influenced the strength of the Anglo-American relationship, and this can be seen through a
variety of peaks (cooperation during the early Cold War, and the increased interdependence during Kennedy and Macmillan’s leadership) and troughs (Britain’s imperial decline following the Second World War, and the disagreement over Suez) during events where individual personalities played a key role in the maintenance of the ‘Special Relationship’. The close personal relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan was highly influential in establishing Britain’s role to affirm Kennedy’s decisions during his management of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and was, as Alistair Horne argues, a time when the ‘special relationship reached a new peak’. It is clear that the era of the Kennedy administration and the Macmillan government was one of exceptional cooperation and excitement between the two powers, so much so that no other partnership within the Western alliance came as close as Kennedy and Macmillan’s relationship, allowing Britain to hold a unique role in Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis; a privileged position as the immediacy of the crisis had cut out the lesser powers, yet brought the two of them more intimately together.

This apparent intimacy between the two leaders arguably gave Macmillan and therefore Britain more authority to assure Kennedy that his actions were correct. It is also evident that the two men enjoyed a genuine friendship, which could only serve to further this role during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The frequency of meetings,
telephone calls and public presentation of the almost family-like relationship essentially painted an image of interdependence between the two countries, which, when considering the wider trend of the Anglo-American relationship, is far from the truth as the relationship between the two was indeed highly unbalanced at times.\textsuperscript{31} The wider historical context of the Anglo-American relationship is especially telling of the dynamics within Kennedy and Macmillan’s relationship during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This ‘special relationship’, from its beginning in 1945 through Winston Churchill’s efforts, although special, was not natural, requiring nurture and negotiation in order for it to survive.\textsuperscript{32} During a notable low point of the Anglo-American relationship: the Suez Crisis, Makins in a despatch to the Foreign Office argues that due to her imperial decline Britain had become increasingly reliant on the US, bringing about ‘subtle changes in the Anglo-American relationship’, which undoubtedly resulted in Britain appearing subordinate to the US.\textsuperscript{33} In relation to this, Dean Acheson stated that ‘Great Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role’, and his statement is quite telling of the dynamic between Kennedy and Macmillan as the latter was eager to find a role for Britain to play within the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis.\textsuperscript{34} This is evident within Macmillan’s Greeks and Romans analogy, which implied that the Greeks (the British) know best, and should guide the big, vulgar, and idle Romans (Americans).\textsuperscript{35} This is an arguably ‘naïve mentalité’ that Macmillan adopted when he
established Britain’s role as providing advice and reassurance to Kennedy during his management of the Cuban Missile Crisis.36

Similarly to Macmillan, David Ormsby-Gore and his close connection with the Kennedy family is especially significant when defining Britain’s role during the Cuban Missile Crisis. His appointment as ambassador to Washington in 1960 was highly influenced by his close personal links to John F. Kennedy, a relationship that granted him an exceptionally privileged position during Kennedy’s presidency.37 This relationship was present predominantly during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which other European ambassadors such as French ambassador Hervé Alphand were distinctly jealous of.38 Ormsby-Gore’s influence on John F. Kennedy was especially notable, with Robert Kennedy stating that his brother “would rather have his judgement than that of almost anybody else”.39 Also, Macmillan noted “he has established a remarkable position with Kennedy … a trusted friend”.40 This was a position which became increasingly valuable for the Anglo-American relationship during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, further reinforcing Britain’s role as an advisor to Kennedy. Due to his close relationship with Kennedy, Ormsby-Gore was often co-opted into many of the key meetings during the crisis, and it was this that provided Macmillan with the opportunity to use Ormsby-Gore as a conduit for his own views.41 This allowed Britain to have a more definite role and consult
Kennedy, rather than merely advising and reassuring him over decisions that had already been made.\textsuperscript{42}

The role Ormsby-Gore played during discussions over the movement of the Cuban naval quarantine, implemented from the 24\textsuperscript{th} October, was one of the significant contributions made by Britain to Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and allowed them to play a somewhat decisive role in Kennedy’s management of the crisis.\textsuperscript{43} It had been established that the quarantine line would stand at 800 miles from Cuba, however Ormsby-Gore, as Graham Allison has suggested, subverted the intentions of the President vis-à-vis moving the quarantine line from 800 miles to 500 miles from the Cuban coastline.\textsuperscript{44} Yet this was one of the only instances in which Britain played a role in consulting Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and it is clear that Kennedy himself was willing to listen to and utilise the information given to him by Ormsby-Gore wholly due to their close relationship and family ties, the significance of which was not lost on Macmillan.\textsuperscript{45} Despite this closeness, Ormsby-Gore and Kennedy’s relationship had a limited impact overall on Britain’s role as a consultant to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and it is evident that the movement of the Cuban quarantine was one of the only marked occasions where Britain played the role of the consultant rather than to simply advise and reassure Kennedy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis presented a new global threat which Gelber suggests exposed the dependence of Western Europe’s
hemispheric security on North America as it had never been exposed before, and ultimately highlighted Britain’s peripheral role in Kennedy’s management of the crisis: to provide an apparent united western front in the face of this unprecedented nuclear threat.\textsuperscript{46} It was important to paint this picture of interdependence between Britain and the United States, and propagandise it to their benefit. The efforts to do so can be seen within Kennedy’s exceptional use of television, especially his televised speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he was able to curate an image of composure, hope and strength which was crucial at the time. Similarly, the amount of filmed meetings between the two leaders available on the \textit{British Pathé} website archive highlights the necessity of publicly affirming the ‘special relationship’ in order to propagandise the relationship and present it as a close, almost family relationship in the face of expanding Soviet power and the threat presented by the Cuban Missile Crisis, when in reality it was, as discussed, highly unbalanced.\textsuperscript{47}

Britain’s role during Kennedy’s management of the Cuban Missile Crisis was undoubtedly to provide reassurance and support to the young president and, although this is an arguably small role, it was still significant; especially when considering the wider dynamics between the two countries during the entirety of the Anglo-American relationship. The role of individuals like Macmillan and Ormsby-Gore had a clear influence over Britain’s role during the Crisis and, arguably if not for their personalities and close relationships with Kennedy,
Superpowers

Britain would not have had as definite of a role in Kennedy’s management of the situation in Cuba. Although the role Britain played in reassuring Kennedy was inherently small, to such an extent that it has been omitted by some American scholars (especially the Camelot school), the fact that they even played a role is telling of the respect Kennedy had for the British, and the gravity of their opinions was not lost on the American president. Despite the emerging age of the superpowers and the loss of her empire, Britain managed to find a role – to reassure Kennedy of his actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis as a direct result of personal relationships paired with her reputation and knowledge as a nation which was respected and held in esteem by John F. Kennedy.
Notes


8 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, 26 October 1962 (FRUS doc. 87): “at this stage any movement by you may produce a result in Berlin ... that’s the danger now”.

9 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:15p.m.


13 L.V. Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 182.


18 Ibid., p. 29

19 Ibid., p. 22, also see Thirteen Days (Roger Donaldson, 2000) and The Kennedy’s (Joel Surnow, 2011) for popular media interpretations of Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis which downplay or omit Macmillan’s role.


21 President Kennedy to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram T488/62 (TNA PREM I I/3689)


36 *Ibid.*, p.6

37 Jackie Kennedy’s Letters to David Ormsby-Gore,  

39 Jackie Kennedy’s Letters to David Ormsby-Gore,


43 L.V. Scott, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 113.


47 https://www.britishpathe.com/search/query/kennedy+and+Macmillan

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Superpowers


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**Lectures**
Superpowers


Was the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America a marriage of convenience?

Olivia Martin

Britain and America have maintained a particularly close relationship for many decades now which began to be most strongly emphasized when the two countries formed an allegiance during World War Two and has continued since then. This essay will discuss the relationship in various areas, i.e. military, economic, political and linguistic, and analyse its nature and benefits, mutual or not, of the alliance in these different spheres. This essay will also seek to determine, via the aforementioned factors, whether the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America was a marriage of convenience, concluding that it was a marriage of convenience, particularly for America. However, for Britain, the partnership was more essential.

One element of the ‘special relationship’ that this essay will discuss is the military aspect. Many historians, including John Dumbrell and Axel Schäfer, argue that the basis of the relationship is rooted in ‘military and intelligence cooperation’ that took off during the Second World War. Both during and after the war, both
countries saw each other as their primary ally, with the US stating that they considered Britain their ‘principle partner and ally…from the military point of view’, and Britain, in return, sought ‘military guarantees from the United States’, especially as the war was significantly longer than had been anticipated by either party.49 This supports the argument that the ‘special relationship’ was a marriage of convenience as both countries were seeking military gains from the other: Britain wanting the support of the wealthy and powerful United States and America, perhaps, looking to capitalise on Britain’s historically iconic naval forces and military prestige. This also sets up the argument outlined in the introduction that the relationship was unequal with Britain wanting to hold onto the coattails of the next great power and America allowing them to do so relatively amicably. This argument is proposed by Leigh-Phippard, who states that ‘there can be little doubt that the British Government chose … to pursue an interdependent relationship with the United States’ once the war was over.50 This British attitude also implies that the relationship had been a military marriage of convenience during the war without a set plan to continue the alliance in the longer term. If there had been a long-term agreement, Britain would surely not have felt the need to chase America for a partnership at the close of the war.

The ‘special relationship’ can also be examined in regard to the economic links between the two countries as both had the
opportunity to gain financially from the other, if they were to maintain their alliance long-term. In the post-war years, the United States made it clear that they were keen to align themselves with and, potentially benefit from, Britain’s historical allegiances, particularly what was then known as the British Commonwealth (now the Commonwealth of Nations). In a 1950 State Department Paper, it was noted that ‘the Commonwealth is of greater importance, economically...than any other existing grouping’.

This clearly indicates that the United States was looking for a cut of the revenue that Britain earned from the Commonwealth. However, this ‘money-hungry’ attitude was not entirely one-sided as Britain looked to America for significant financial aid to rebuild its infrastructure and economy after the war. Leigh-Phippard argues that ‘Britain was reliant on American financial help to restore its economy’, which is supported by the fact that the American aid program, that became known as the Marshall Plan, intended to give Britain and its European allies a vast $13.5 billion. This does imply that the United States treated its relationship with Britain as a marriage of convenience as they could see the advantages of aligning themselves with Britain and its international economic network, although America did not necessarily need this alliance, it was definitely an easier way to build on its existing economic standing. For Britain, however, the economic element of the alliance was not a convenience but a necessity. Britain had fought in the Second World War from the beginning and had
Superpowers

suffered huge damages: both in terms of loss of life, leading to a significantly reduced workforce, and having spent huge amounts of money on sustaining their position on the battlefield. As has already been mentioned, Britain’s economy was ruined by the war to the extent that it could not have survived without the significant aid that Britain received from the United States in the following years. This again emphasizes the unbalanced nature of the relationship: America believed it to be a marriage of convenience that they didn’t necessarily need but preferred to have; whereas, Britain believed it to be a lifeline which was imperative to the nation’s economic survival.

This essay will now focus on another element of the ‘special relationship’, the political alliance. Historians such as David Reynolds argue that Britain latched onto the United States so strongly in order to maintain its political prowess on the global stage, describing the relationship as ‘a device used by a declining power [Britain] ... trying to harness a rising power to serve its own ends’. This implies that Britain was manipulating the relationship to its advantage by aligning itself with a new, large power, America, in an attempt to maintain its own relevance. This is supported by the fact that, although the strength of the political alliance has ebbed and flowed with the changes in Prime Ministers and Presidents, it is usually the British that pulls the two back together. A prime example of this being the

~ 27 ~
friendship between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan, great personal friends with one friend of Reagan stating that they ‘literally loved one another’, who also recognised the benefits of a positive political relationship.\textsuperscript{54} Richard Aldous states that Thatcher realised that a political allegiance with the United States allowed her ‘to power in the furtherance of British interests’, which supports Reynolds’s argument that Britain’s long-term goal in this relationship was political, an attempt to maintain world influence.\textsuperscript{55} This also implies that the relationship was a marriage of convenience for both countries: as America felt no harm by allowing Britain to associate with them politically in order to benefit from the affiliation. In this respect, it does not seem as though Britain absolutely needed the United States by their side to remain relevant and globally influential. However, maintaining the ‘special relationship’ was an easier way to achieve the same goal than going it alone, making the partnership a marriage of convenience.

The ‘special relationship’ can also be considered in terms of the shared primary language of the two countries. The military, economic and political factors discussed earlier in this essay are not constants and not necessarily a basis for a long-term union of two nations. Furthermore, ‘the concept of a special relationship is not uniquely Anglo-American’.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, it would seem that there must have been something else that bound the United States and Britain
in their ‘special relationship’ for longer with Reynolds arguing that the relationship was ‘facilitated by the shared language’.\(^57\) This would suggest that the relationship was a marriage of convenience for the politicians involved as it is most definitely simpler to maintain close ties with someone who speaks the same language, as the formality of having a translator is unnecessary. However, in the modern era, when many high-profile politicians speak multiple languages and there are many excellent and reliable translators, a language barrier does not seem like so difficult an issue as to prioritise a relationship with a shared-language country on this basis alone. In addition to this, the fact that British and American English are not exactly identical could sometimes cause more confusion than translating from a different language entirely, with the ‘diametrically opposite British and US usages’ of some words causing difficulty at conferences.\(^58\) The correlation of the two nations sharing a primary language does not necessarily cause a strong alliance to be made. Therefore, the shared language on its own does not strongly indicate that the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States was a marriage of convenience; instead it seems to have been an added bonus to an already mutually beneficial partnership.

In conclusion, the ‘special relationship’ can be considered a marriage of convenience on all fronts from the perspective of the United States. This is because they did not have to come to Britain’s
aid with military power during the war or economic support after it, nor did they desperately need Britain’s shoulder to stand on in order to gain and exert global political influence. They most likely did the aforementioned as they felt a partnership with Britain would be a relatively easier way to gain and maintain a higher global standing than they had had before the Second World War, compared to doing it alone. For Britain, on the other hand, the ‘special relationship’ was not a marriage of convenience but a partnership of necessity. They started to lose steam towards the end of the war, were financially ruined by it and were facing a gradual decline in influence in the global arena, which was difficult to come to terms with for a nation which had once had an Empire on which the sun never set. Therefore, they desperately needed and wanted the wealth and power that the United States was gaining. Although the relationship could be seen to have been started by Britain as a military marriage of convenience, it was quickly realised that Britain could gain a lot more from maintaining the relationship than they could achieve on their own thus the partnership became a lifeline for them. To summarise, the ‘special relationship’ was a marriage of convenience to the United States but an essential support system for Great Britain.
48 John Dumbrell & Axel Schäfer, America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (Routledge, 2009), p. 3.


50 Leigh-Phippard, Congress and US Military Aid to Britain, p. 21.

51 State Department Paper, 1950 [accessed on QMPlus].


55 Ibid., p. 260.


58 *Ibid*.

59 ‘The Empire on which the Sun never sets’, National Public Library, available at [http://nationalpubliclibrary.net/articles/eng/The_empire_on_which_the_sunset_never_sets](http://nationalpubliclibrary.net/articles/eng/The_empire_on_which_the_sunset_never_sets) [accessed 24/3/2018].
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What role did the Anglo-American Relationship Play in the Falklands

Dominique Pope

The Falklands conflict saw tensions arise in what was otherwise perceived to be a harmonious period in the Anglo-American relationship. President Reagan’s administration approached the Falklands with what can at best be described as ambivalence, which was a far cry from the support that Margaret Thatcher sought from her principle ally. The difficult position that the US government found itself in arose from differing views on the Falklands within the administration itself, ranging from the sympathies of Caspar Weinberger to the hostility of Jeane Kirkpatrick. Thus the Anglo-American relationship could not play a central role in the conflict, and this is not to mention the complicating factor of the US’s Cold War alliance with Argentina at the time. These difficulties were hardly met with sympathy from Thatcher, who was nothing short of outraged that the Americans attempted to carve out an honest broker role with complete neutrality on the issue of sovereignty over the islands. However, the role of the Anglo-American relationship was far from static and indeed Reagan became increasingly supportive as the war waged on. Furthermore, it would
be misleading to imply that the Anglo-American relationship played too limited a role during the Falklands, as from the beginning the Americans provided vital assistance in terms of logistics and intelligence through unregulated backchannels. As such the relationship did play some part in the conflict, although this was largely kept from the public. The fact that the Falklands is held in public memory as a British war with much of the media coverage and public perception centring on Thatcher herself speaks volumes about the significance of the Anglo-American relationship in the conflict. Whilst it was undoubtedly present, it was not central much to Thatcher’s dismay. To her, if the Falklands conflict was a test of American commitment to its UK ally on an exclusive level, ultimately the United States failed.¹

It is first important to contextualise the Falklands within the existing framework of Thatcher and Reagan’s relationship. Both were established leaders by the spring of 1982 and had met each other on numerous occasions with correspondences dating back to the mid-1970s. The two had a shared affinity in that they had both been continually underestimated throughout their careers; Thatcher primarily because of her lower middle-class origins and her gender, and Reagan because of his acting career leading to questions about his capacity to run a country. Despite concerns about the president in Britain – perhaps best epitomised by Spitting Image’s regular ‘the President’s brain is missing’ segment – Reagan had surprisingly
considerable anti-communist credentials stemming from his time as president of the Screen Actors Guild where he worked to root out communist influence.\(^2\) Thatcher too had shown herself to be an uncompromising figure in her handling of the Brixton riots and the Irish hunger strikes in 1981. In Reagan the British prime minister found an ideological soulmate, and the Anglo-American relationship was afforded a “special sanctity” under Thatcher.\(^3\) The two were from the right of their respective parties and both pursued policies such as lowering income tax and reducing the size of the state with their mutual assistance perhaps strengthening each other’s resolve.\(^4\) This shared ideology of neoliberalism was altogether unprecedented on this level in the history of Anglo-American relations. However, it was in the cause of anti-communism that Thatcher and Reagan were most obviously united on the international stage, though ironically it was the United States’ approach to the Cold War that would prove to be the point of contention in the Falklands that would ultimately limit the role that the Anglo-American relationship had to play. As with many aspects of Thatcher’s premiership, it is difficult to examine her relationship with Reagan as it has come to be shrouded by myth; the popular perception of a romantic and at times flirtatious relationship between the two holds elements of truth, but it glazes over events such as the Falklands wherein tensions between the two countries arose, and trust was damaged on a personal level.
What Thatcher did not expect was that the American State Department would initially see something as serious as the Argentine invasion of the Falklands as being reminiscent of a “comic opera”.\(^5\) It was evident from the beginning of April 1982 that there was a fundamental misunderstanding as to the significance of Argentine aggression, meaning that the Anglo-American relationship could not be central to the conflict as there was no united front. Just as the British perhaps did not perceive the threat of Castro in Cuba in the same way that the Americans did, so the latter did not view Galtieri in the same way as the British.\(^6\) It is perhaps understandable that the Americans could not quite comprehend Thatcher’s uncompromising position when it came to negotiating sovereignty of the Falklands; every indicator that Britain gave prior to the invasion taking place seemed to suggest a lack of interest in South America. John Nott had been orchestrating serious spending cuts as Defence Secretary in order to reorient Britain’s military strength from conventional weaponry – with most cuts targeting the Navy – towards nuclear technology to adapt to the challenges of the Cold War. At the same time, Thatcher had shown herself to have little attachment to British imperial legacies with her policy on her colonial possessions being one of leaseback, as had just been the case with Hong Kong.\(^7\) Confronting a right-wing, anti-communist regime seemed nonsensical within the broader context of the Cold War for someone with the aforementioned anti-communist credentials. Thus to the
Superpowers

Americans the decision to send a task force seemed antithetical to the Thatcher government’s outlook, and this fundamental divergence meant that the balance of involvement in the Falklands was undoubtedly tipped towards the British.

The Americans also had their own interests to pursue in foreign affairs which dictated the role they chose to play far more than any historic loyalty to Britain could ever hope to. Since the Second World War the Americans had had a somewhat uneasy alliance with the Argentinians, something that some in the Reagan administration were keen to maintain. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador at the United Nations, was most hostile to Britain and made her own position clear by keeping a dinner appointment at the Argentine Embassy on the evening of the invasion. Her distinction between ‘bad’ totalitarian communist states and ‘sometimes tolerable’ authoritarian regimes meant that she did not share Thatcher’s outrage at Argentina’s invasion and similarly did not wish to pursue Secretary of State Al Haig’s suggestion of a more pro-British policy on the Falklands.8 Thus the United States took on an arbiter role sending Haig between Britain and the Falklands to attempt to negotiate some form of sovereignty settlement; it was in US interests to diffuse tensions between two important allies in the struggle against communism. This is illustrative of a larger rift between Britain and the United States in the broader context of the Cold War: whereas Reagan had an eye to ‘winning’ the Cold War and was more
inclined to use aggression to meet his ends, Britain – and Thatcher particularly – were more hesitant in using force. Whilst this is partially due to the fact that Britain simply did not have the same resources as the States it is also due to Thatcher’s staunch adherence to international law and her belief in national self-determination. This was seen clearly in the dispute over Grenada, but it was also seen in the Falklands with the USA’s policy of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ towards Argentina leaving them unable to condemn the Falklands invasion in such stark terms.9 The lack of common purpose which had historically brought the two nations together meant that the Anglo-American role did not feature greatly in the conflict.

However, this is not to say that the Americans completely abandoned the British for the sake of neutrality. From the outset vital assistance was offered by the anglophile Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger at a speed that was altogether unprecedented in the Pentagon’s bureaucracy.10 The most significant example of this was British use of Ascension Island: with the Falklands being around eight thousand miles away from British shores, Ascension Island – which was only around four thousand miles away – was an extremely significant stopping point throughout the conflict.11 This assistance also included ammunition and invaluable intelligence which was only set to increase as American opinion came down on the side of the British at the end of April 1982. The position of favourability towards Britain was not necessarily something that the USA kept covert
domestically either; as early as mid-April support for Thatcher’s endeavour could be seen in papers such as the *New York Times*, who claimed that the sharing of intelligence was “based on cooperation dating back to World War II”, a reminder of the Anglo-American relationship’s historical integrity.\(^{12}\) Thus although the Americans did not offer the uninhibited support that Thatcher desired, there was a definite propensity to lean towards the British in the conflict. The Anglo-American relationship certainly did not take centre stage in the Falklands, especially not publicly in the international arena, but American assistance proved vital to Britain’s war effort and it is doubtful that victory would have been reached if it had not been for the use of US intelligence or Ascension Island, for instance. Beyond this the very fact that Reagan essentially allowed a European power to intervene in the western hemisphere to repossess a colony was a measure of how significant the Anglo-American relationship was, as it is difficult to imagine the same favour being extended to other allies.\(^{13}\)

Part of America’s logic in supporting the British, even if it was on a low scale, was undoubtedly influenced by events of a similar nature in the past. The implications of the Argentine invasion were not considered in a vacuum and one memory that loomed large was that of the 1957 Suez Crisis wherein Britain and France invaded Egypt without US backing, leading to a humiliating retreat several days later. Whilst historians have debated the degree to which this was a
watershed moment in Anglo-American relations, the crisis resulted in the balance of the alliance tipping irreversibly towards the Americans, and Britain’s role in the world was damaged on a symbolic level epitomising the nation’s decline which had been taking place over the past decades.\textsuperscript{14} It was recognised in the USA that Britain could not be left humiliated on the world stage in having a country such as Argentina successfully invading an island with a population of just under 2000 people. As such it was somewhat imperative that the Anglo-American relationship should play some part in helping the British to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which might jeopardise the western alliance at a critical point in the Cold War. Concerns about the cost of the conflict did not just centre on the issue of prestige; ironically just as Germany won the 1982 Eurovision Song Contest with the song ‘Ein bißchen Frieden’ or ‘A Little Peace’, the first British casualty in the Falklands took place, raising questions about the human costs Britain was willing to pay as the death toll was only set to increase. In terms of military capacity, Britain was clearly the dominant force in the conflict, but it was unthinkable that Thatcher would employ sophisticated and expensive weaponry on Argentina, certainly not nuclear. The American position was thus neutral on the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands, but not over the issue of Argentine aggression, and as such once the fighting on the ground began, Reagan used a more condemnatory tone towards the Argentines.\textsuperscript{15} With American backing, the British could hope to
Superpowers

maintain their international prestige and mitigate the costs of the conflict, both in terms of military resources and in human casualties, giving the so-called ‘special relationship’ a considerable role in the Falklands.

It is important to consider the role that the Anglo-American alliance played in public perceptions of the conflict as it informs our understanding as to how the British and American peoples saw themselves, each other and their relationship. Despite some degree of assistance from the US, it is worth noting that the Falklands endeavour was essentially viewed as a British conflict that echoed the First and Second World War concepts of fighting alone. There were of course some opponents of the war in Britain with the likes of Elvis Costello’s ‘Shipbuilding’, and Billy Bragg’s claim that the Falklands was his political awakening – something for which Britain was undoubtedly grateful – with his song ‘Island of No Return’. However, dissenters were a vast minority, as for many the Falklands had become a straightforward narrative of British servicemen laying down their lives for the cause of freedom – and Thatcher was perfectly in tune with the attitude of the mob. Certainly there was a large degree of romanticism surrounding the conflict in Britain, with some viewing it as a moment of national renewal that the country had desperately needed since Suez. The public was consumed by a jingoistic fervour that was simply not matched in the USA perhaps best epitomised by *The Sun’s* infamous headline after the dubious...
sinking of the Belgrano which simply read ‘Gotcha’.

Whilst the sinking of the Belgrano in itself was not necessarily popular, there was still a sense of collective purpose within Britain during the Falklands, and thus there was not necessarily a role for the United States to play in this narrative. The role of the Anglo-American relationship was further minimised in this way as the Falklands became increasingly centred on Thatcher herself. Indeed, Enoch Powell claimed that this was an opportunity for the so-called Iron Lady to show the world from which metal she was really made.

It was slightly ironic that stronger support for the Falklands endeavour was offered from the Opposition benches than from the Americans; Michael Foot, who had made a name for himself in his anti-appeasement writings during the Second World War, agreed that “the people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute right to look at us at this moment of their desperate plight”, with commentators at the time dubbing this speech as his finest hour. Thus the fact that the Falklands took on this narrative as a British war led by a determined prime minister meant that the Anglo-American relationship could not be featured heavily as it would take away from the sense of national purpose that had been whipped up. However, this is not to suggest that the Reagan administration were entirely unaware of Britain’s domestic situation. Although there was a degree of misunderstanding about the strategic significance of the Falklands for Britain, the political significance was a lot clearer: the Thatcher
administration was drastically unpopular by 1982, particularly as the controversial 1981 budget caused unemployment to skyrocket during a period of recession. Though perhaps not a leading principle, doubtless in Thatcher’s mind it was recognised that victory in the Falklands could give her a much-needed popularity boost on the back of newfound patriotism at home. The aforementioned Foot speech was therefore not simply a matter of a strong performance in the House of Commons in so much as it was evidence that Foot could be a credible electoral force. Reagan too recognised this, and thus to some degree the Americans took on a so-called ‘save Maggie’ mission to help her achieve victory at home, meaning that the Anglo-American relationship played an implicit role in terms of the domestic repercussions of the Falklands.

In a broader sense the role that the Anglo-American relationship played during the Falklands was indicative of a rift between the two countries in what would become the final phase of the Cold War. As was touched upon, Britain and the United States had fundamentally different approaches to the Cold War with the Americans sometimes acting unpredictably and even unnecessarily aggressive at times. The unreliability of the USA in backing Britain during the Falklands illustrates this tension within the Anglo-American relationship and how it only worked up to the point that it ceased to serve their respective national interests. The fact that the Americans would almost turn a blind eye to Argentine aggression for
the sake of maintaining an anti-Soviet alliance in the Cold War was something that could lead to their principles being questioned; Reagan’s support for Galtieri, albeit half-hearted, was unfathomable to Thatcher who strongly resented the fact that Britain was essentially being compared to an aggressive, fascist junta in Argentina. This was against the backdrop of the US already losing a considerable amount of their moral high ground during the Cold War, most notably with Vietnam. Episodes such as the Falklands may illustrate that there was nothing constant about the Anglo-American relationship, although it should be noted that the very fact that Thatcher approached Reagan with such high expectations and was subsequently wounded when he did not deliver speaks of a strong affinity between Britain and the United States. There was something natural in the way in which Thatcher turned to Reagan in her hour of need, suggesting that this was a relationship that transcended the usual diplomatic niceties alliances usually conjured up. Indeed, Thatcher received stronger support for the Falklands from the French president Mitterrand, in part due to their shared colonial histories, and yet Thatcher consistently misspelled his name – a far cry from the familiar, sentimental ‘Ron’ that she used to address the American president.21

Despite a rosy image of the Anglo-American relationship under Thatcher and Reagan, the Falklands is evidence that this was not always the case. As Richard Aldous argues fervently there were
deep, fundamental differences between Thatcher and Reagan that should not be overlooked. Whilst on one level of course the experience of the Falklands conflict may illustrate small diplomatic misunderstandings that would explain why the Anglo-American relationship did not take on a central role, on another it illustrates larger features of the somewhat uneasy alliance. The US’s support came altogether too late in Thatcher’s mind, and though there had been a considerable degree of assistance from the outset of the conflict which proved essential, the general reluctance and lack of understanding on America’s part frustrated the prime minister, and as such the Anglo-American relationship never took centre stage in the Falklands. However, the very fact that Thatcher had such high expectations of the United States shows the significance of the relationship in itself. Beyond individuals there is something implicit in the events of the Falklands which convey something about the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. The fact that the US Defense department was able to quickly provide such support illustrates the historical channels between the two nations that were wholly unique. The fact that the Reagan administration felt any sense of obligation towards Britain at all considering the issue of the Falklands was essentially colonial illustrates how there was a certain gravitational pull between Britain and America that was inescapable. Certainly this was exacerbated by the ideological kindship of Thatcher and Reagan, but it is worth noting that even under the Eurocentric Heath
administration, the Anglo-American relationship was never completely ignored. Thus although the alliance did not play a key role in the Falklands, that Thatcher and Reagan were both able to bounce back from a dip in the alliance speaks volumes about its durability and strength.
Superpowers

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~ 52 ~


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Why did the United States go to war with Spain in 1898?

Freddie Stoker

The Spanish-American War was a significant event in the history of the United States; it was a key step in placing itself firmly among the great world powers. The motivations of the public support and of the McKinley administration are complex and intertwined. This essay will argue that it was primarily imperialism that drove the U.S. into war. This then raises the question: why was America imperialistic in 1898? There was a general and widespread desire for expansionism and imperialism among influential Americans and policy makers, a desire driven by economic factors but most importantly driven by a competition with European states. This essay will start by looking at the short term factors that were important in breaking down Spanish-American relations; it will then ask whether the media had a part to play in provoking a response from the public and the government. The last section will address imperialism as the main factor leading to war, looking at the reasons why America was imperialistic and arguing that competition with European states was the most important one.
There were two short term factors that led to the failure of diplomacy between the U.S. and Spain: the De Lome letter and the destruction of the Maine battleship. The De Lome letter written by the Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. was meant for Spain but was supposedly intercepted by Cubans and given to the New York Journal two months before the official start of the war. It insulted President McKinley, calling him ‘weak.’ Joseph Smith argues that this ‘contributed to a further undermining of the peace process.’

Six days after the publication of the letter, the Maine battleship blew up in Havana harbour and 266 people died. Spain was blamed for the disaster and after this war seemed likely; Roosevelt claimed that ‘war became inevitable’ with many other contemporaries claiming that, if the Maine hadn’t blown up, war might have been avoided.

Diplomatic relations were harmed; however, the U.S. was already receptive to the idea of war, for example among U.S. officials there was a rejection of information contrary to the view that Spain was responsible for blowing the Maine up. There were factors leading to these diplomatic crises that created an atmosphere ready for war.

Some suggest that the media were responsible for creating the atmosphere which led to U.S. involvement. Miller notes that cultural producers in the U.S. created ‘patterns of ideological production (that) helped to unify... the nation on questions of enormous political, military, economic, and cultural importance.’

~ 56 ~
Superpowers

This case, the question of importance was the Spanish-American war. The yellow press published stories about the De Lome letter and the Maine; the journal wrote: ‘War! Sure! Maine destroyed by Spanish.’ The Journal described the De Lome letter as ‘the Worst Insult to the United States in its History.’ Indeed, headlines told harrowing tales of Cuban hardship. This could have played a part in mobilizing support for war. Although the impact of the press was limited, they merely compounded a feeling that the public had already. Small notes that the press sold similar stories during the Ten Years’ War but that it did not lead to U.S. intervention. The public and politicians were now receptive to this due to imperialism, resulting largely from increased competition with European states.

The Spanish-American war, for the United States, was imperial; U.S. actions in the lead up to the War highlight this view and Small notes that nearly everyone was ‘receptive to the idea of expansion.’ Fry understands imperialism as the control of one state over another through either ‘formal (via annexations, protectorates, or military occupations) or informal (via economic control, cultural domination or threat of intervention) means’ as does this essay. There was a general desire for some kind of empire, control, and domination over other states. Indeed, leading up to the War, Frederick Jackson Turners’ thesis in Closing the American Frontier that American expansion westward had been vital to its national
psyche was used by influential people such as Roosevelt to advocate ‘extra-territorial expansion.’ This concept was prevalent in the lead up to war and characterised the outcome as America undertook a series of formal and informal imperialist policies such as denying total sovereignty to the Cubans and Filipinos after the war. If imperialism is to blame, then how are these imperialistic impulses explained? Economic factors but most importantly a desire for world power resulted in competition with Europe which led to imperialism and therefore to war with Spain.

It is, however, possible to suggest that U.S. imperialism and a desire to interfere was influenced by humanitarian imperialism as war was portrayed as the liberation of Cuba and the Philippines from Spanish exploitation but also as the civilisation of them as ‘backward’ nations. Those who signed up to fight were clearly influenced by the idea of it being a noble cause and were genuinely moved by the atrocities and had a desire to help Cubans; Perez cites the diaries of men who fought and the reason most had for signing up was to help Cubans. Indeed, powerful politicians and soldiers saw the war as a liberating and civilising mission; the U.S. military governor claimed America was now ‘responsible for the welfare of the people, politically, mentally and morally.’ Furthermore, McKinley himself claimed that ‘there was nothing left for us to do but take them all (Filipinos) and to educate and uplift and civilise and Christianize
Perhaps then imperialism can be explained as humanitarian. However, the element of domination and control suggests it was more of a power game than truly humanitarian; the treatment of the Philippines and Cuba after the war highlights that it was more of a quest for power than humane. The denial of true sovereignty and the essentially autocratic rule of the U.S. in the two countries illustrate this; the suppression of the Philippine revolution led to 18,000 Filipino casualties and McKinley and the U.S. cut Cuba out of negotiations after the war. U.S. interests in challenging European power were more important in explaining imperialism and were higher on the agenda than a liberating or civilising mission.

Economic factors partly explain the imperialist impulse; some historians argue that the U.S. was more motivated by the acquisition of markets than of territory and that the domestic economic situation was responsible for its desire to expand. Towards the end of the 1900s when the U.S. experienced depression, McKinley declared that his primary motive when he came into power was to lead America out of it. Perhaps war with Spain was part of this? The general belief among businesses and economists was that supply exceeded demand and the solution to depression laid in offsetting surplus in overseas markets, suggesting that the domestic economic situation led to imperial impulse and war. Indeed, the U.S. purchased about 80-90% of Cuba’s total exports by 1888 and
Cuba was therefore an important relationship to preserve and enhance. McCormick has pointed to a desire to dominate the China market, citing a partnership between government and business in leading to war. McCormick argued that the U.S. wanted to create an informal empire by dominating the world markets as to do this they needed Spanish territory in the Pacific to use as coaling stations on route to China. Indeed, the fact that they annexed Hawaii as well as Spanish territory indicated their desire for a route to China as a kind of market imperialism was at work in leading to war. McCormick shows that plans to create outposts were formulated before the war, the McKinley administration saw Manila and Guam primarily as coaling stations to the Orient. Therefore, economic factors partly explain this imperialism. Fry has demonstrated some limitations to the economic argument: for example, the China market made up less than 1% of U.S. exports in 1910 and he highlights that businesses were mostly neutral or even against war until the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila. Although, economic factors were important, there was a genuine belief that offsetting the surplus would solve depression and China was seen as a valuable market in this. Even if the extent of trade the U.S. had wanted didn’t materialise immediately, the intent to dominate it was still there in the lead up to war. A kind of market imperialism is important in explaining the war.
The most important factor explaining the U.S. imperialism that led to war is competition with European states. The Monroe Doctrine and its principles were key to U.S. foreign policy leading up to and following the war; it opposed European presence in the Western hemisphere and stated that it would harm U.S. interests. Paterson claimed that this was a ‘consistent goal of U.S. foreign policy.’

Therefore, the removal of Spain from the Americas was attractive and an obvious benefit of winning the war. Indeed, the desire to obtain outposts to China and to monopolize the world economic market can also be seen to be competitive and aimed at increasing U.S. world power. Powerful politicians and citizens advocated an increasing presence around the world, largely in response to European powers. Three such men—Roosevelt, Lodge and Hearst—supported an expansionist and Weltpolitik foreign policy to compete with other world powers.

They were very outspoken in their views and gained a lot of support. Lodge claimed that ‘the great nations [were] rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and their present defence all the waste places of the earth (and the U.S.) much not fall out of the line of march’ so the imperialism was motivated by a wish to counter to European power.

Furthermore, Mahan, in the widely read book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, claimed that global power was desirable, especially in achieving great naval power. Indeed, many in the U.S. took on these ideas and used them to condone imperialist expansion and therefore the war with Spain.
U.S. actions after the war further highlight the competition with Europe. The denial of sovereignty to Cuba and the Philippines can be seen as an attempt to prevent it being transferred from Spain to anyone else. America imposed a protectorate, legislated by the Platt amendment, over Cuba which meant, among other things, that they could not enter into treaties with other powers.\(^{27}\) This paternalistic control over Cuba and the Philippines as well as the annexation of territories not under Spanish control in years following the war were attempts to challenge European power and increase their own.

In conclusion, imperialism led to the U.S. decision to go to war and was caused partly by economic factors and a desire to dominate world markets. The most important cause of this yearning for increased world power status and hegemony was a competition with European states. It was this that made the Maine disaster and the De Lome letter so damaging for Spanish-American relations. The humanitarian imperial argument is limited; American self-interest was the priority in deciding to go to war and in determining U.S. actions after it. This is what drove the U.S. into war with Spain in 1898.
Superpowers

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11 Ibid, p 119.


13 Ibid, p 35.

14 Ibid, p 37.


21 Ibid, pp 158-159.

22 Fry, “Imperialism, American Style,” p 56.

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Superpowers

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Superpowers


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Was Britain's entry to the European Community on 1 January 1973 simply the result of Edward Heath's personal agency?

Thomas Chadwick

Britain's entry to the European Economic Community (EEC) was a remarkable feat of both persistence and international diplomacy. After the 1963 and 1967 vetoes to entry, the Heath government's decision to apply for a third time was politically courageous and became the most lasting legacy of the 1970-1974 government. The eventual success of this bid was in large part due to the dedicated 'Europeanism' of Edward Heath who saw entry as being central to his vision of a modernised and restructured Britain. Heath's personal agency in setting this key pillar of government policy was bolstered by a number of other government ministers including the very capable and ever-dependable Alec Douglas-Home at the Foreign Office and Geoffrey Rippon leading the negotiations in Brussels. Whilst Heath's persistence was central to the government's decision to apply for entry, it would substantially distort the reality and
complexity of government policy-making to attribute entry only to the actions of the Prime Minister.

Before considering the application itself and Heath's role in it, it is important to briefly consider the dominance of any Prime Minister. George Jones argues that a Prime Minister's influence over policy has been exaggerated, emphasising that with the 'many technical and complex factors...no man is able to survey the whole field.' To some extent, Jones's assessment is also applicable to Heath. Whilst the Prime Minister is unable to completely direct and routinely intervene in the entirety of government policy, he is able to set its tone. With Heath's renowned Europeanism, dating at least from his maiden speech of 1950, he was able to set the direction for the government's negotiations despite being unable to manage its day-to-day business. Yet despite this, there is a historiographical consensus which has personally attributed entry to Heath's personal agency. Peter Hennessy identifies 1 January 1973 as a moment unparalleled in British history and which is directly attributable to Heath's own agency. Hennessy argues that entry was more prominent than the creation of the British Empire as 'neither the acquisition nor the disposal of Empire can be fixed to a particular man or moment.' John Young is in agreement with Hennessy, arguing that entry was undoubtedly ‘a great success’ for the Prime Minister.
personally who Young deems as being genuinely ‘communautaire in behaviour, [and] committed to the European ideal.’

Edward Heath’s first interaction with Europe in government came during his time as Lord Privy Seal under Harold Macmillan. Heath's biographer, Philip Ziegler, attributes Heath's insistence on entry, both in opposition and government, to the ‘wounding rebuff' in 1963 of de Gaulle's veto. Heath’s view that EEC entry would modernise the British economy in large part corresponds with Harold Macmillan’s ‘cold douche’ theory, based on the principle that 'we could develop more wealth for everyone than we could separately.' John Campbell supports this assessment, arguing that Heath’s repeated emphasis on creating ‘an outward-looking Europe, aware of its global responsibilities’ was coupled with his primary objective of gaining access to the Community-wide market. Heath saw Community membership as the method by which Britain could create a 'broader platform, a wider economic base, from which British influence could be exercised and amplified.' Heath’s support for the ‘cold douche’ model remained throughout his period in opposition from 1964-1970 and was rigorously defended throughout his time as Prime Minister and also his lengthy post-premiership career. Peter Hennessy has situated Heath’s support for the cold douche theory in the context of the postwar consensus. Hennessy argues that Heath was ‘enabling the essentials of the postwar settlement (full
employment, social peace and as high a degree of consensus as possible between the ‘social partners’ to be preserved and built upon.¹⁸

Heath had a personal command of the detailed complexities of the Macmillan negotiations which was carried over into the 1964-65 Conservative opposition’s policy review. His promotion to Shadow Chancellor during Alec Douglas-Home’s brief spell as Leader of the Opposition propelled him into Rab Butler’s recently vacated shoes as the Conservative Party’s overall policy impresario, allowing him to exert a substantial influence over the party’s policy. The Heath-led policy review has been characterised by John Ramsden as being the ‘most exhaustive that any party has ever conducted.’ Ramsden argues that Heath’s ‘well-developed understanding of the importance of process as well as content in politics’ made the subsequent Heath Shadow Cabinet ‘extraordinarily well-prepared for office.’ It was the quality of this preparation and Heath’s clarity in the party’s support for Europe which prevented an extensive and potentially destructive debate within the party at large. It was as a result of Heath’s personal agency that the Conservatives did not choose to trawl for anti-Europe votes whilst in opposition as Labour sought to in 1970-1974 and throughout the 1980s. Interestingly, Heath also managed to convince the Conservative Party of the importance of maintaining its commitment to Europe in opposition
despite his personal unpopularity amongst members of his own party at times. Therefore, the Conservative Party's commitment to entry was maintained largely as a result of Heath's agency first as Shadow Chancellor and then as Leader of the Opposition from 1964-1970.

As Prime Minister, Heath exerted particular influence on the Cabinet in moving the government towards European entry. Whilst his appointment of senior ministers is of central importance to his involvement with the application, his use of Cabinet and Cabinet committees can be seen as a tool of prime ministerial influence. Peter Hennessy’s theory of Cabinet overload throughout the 1960s and 1970s is of particular importance in understanding how Heath used his time in Cabinet. Alec Douglas-Home’s recommendations for an efficient Cabinet able to pass the Prime Minister’s business were centred on 'a chain of government committees each charged to take decisions, resulting in a Cabinet agenda which is cleared of all but the absolute essentials.'¹¹ Heath’s creation of the Europe Cabinet Committee appears to conform almost entirely to the Home doctrine of Cabinet government. Heath's use of the Europe Committee allowed ministers the opportunity to extensively discuss items of European business without risking a split in full Cabinet.¹² Although delegating these items to a Cabinet committee appears to inhibit his personal agency, by preventing a split in the Cabinet Heath enhanced the unity of his government and therefore his own authority.
Hennessy has made a similar analysis of Cabinet committees and sub-committees in Harold Wilson’s government during 1967-68, where Wilson, much like Heath, sought to remove key strategic decisions from full Cabinet.\textsuperscript{13} In summary, the use of the European subcommittee allowed Heath to maintain a tight grip on the overall direction of Cabinet deliberations whilst intentionally allowing other ministers, primarily 'to deal with the more detailed aspects of it in the European Committee.'\textsuperscript{14}

Number 10’s, and thus Heath’s, agency was clearly strengthened by the Prime Minister’s distribution of ministerial responsibilities between himself, Rippon and Douglas-Home. This was coupled with the creation of a Europe Unit in the Cabinet Office, reporting to Heath and the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend. The creation of the Europe Unit allowed Heath to harness the full weight of official advice whilst enabling him to exert a considerable level of control over the briefing work done by officials for the negotiations. Heath’s dependence on senior civil servants including William Armstrong, Burke Trend and Robert Armstrong can be seen in the structure of the Europe Unit, which was headed by a second Permanent Secretary and staffed entirely by civil servants.\textsuperscript{15} Heath’s particularly close relationship with William Armstrong (Head of the Home Civil Service) is noteworthy as he particularly valued Armstrong’s advice and shared a great deal of his politics, including
those on Europe.16 Whilst Heath’s relationship with Burke Trend was not as warm, he valued his integrity, as shown by Philip Ziegler’s view of him as ‘the epitome of the correct civil servant’ in contrast to Heath’s unofficial ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ William Armstrong.17 Heath’s comfort with and dependence on senior civil servants makes his concentration of the Europe Unit in the Cabinet Office particularly understandable. By placing this key unit in the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister’s domain, rather than the Foreign Office, Heath manipulated their Whitehall struggle for influence to enhance his own agency as Prime Minister.

Geoffrey Rippon’s appointment as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (with responsibility for negotiations with the EEC) is revealing in its reflection on Heath’s personal agency. In the biggest foreign policy decision of the decade, and one which the Foreign Office largely agreed with, Rippon’s requirement to report directly to the Prime Minister is telling as an exercise in Number 10’s dominance of the negotiations. Although unintentional on the part of Edward Heath, the relative absence of Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home throughout the negotiations prevented the kind of tensions that Geoffrey Howe thought were bound to develop between a Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.18 Douglas-Home’s involvement in the European negotiations and discussions in Cabinet were coupled with his management of the rest of the UK’s foreign relations. His

~ 74 ~
extensive experience of foreign affairs and reputation for competence and stability allowed Heath to leave the majority of foreign affairs to Douglas-Home whilst he himself concentrated the full force of Number 10’s energies on the European negotiations. Richard Thorpe briefly commented on the Heath-Home dimension in his seminal biography of Alec Douglas-Home published in 1997, highlighting how the Heath-Home relationship was one of ‘fruitful harmony’ with Heath being able to build on Douglas-Home’s commitment to entry as Foreign Secretary (1960-1963) and opposition leader.19

One of Heath's biographers, Philip Ziegler, highlights the importance of Rippon reporting to the Prime Minister in ensuring the success of personal diplomacy. In this separation of responsibilities, Ziegler argues that Rippon was responsible for handling the negotiations with the Six as a whole whilst Heath took closer control of the negotiations that would have to occur with France alone.20 Ziegler also argues that Heath’s experience of Foreign Office negotiations in the Macmillan bid encouraged him to overrule the Foreign Office’s traditional ‘divide and rule strategy’ in favour of a personal negotiation with President Pompidou.21 It was this personal diplomacy between the Prime Minister and the French President that facilitated the lifting of General de Gaulle’s veto which had hung over British membership since 1963. John Young highlights the importance
of Heath's visit in assuring Pompidou of Heath's 'sincere commitment to a European future.'

Despite recognising the importance of Heath's achievement in talking Pompidou round to British entry, it was facilitated by factors other than solely Edward Heath’s personal agency. Whilst this crucial meeting was in large part made possible by negotiations between Christopher Soames (British Ambassador to France) and Michael Jobert (Secretary-General at the Élysée Palace), it is also important to consider the change in French attitudes towards EEC expansion since Pompidou’s election in 1969. The importance of the change in French government attitudes was recognised by Number 10 in minutes of a meeting between Heath and Jack Marshall (Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand) in May 1971. The minutes recognised that 'in the new atmosphere there was a much greater chance of working out satisfactory arrangements on outstanding issues.' Whilst the British government relished the potential of this new atmosphere, it did serve in part to reassure the traditional French dominated power balance in the EEC. The French government’s realisation of the need to end Sterling's global reserve status and encourage Britain to adapt to EEC market conditions allowed Pompidou to justify British entry on France’s terms. Young argues convincingly, albeit somewhat cynically, that this was part of a clever strategy by Pompidou to convince Britain to pay a substantial contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the price of entry.
Uwe Kitzinger’s analysis is particularly perceptive about the more hardline tone of French policy in early 1971:

It was not until the deadlock had crystallized at the multilateral level, not in other words until France had made clear that it was in her power to insist on conditions which no British government was likely to be willing to accept, that Georges Pompidou could reckon to obtain the maximum advantage from a direct approach by Edward Heath. A great deal of the bargaining manoeuvres in the early part of 1971 could thus in a sense be construed as signals to "come up and see me some time".26

By agreeing to a summit on the terms that France demanded 'as a precursor to the resolution of the major issues at Brussels' as Daniel Furby and Kitzinger highlight, the Heath government reaffirmed France's dominance of proceedings and the self-proclaimed French leadership of Europe.27

As Heath squared British entry with Pompidou, Germany’s willingness to accept British entry was more easily achieved because of Willy Brandt’s willingness to expand the Community. John Young argues that Brandt’s decision not to attempt to force France to agree to British membership was part of a consistent trend in German foreign policy not to create a Franco-German rift over European enlargement.28 Heath wrote in his memoirs that Brandt’s Ostpolitik
was coupled with a determination to enlarge the European Community to include Britain with the aim of creating a common European foreign policy. Philip Ziegler is in agreement with John Young about Germany’s reluctance to push France towards British entry and emphasised the need to use German influence in Paris with great discretion. Ziegler also argues that the Federal Republic’s growing strength was a cause of alarm for the French government and its acceptance of British entry was, as Kitzinger argues, designed to reinforce French leadership. Therefore, Germany’s willingness to allow Britain entry to the Community also satisfied France’s desire to curtail growing German dominance, thus clearing both major geopolitical obstacles to British entry. This clearly points toward wider geopolitical factors being of greater significance than the personal agency of Edward Heath, but it does demonstrate the growing accord to British entry, which Heath recognised when applying.

Once Britain’s entry to the Community had been agreed by the Six in late June 1971, the actions of the Heath government domestically on Europe were particularly agentic in moving towards the signature of the Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972. Heath’s decision not to offer a referendum, at this time still a largely alien constitutional device, reinforced the supremacy of Parliament to decide Britain’s future in relation to Europe. Despite the possibility of losing the vote because of the opposition of Harold Wilson and the
Superpowers

Powellite anti-Europe wing of his own party, Heath’s decision not to take the issue to the country gave him a greater control over events than Wilson had in 1975 after the Callaghan-led renegotiations. Young highlights the commitment that Heath gave to only take Britain into Europe with the ‘full-hearted consent’ of both Parliament and people, suggesting that Heath reneged on a commitment to a referendum.\(^{32}\) Whilst Heath participated in the 1975 referendum, it seems more than likely that Heath’s aversion to referenda meant that his references to the consent of the people were most likely to be referring to the House of Commons and Heath’s notion of the consenting Europeanism of ‘rational’ people.\(^{33}\) Young does, however, recognise that by delaying the parliamentary vote until after the recess, Heath allowed the Conservative whips time to put pressure on Conservative ‘anti’ MPs to support the government.\(^{34}\) Heath’s eventual agreement to Francis Pym’s proposal to hold a free vote encouraged just 39 Conservative MPs to vote against entry (39 who were likely to have defied a three-line whip had Heath followed Carrington and Douglas-Home’s advice to hold a whipped vote). Coupled with Roy Jenkins’s rebellion along with 68 other Labour MPs, the government achieved a majority of 356 to 244 in favour of entry in principle, much greater than expected and more directly attributable to Heath’s agency than a referendum. Heath’s decision not to call a referendum on entry greatly reinforced his ability to encourage entry, unlike Norway which had rejected membership by
referendum simultaneously to events in Westminster. Had Heath followed Tony Benn’s proposal for a national binary referendum on entry, as Wilson did in 1975, and lost, both Heath’s personal agency and that of any Prime Minister would be severely, perhaps irrevocably, damaged on constitutional matters.

As Prime Minister, Edward Heath achieved a considerable level of personal agency in relation to Europe. His personal knowledge of and deep commitment to the ideals of European union allowed him to exert considerable influence over his colleagues in Cabinet and over the direction of negotiations in Brussels. The structure of his government, including his choice of Alec Douglas-Home as Foreign Secretary, and his close relationship with senior officials allowed him to best manage his time to have a close involvement in entry. Whilst Heath has rightly received the credit for initiating the move to entry at a domestic level, international geopolitical shifts including the post-de Gaulle political climate in France and Germany’s willingness to widen European integration coalesced to facilitate British accession.
Notes


7Ibid, p.335.

8 Professor Peter Hennessy, “Premiership: ‘The Somersaulting Moderniser’ Edward Heath, 1970-74” (Gresham College, 1997), available at https://s3-eu-west-

Ibid.


For Heath’s reliance on No.10 staff see Peter Hennessy, ‘Somersaulting Moderniser’ (Gresham), p.10. Also see Heath’s recollections in Edward
Heath, The Course of My Life on friendships with what Hennessy calls Heath's ‘surrogate family.’

16 For Armstrong’s relationship with Heath, see Ziegler, Heath, p.250.

17 Both Ibid.


20 Ziegler, Heath, p.273.

21 Ibid.


30 Ziegler, Heath, p.275.

31 Ibid.


33 Note: ‘rational’ – a favourite Heath term, which he frequently levelled against Mrs Thatcher later. Heath used ‘rational’ as a way of convincing Cabinet and Party of the need to adopt the policy without great controversy. Key to his idea of the inevitability of embracing Britain’s European destiny.

34 Ibid.
Superpowers

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What effect did the urban expansion of New York City have on the lives of working-class men and women who lived in the city between 1800-1840?

Jasmin Bath

By 1840, urban expansion had radically affected the lives of the working classes in New York City [NYC]. With the advent of industrialization, which aided in expanding the city, the family production system of the preindustrial era was replaced by a system of wage labour which would reign supreme for decades to follow. However, not only did this have extreme effects on the economic development of the city, it also significantly altered the social and economic relations of the city’s working classes. As this essay will prove, by altering their economic role, urban expansion significantly affected the social relations between working-men and women and also between women of different classes. As working-class women entered the marketplace and became wage labourers, it not only gave them a sense of independence as now they had a wage all of their own, but they also came under scrutiny from middle-class women by not adhering to ideals of ‘true womanhood’. By escaping the traditional realm of the ‘private’ sphere, working-class women not only threatened men’s place within the labour market but also threatened the status of womanhood itself.
Therefore, although this essay will focus on working-class women, it is only by understanding how urban expansion affected the wider New York economy and the development of a male working-class that a true understanding of the effect of urban expansion on women can be reached. As a result, this essay will take a very wide-ranging view of the period at hand: by explaining the economic system before urban expansion and how the city’s economy transformed with its transition to become an industrial metropolis by the 1840s. Within this will be interwoven discussion of how the working-classes developed and started to be affected by this economic change. Finally, this essay will end by focusing specifically on working-class women and how they were affected by this expansion.

Urban expansion or urbanisation began at the end of the eighteenth century. As the rest of main land Europe became engrossed in wars, America was able to capture European international trade. Given that New York City had one of the most prominent ports in the country, this growth in international trade and even interregional trade meant that NYC’s economy grew enormously by the 1820s. For example, the NY port managed to increase the value of its imports by $6.2 million between the 1790s and 1807, which created important financial growth for the creation of infrastructure and urban development of the city which continued throughout the nineteenth century. Although economic growth is important in the expansion of the city, it was also the growth in the city’s population which was crucial to its urban expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, NYC had become a
hub for immigration both from abroad and within the boundary of the United States itself. The development of the New York port, as well as the growth in industrialisation, created important job opportunities which aided the urban expansion of the city. It is this which Geographers have often cited as the greatest signifier of urban expansion, the concentration of ‘labour power’ in one area and thus the industrial process. By drawing people to NYC, urban expansion, industrialisation and the development of capitalism are all intimately combined. Consequently, throughout this essay the effects of industrialisation and capitalism are often treated as the effects of urban expansion also. Thus, by drawing people to the city, urban expansion was incredibly important in creating an entire class of workers in NY which had not existed beforehand. As a result, the first effect of urban expansion was the creation of working-class communities, in which all other effects of urban expansion would be based.¹

Before New York City’s growth as an industrial power house, much of the labour was supplied by family production and artisanal labour. Throughout the eighteenth century and until the late 1810s, the main source of revenue for working families was income made by male labourers in traditional crafts such as tailoring and shoe-making. These male labourers would have been trained by skilled artisans as young apprentices, developing their skills alongside their employers, being paid not in wages but in shelter, food and training. This economic system, which had existed since the sixteenth century, had managed to provide subsistence to most families without the
need for women to fully enter into the labour system, allowing them for the most part to remain in the domestic sphere of the home. However, if women did need to work to supplement the earnings of their husband, they would have undertaken traditionally female jobs such as domestic service, street selling, and work within the ‘putting-out’ system. The ‘putting-out’ system, beginning in the colonial era, saw women produce cheap but low-quality shirts and trousers that would then be given to a tailor to sell on. Although this did little to drastically alter the NYC economy and male prospects in the labour market, it was very beginning of a process which would include women in the labour market.²

Therefore, in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, there was a clear gender division in which women were, in the most part, spatially constrained to the home and more domestic settings. This was clear not only within the economic systems at work between 1800-20 but also within the deep ideological beliefs of New York’s citizens. Dating right back to the colonial era, even women saw themselves as having a “narrow sphere” in “domestick affairs” as one pre-revolutionary female writes.³ This illustrates the pervasiveness of the separation of genders into different spatial areas, both metaphorically and literally with women being dependent on their husbands, fathers and brothers to provide incomes.⁴ Women were not expected to have economic independence in the form of paid work; their biggest role, especially after the American Revolution, was to be good wives and educate their children on civic virtues, all things they could do from
within the home.\textsuperscript{5} However, as urban expansion began, both working-class men and women had to cope with the changing economic realities of industrialisation, urbanisation and the early development of capitalism. The ‘traditional’ roles changed drastically. Working-class women could no longer just exist within the ‘private sphere’ as status and spatial restrictions started to be questioned.\textsuperscript{6}

By 1820, the artisanal labour system which dominated NYC’s economy at the beginning of the nineteenth century had begun to decline. As the city expanded with the expansion of markets, better transportation systems and easier access to labour, NYC became a hub for mass immigration. It became clear to artisanal entrepreneurs and merchants that more profit could be made than the current labour system provided.\textsuperscript{7} Furthermore, given that the industrial revolution in Britain meant that there was an influx of cheap goods, there were further incentives for merchants to reform the labour process by minimising their outgoing costs. Therefore, there was a turn away from artisanal labour and towards waged labour which allowed for a maximisation of profit. For example, apprentices were now paid in wages, rather than ‘customary obligations for room, board and education’.\textsuperscript{8} This new economic system, however, was far from stable and the new class of wage labourers could not always guarantee that work would be there for them, a situation that was made worse by the constant supply of poor immigrant workers and, within a short amount of time, women.\textsuperscript{9}
However, this change to the wage labour system did not just affect men; it also hugely changed the economic lives of women. Merchant bosses, for example, looked towards the ‘putting-out’ system for low paid workers to produce a vast amount of cheap goods. This created a whole new system of labour in which women began to be more dominate. This new system was known as the ‘Outside’ system and would become notorious for its poor pay and working conditions. The ‘Outside’ system allowed women to work in their own households for wages and gave employers the ability to expand outside of their workshops given the limited space the city had for industrial factories. This system would be incredibly important to urban development as it opened up New York City, not only to new locations for industry, but also new workers. By allowing women to be wage labourers from within their home, there was an illusion that the traditional role of women was being retained in this new economy. Domesticity now became ‘practical necessity of industrial capitalism’; however, the public and private spheres became blurred for working-class women in a way they had not been before.  

Moreover, this stark transition from the artisan system of labour to that of wage labour reordered the social relations in which the working-class existed. It created what Christine Stansell has called ‘proletarian dependency: the state in which workers have no means of livelihood other than their own ability to labour’ making the working-classes dependent on wage labour and wages to sustain themselves. However, given that this work paid less and was unstable, it meant that more women had to enter
Superpowers

the workforce in order to ensure that they could survive. This increased importance on the labour of women affected relations between working-class men and women. As Stansell has demonstrated the deterioration of male independence and complete control over the household as women gained wage saw men try to enforce the subservience of women by force. Even Trade Unions, instead of advocating for better conditions for working-class women, started to suggest that men should be paid enough so that women did not have to work and could go back to their traditional role as domestic housewife and mother. It is made clear in one statement by the National Trades Union in 1836 that women in the workplace meant that a husband could not ‘perform the duties of the household’. By allowing women in to the work place—what was historically a male dominated sphere—it threatened working-class notions of what it meant to be a man in this period. Consequently, as urban expansion led to the altering of women’s economic role within society, it led to a complete re-evaluation between both working-class men and women and even led to a crisis about where working-class men stood in this new system of labour.

Nevertheless, the creation of wage labour is in itself very important. Wage labour created the very foundation of the working classes in NYC and thus this was the first and perhaps most significant effect of urban expansion. It was the realisation that workers were being subordinated by capital which made working-class act in, what E. P. Thompson has called a ‘class way’, despite their differences. Although the working class was far from a
homogenous identity, both working-class men and women came together in the city in order to protect their rights as workers, indulge in ‘working-class activities’ at the Bowery and create a new identity in the city. Thus, urban expansion became incredibly important by changing the labour system in the city, and creating the conditions in which a new class could be created. It was the very creation of this class after 1820 on which all other effects felt by the working-class would be based.

Historian Sean Wilentz has followed a very similar argument in his book *Chants Democratic*. He argues that the break-down of artisanal labour into a wage labour system was incredibly important in effecting the lives of working classes in New York City. However, there is a lack of meaningful analysis into the lives of working-class women and how wage labour, urban expansion and capitalism affected their lives specifically. This is not only a weakness of Wilentz’s work but the wider historiography around capitalism and urban development. As Amy Dru Stanley has argued, ‘problems of sex appear to lie outside the optic of a new history of capitalism’. As a result, this essay will show the importance of women and gender to understanding the effects of urban development on the working-classes. It is women’s relationship to the urban space and the industrial setting, which was growing within it, which would change labour relationships and give women a sense of independence on one hand, and oppressing them in another.
With urban expansion and the development of an industrial economy, an emphasis has been placed on the need to retain the idea that women belonged in the private, domestic sphere of the home. As historian Barbara Welter argues in her foundational essay, ‘The Cult of True Womanhood’, as a result of the changing social and economic relations of American society with the advent of industrialisation, literature tried to reinforce the idea that women should remain within the domestic sphere as ‘true women’. Piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity were the four characteristics which were seen as making ‘true womanhood’; however, perhaps the most important was ‘domesticity’ (domesticity is the idea that women belonged in the home). Therefore, there was an unprecedented emphasis on trying to keep women as moral guardians, uncorrected by the effects of urban expansion. This was done, not only to ensure the saviour of women, but also of men. Although Welter specifically looks at middle-class women in New England, the ‘Cult of True Womanhood’ extended along both class and regional lines. The nature of working-class women’s lives would come to be defined by the expectations of womanhood. The Outside System which dominated female wage labour was accepted because it placed women inside the home, where their job as wife and mother could be retained as well providing cheap labour to capitalist bosses. Therefore, the ideas of true womanhood, domesticity and women’s place within the private sphere all strengthened as the city expanded and women’s role within the economy started to question the strict gender divisions of societal obligation.
The cult of True Womanhood was also used by women of the middle-classes to justify their own action into the lives of the working-classes. Middle-class ‘urban ladies’ saw it as their duty to ‘reform’ the lives of ‘poor but industrious’ women who had fallen morally from the virtuous pedestal on which middle-class women sat.\(^\text{24}\) This is clear from the copious amounts of charity work which was carried out by these urban ladies in the first half of the nineteenth century which made an emphasis on working with the worthy, deserving poor women. They required seeing evidence, such as marriage certificates and character references from each person seeking their help before they decided to help them.\(^\text{25}\) This illustrates two important effects of urban expansion on the lives of working-class women: the first is that middle-class urban ladies now had a need to interact with working-class women as they saw them as citizens that needed to be saved; the second effect is that very need for these urban ladies to set up charities suggests that working-class women had to face horrific conditions. The possibility of being unable to feed, clothe and provide shelter for your family was ever-present, a consequence of the new capitalist system which had developed by 1840.\(^\text{26}\)
However to suggest that urban expansion only had negative effects on the lives of working-class women would be incorrect. NYC became a place of migration for single young women looking for work where they departed from the dependence of their family homes to move to boarding houses in the city in which they had wages all of their own. This new-found freedom away from the obligations of their family home and submissiveness to their fathers meant that they could embrace the city in ways in which no other class has done before. Therefore, single women in particular embraced some of the things the city had to offer, defying middle-class standards of domesticity to fight for their own sense of freedom within an already ideologically restrictive world. Nowhere was this new sense of freedom and independence seen more than on the Bowery. The Bowery, located in the fifteenth ward, was a promenade which was home to various shops, amusement and entertainment outlets at a price which working-class communities could enjoy. It proved “that however poor may be the

Figure 1- One of the Galls, Sketches of New York Bowery Girl No. 3, 1846,
condition of the American family” they had a sense of autonomy crafting their own vehicles of entertainment and leisure time. Working-class women would use the little disposable wages they had left in order to engage in the Bowery life and do what they could to reject middle-class notions of bourgeois female respectability. Bowery girls had an ‘exhilarating appearance’ as they dressed in a combination of colours and patterns [see figure 1], with clothing becoming a way to express pride in their class and sex. This open display through their bright clothing rejected middle-class notions of ‘True Womanhood’, working-class women would not remain submissive, they would use their new-found independence to express rather than hide themselves. As a result, despite the problems that came with urban expansion and the oppression that industrialisation brought working-class women in the form of poor working conditions and poor pay, urban expansion also brought more positive opportunities. Consequently, urban expansion allowed single working-class women to escape the bonds of the patriarchal family and live their own lives dictated by their own small sense of independence which wages gave them.

The urban expansion of New York City had significant effects on the working-classes of New York City. The impact of expansion, industrialisation and capitalism changed labour systems and labour relations, which would alter not only the economic development of the city but the social development of those labouring within that system. Urban expansion, by bringing women into wage labour, altered not only women’s own sense of independence, but
also altered the way they interacted with men of the same class as them and women in the class above them. As a result, this essay goes a long way in proving the important of understanding the effect urban development had on the lives of the working-classes and particular working-class women. Too much of recent scholarship has failed to show the importance of gender in capitalist development such as that seen in New York between 1800 and 1840. This essay proves beyond anything the importance of marrying these two fields. Consequently, urban expansion radically affected the lives of working-class men and women with gender and sex being just as important to the development of urban expansion, class and capitalism as any other historical lens.\textsuperscript{30}
Notes


~ 102 ~
Superpowers


6 Stansell, *City of Women*, xi


8 Wilentz, *Chants Democratic*, 33

9 Stansell, *City of Women*, 44


11 Wilentz, *Chants Democratic*, 5,110

12 Stansell, *City of Women*, 44

13 Wilentz, *Chants Democratic*, 5; Christine Stansell, *City of Women*, 3-4, 108

14 Ibid, 77-78


~ 103 ~
The creation of working-class movements and associations were also an important effect of urban expansion, but something beyond the scope of the direction of this essay. See For discussions of the political class associations see Ronald Formisano, *For the People*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)

19 Amy Dru Stanley, “Histories of Capitalism and Sex Difference”, *Journal of the Early Republic*, 36:2, (Summer 2016) 349


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26 ibid, *City of Women*, 42

27 ibid 84, 89, 92; George G. Foster, *New York Naked*, (New York: 1851), 142

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~ 112 ~
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